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Overview  
 
 
The worldwide labour market participation of women of working age continues to lag behind 
that of men. According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), in the beginning of the 
21st century, the global share of women at working age (between 15 and 74 years) in the 
labour force is 54 percent, compared to over 80 percent male participation. According to the 
European Commission, across the 25 EU Member States in 2003, the employment rate for 
women was 55 percent compared to 71 percent for men. In many -not necessarily the 
poorest - regions of the world, women’s labour market participation is actually much lower 
than men's. This goes especially for mothers with young children. The ILO as well as the 
European Commission stress that women’s lower participation in the labour market exposes 
them to a higher risk of poverty and social exclusion. At the same time, the persisting gender 
employment gap is costly not only for women, but for the society as a whole. From an 
economic perspective, the gender employment gap represents a huge untapped source of 
potential talents. For this reason, one can say that the labour market loses a lot of valuable 
resources, the more so as women’s qualifications have increased continuously during the 
last decades. Consequently, one might suggest that in many countries, economic growth lies 
below its potential and an increase of female labour market participation would provide a 
considerable boost to the economy.  
 
In order to prevent women from income poverty and to take advantage of women’s potential 
for the labour market, both the ILO and the European Union have set the target to raise 
female labour market participation significantly within the next years. To promote gender 
equality in decent work, the ILO has launched a Gender Promotion Programme (GENPROM) 
set up within the Employment Sector to enhance activities for gender mainstreaming in 
employment creation. The European Union has set the Lisbon target to increase female 
labour force participation to 60% in 2010, which involves a marked acceleration of the trend 
in the number of women at work when compared to previous decades, in particular for 
Mediterranean countries, which lag behind by far.   
 
The political will to promote women’s labour market participation is backed up by the 
scientific finding that gender equality in terms of education and employment promotes 
macroeconomic outcomes. The finding seems intuitive, yet, it was observed only quite 
recently. Before 1950, in economics little attention was given to women’s and men’s different 
roles in the economy. In the 1960s and 1970s there was an increasing interest in women’s 
economic role because women’s labour market participation had continued to increase. Yet, 
this interest was primarily influential in microeconomics (process of intra-household decision 
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making, labour supply function). In macroeconomics, even today most models refer mainly to 
neoclassical determinants of economic development such as technology and the capital 
stock (along with institutions and trade) and do not have gender as an integral part of their 
analysis. 
 
The present research offers a detailed investigation of the interactions between macro-
determinants, gender aspects of the labour market and family policies. The first chapter 
discusses interactions between women’s labour market participation and GDP growth. The 
second chapter presents an empirical analysis of the impact of GDP on women’s labour 
market participation. The third chapter discusses the impact of family policies on mothers’ 
employment patterns in Europe, completed by a comparative case study for Germany and 
France. 
 
More precisely, in the first chapter, concerning the link between GDP (growth) and female 
labour market participation, both theoretical and empirical findings are taken into account. 
The analysis shows that, whereas economists today agree that the impact of female labour 
market participation on GDP is strictly positive, the reverse impact of GDP on female labour 
market participation is not as clear. 
 
 
 
Firstly, I show how endogenous growth models suggest a positive impact of women’s 
education and labour market participation on GDP  due to their impact on a country’s human 
capital stock. In a next step, I show how empirical studies give evidence of the fact that 
gender discrimination in education and employment has a negative impact on GDP, which 
implies that gender inequality is costly to economic development. In the next step, I find out 
that, whereas a series of studies, theoretical and empirical ones, clearly prove that female 
labour market participation promotes GDP, economists today still disagree about the inverse 
impact of economic growth on female labour market participation. In the literature, one often 
finds the common assumption that economic development promotes gender equality. Yet, 
there are two different theoretical approaches, one that suggests a positive impact and 
another that suggests that GDP growth first lowers female labour market participation at 
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early stages of development and then increases it in the middle and long run. I demonstrate 
that recent empirical studies assume a convex impact of GDP on female labour market 
participation: that means that at intermediate income per capita levels, female labour market 
participation is lower than at low as well as at high levels of income per capita. By discussing 
measurement and estimation problems, I point out that the present time-series and cross-
country studies do not globally confirm the assumed convex impact.  
 
The first chapter reveals a research gap in this field, which is the empirical evidence of a 
convex impact of GDP on female labour market participation. Answering the question of 
whether there is a purely positive or rather a convex impact of GDP on female labour market 
participation is crucial. If GDP growth can have a negative impact on women’s labour market 
participation, simply trusting the equalising effects of economic growth is not advisable for 
policy makers who intend to effectively promote gender equality. If they do so, women’s 
potential remains underutilised, and this lowers a country’s growth performance.  
 
Hence, the second chapter offers an empirical analysis that attempts to close this research 
gap.  
 
 
 
 
     
The mutual interactions between GDP and female labour market participation present a 
particular challenge to the estimation model. The two-way causality between the variable 
“female labour market participation” and the variable “GDP” suggests that both variables are 
endogenous. This endogeneity problem means that the explaining variable is correlated with 
the error term in the regression model. Consequently, the estimated coefficients of the 
“exogenous” variable are biased and inconsistent. In order to address the endogeneity 
problem I use a large macro panel data set (combination of cross-country and time-series 
data), containing observations of over 180 countries that span over four decades. In contrast 
to the existing cross country studies, the use of macro panel data allows taking into account 
methodological problems caused by endogeneity. The applied empirical methods are: fixed 
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effects, 2SLS, System GMM, Moving Average and Granger Causality. I pay special attention 
to time-specific effects and distinguish between within-country and between-country 
variations. Furthermore, the larger data set allows testing for the robustness of the findings 
by using different specifications of the endogenous variable “female labour market 
participation”. My empirical work confirms a convex impact of GDP on female labour market 
participation, although no nation in the panel went through all stages. I point out that the 
informative value of the estimation results depends strongly on the availability and 
comparability of the used data. Missing data, especially for early time periods and developing 
counties may bias my estimation results. Furthermore, due to insufficient data availability, the 
estimation model is limited to only a few exogenous variables. This limits the insight provided 
by the estimation because the estimation model does not filter out the impact of several 
important macro-level determinants that vary over time, such as institutional variables like 
family policy instruments.  
   
Chapter 3 singles out this aspect. In order to investigate the impact of family policies on 
female labour market participation, I focus the analytical scope on a cross-country analysis 
based on countries of the European Union and the recent decade. I expose the impact of 
family policies on female labour market participation in the EU (27) by paying special 
attention to the impact of the presence of children on women’s time dedicated to work by 
distinguishing between women’s full-time equivalent employment and part-time work as well 
as by taking into account the division of labour within European households. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis shows that mothers’ employment patterns vary widely across European 
countries, with 11 countries forming extremes: in Denmark, Sweden and Finland, mothers 
tend to continue working full-time rather than reducing to part-time at the arrival of a child. In 
the Netherlands, the UK, Germany and Austria, the working activity of mothers shows a 
strong discontinuity (interruption, part-time work). In Spain, Italy, Greece and Malta, the 
labour market participation of mothers appears to be quite continuous at the arrival of a child 
because female employment rates are rather low in general. Furthermore, the analysis 
suggests that the impact of children on mother’ labour market participation is influenced by 
family policies. The discussed family policy instruments are cash support (benefits and tax 
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reliefs), child-rearing allowances during parental leave and childcare support. I point out that 
these instruments can impact women’s labour supply decision in a positive or a negative 
way, depending on the instruments’ characteristics. In some countries, the redistributive 
character of several family policy instruments risks discouraging mothers’ labour supply. It 
turns out that in Europe, one main challenge of family policy is to create a set of coherent 
family policy instruments that manage to simultaneously prevent families from income 
poverty and encourage mothers’ employment. This is in particularly valid for Germany, as the 
case study in the second half of the third chapter shows. This case study compares French 
and German family policy instruments. The focus on only two countries allows a closer 
examination of institutional details. I conclude that, whereas in France, most family policy 
instruments stimulate mothers’ labour supply more than in Germany, both countries’ tax 
systems significantly discourage mothers’ labour supply, and hence, reforms of the family 
taxation mechanisms are advisable.  
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Chapter I: 
The links between women’s economic empowerment  
and macroeconomic growth: theory and empirical evidence 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Equal status among men and women is a central developmental goal of many international 
bodies, for example UNICEF, ILO, the UN or the World Bank.  The United Nations define 
gender equity as related to women's rights and economic development. In its 2001 report, 
“Engendering Development,” the World Bank formulates equal status as a goal that 
specifically benefits women and girls, as they bear the bulk of economic disadvantages of 
gender discrimination. The UN and the World Bank, however, also clearly demonstrate that 
inequality between men and women, particularly in terms of education, employment and 
income, is economically costly not just for women but also for all of society, because it limits 
a country’s economic growth and welfare. Consequently, the United Nations Millennium 
Project, for example, names gender equity as one of the key elements to end world poverty 
by 2015.  
 
Recent theoretical and empirical studies in economic growth support the view that gender 
discrimination hinders growth. Naturally, quantity and quality of institutions, the degree of 
integration of trade and a country’s geography – particularly, its access to natural resources 
– have always been the key factors of income growth (cf. Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 
2004).  Yet, economists today agree that women’s economic empowerment significantly 
contributes to a country’s economic growth (c.F. Worldbank, 2001).  Several theoretical and 
empirical economic studies ascertain a positive impact of women’s education, employment 
and income on growth and thereby suggest that gender differences in education, 
employment and income lead to high economic costs for society. The first part of this chapter 
gives an overview of these studies, which prove that a reduction of gender differences in 
education, employment and income would accelerate a country’s growth performance and 
therefore would raise aggregate welfare. 
 
The second part of this chapter shows that the reverse impact of growth on the 
empowerment of women is much less researched and that the impact of growth on the 
economic status of women is not clear, neither in theory nor in terms of empirical analysis. 
Most available studies focus on the impact of growth on female labour market participation 
only. Intuitively, one would expect to find a strictly positive impact of growth on the female 
 12
labour market participation. This assumption is supported by a theoretical approach called 
the “modernisation neoclassical approach”, which is presented at the beginning of the 
second part. Yet, simply trusting the equalising effects of economic growth is not advisable 
for policy makers who intend to effectively promote gender equality in the labour market, 
because more recent studies acknowledge that the impact of growth on female labour 
market participation is not strictly positive. I present a series of theoretical arguments that 
suggest that growth convexly influences the female labour market participation, which implies 
a U-shaped pattern of female labour market participation along the economic development 
path. This means that at low income levels, income growth lowers female labour market 
participation relative to male labour market participation and increases it in the middle and 
long run only. This phenomenon is known as the “feminisation U”. Nevertheless, until today, 
empirical analysis gives no clear evidence, neither for the “modernisation neoclassical 
approach” nor for the “feminisation U” hypothesis. In the last part of the chapter, I discuss 
measurement and estimation problems which are the reason for the weak empirical findings. 
Finally, in exposing in detail what is scientifically known today concerning the interactions of 
macroeconomic growth and female labour market participation, this chapter discovers a 
research gap in the field of empirically analysing the impact of growth on female labour 
market participation. 
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1. Link one: The impact of women’s economic empowerment  
on macroeconomic growth 
 
 
This section deals with a series of theoretical models and empirical studies that investigate 
the impact of women’s economic empowerment, that is, of women’s education, employment 
and income, on macroeconomic growth.  
 
The first part shows how theoretical models illustrate the aforementioned growth impact. I 
start by elaborating how, during the evolution from exogenous to newer endogenous growth 
models, education (and, implicitly, accumulation of human capital) has gained increasing 
significance. Firstly, I present the central results of the exogenous growth model by Solow 
(1956). Then, I show how Barro and Sala-i-Matin (1995) endogenise a country’s growth by 
introducing human capital as an input factor, which allows modelling continuous long-term 
growth.  Based on Knowles, Lorgelly and Owen (2002) I investigate how gender-specific 
distribution of education affects a country’s growth by pointing out that gender discrimination 
in education lowers a country’s growth potential. Based on Galor and Weil (1996) I illustrate 
how employment and earned income of women promotes growth over generations. 
 
The second part of this section focuses on empirical estimations of the impact of women’s 
education, employment and income on macroeconomic growth. Firstly, I present how Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1995) estimate a negative impact of women’s education on growth, 
followed by a critical discussion of these puzzling estimation results, which is mainly based 
on Dollar and Gatti (1999) and Knowles, Logelly and Owen (2002).  Drawing from Klasen 
(2002), I show that an improvement of the estimation method yields a positive impact of 
women’s education on a country’s national income level. Then, I show how Klasen (1999) 
empirically proves a positive impact of women’s employment on growth. Finally, I discuss 
Seguino’s (2000) estimations of the impact of women’s income on a country’s income level.  
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1.1. The impact of women’s empowerment on growth in theory 
1.1.1. Exogenous growth according to Robert Solow 
 
The enormous surge of economic growth in Western countries during the second half of the 
20th century leads to the question as to how such growth can be secured for the long-term. 
Growth is usually measured as a long-term development of national income on the basis of 
change in per capita income. This takes the size of population into consideration. Still today, 
economists discuss determinants of a nation’s long-term growth. This is mainly because the 
variables that influence long-term growth trends differ considerably from those that cause 
short-term economic fluctuations.  
 
Economist Robert Solow (MIT) formulated a model of growth for closed national economies 
that predicts a convergence of nations’ income levels. Solow’s model was first published in 
1956 in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, and Solow won the Nobel Prize for it in 1987. 
Solow modelled a neoclassical production function, which establishes a relationship between 
aggregate output and input factors:    
 
 
),( LKFY =        (1.1) 
 
with Y: national income; K: capital; L: labour 
 
 
The factors of production labour, L, and capital, K, determine national income, Y. The 
production factors’ constant returns to scale imply a doubling of output when both input 
factors double (hypothesis: linear homogenous Cobb Douglas production function). Output 
does not increase proportionally when only one input factor increases. 
 
The declining marginal returns of L and K imply that an additional unit of input yields a larger 
increase in output at a low input level than at a high input level. The “Inada” constraint, 
typical for the Solow Model, states that the marginal returns of K and L approach infinity 
when K and L approach 0 and that the marginal returns approach 0 when K and L approach 
infinity.  
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The constant returns to scale allow us to write the production function with per capita terms: 
 
 
)()1,( kfL
L
KFLY ⋅=⋅=      (1.2) 
)(kfy =⇒       (1.3) 
 
with Y: national income; K: capital; L: labour; y: per capita income; k: per capita capital stock 
 
 
Equation (1.3) shows that growth of per capita income is determined by the growth of per 
capita capital stock. According to Solow, capital stock growth is in turn determined by 
savings, population growth and depreciations.1 
 
One of the main implications of Solow’s growth model is that there exists a “Steady State” 
which is the long-term balance in which per capita terms no longer grow. For example, in a 
Steady State, the per capita capital stock’s growth rate is 0. Consequently, a nation’s 
aggregate output converges against its Steady State level. Furthermore, there is a Steady 
State Value k* for each savings rate value. Another noteworthy result of the model is the 
dynamic impact of the “Golden Rule” of the accumulation of capital: There exists a “golden” 
savings rate which maximises per capita consumption in the Steady State. When the savings 
rate lies under or above this value s*, the Steady State declines. Savings rates that are either 
too high or too low reduce per capita consumption: a savings rate that is too high directly 
hinders consumption possibilities and a savings rate that is too low slows down the 
mechanism of capital consumption indirectly with a time delay.  
 
The Steady State exists due to the declining marginal returns of the input factors. Because 
population size L is exogenous, it is not possible for both input factors K and L to double 
simultaneously and an increase in K alone causes only a disproportionate increase in output 
Y.  Hence, the Solow model of growth predicts that countries with capital stock values above 
the Steady State level will experience negative growth. Countries with a capital stock below 
the Steady State level, in contrast, will grow, although growth rates decline the closer the 
actual capital stock approaches its Steady State level. This is why a country’s growth has an 
inverse relationship with initial income: Wealthy countries with high per capita capital stock 
(but still below the Steady State level) grow less vigorously than poor countries. As a result, 
the per capita income of both countries converges to a common Steady State level.   
 
                                                 
1 depreciations are amortizations of fixed capital that makes replacement investment necessary. Replacement investments keep 
the capital stock constant.  
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The graph in figure 1 shows in a comparison between OECD countries that there is an 
observable negative correlation between per capita income of countries during their 
beginning stages in 1950 and their growth rate up to 1992.  Countries with low initial levels, 
such as Japan or Portugal, grow faster than, for example, the United States or Great Britain, 
which have had relatively high per capita incomes since the 1950s. The Federal Republic of 
Germany made up for the difference between its income and that of neighbouring countries 
after the Second World War and underwent a rapid accumulation of capital in the 1950s and 
1960s.  Blanchard (1999) underlines that, in comparison with other OECD countries, 
Germany’s slow-down in growth during the 1970s goes back in significant parts to the Solow 
effect (slowing of growth after a rapid beginning growth period). 
 
 
Figure 1: GDP per capita in 1950 against GDP growth rate 1950 -1992 
 
 
Source: Blanchard (1999) 
 
 
However, an examination of countries outside of the OECD reveals that Solow’s growth 
model is not universally applicable.  The model can be applied to four Asian tiger states: 
Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea. Indonesia, Malaysia, China and Thailand 
also experienced strong rates of growth despite the Asian crisis of the 1990s. Still, in the 
poorest countries of the world, particularly in Africa, rapid growth and a convergence with the 
Western income level cannot be found. In Chad and Madagascar, the growth rate of per 
capita outputs has fallen approximately 1.3% per year since 1960 (cf. Blanchard, 1999). 
These examples suggest a conditional instead of an absolute convergence (cf. Barro und 
Sala-i-Martin, 1995): countries with similar savings rates, population growth and depreciation 
terms share a similar Steady-State level. Hence, a convergence of income seems only 
applicable to countries with homogenous parameters and similar economic structures. 
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Solow’s exogenous growth model can not explain what influences a country’s specific Steady 
State level. Empirical research on growth calculates that approximately 60% of a country’s 
actual growth cannot be described by the Solow model („Solow-residual“) (cf. Blanchard, 
1999).  
 
Economists, therefore, investigate alternate growth determinants that are not included in 
Solow’s growth theory. In a first step, an exogenous progress in technology, t, that saves 
capital K and labour L, was added to the model by Solow himself. A capital- and labour-
saving progress in technology requires less capital and labour to maintain the same output. If 
production continues at the same rate, output will increase.  
 
The new production function is:  
 
 
),,( tLKFY =       (1.4) 
 
with Y: national income; K: capital; L: labour; t: technological progress 
 
 
The modelling of technological progress as a third production factor shows that the per 
capita growth rate in a Steady State is the same as the rate of technological progress  Yet, 
this model is also unable to explain the real reasons for an increase in income, because 
technological progress is considered exogenous. It was not until the 1980s that 
endogenous growth models were developed to explain long-term growth of productivity.  
 
 
1.1.2. Endogenous growth: human capital as growth determinant 
 
Robert Lucas and Paul Romer primarily developed a new endogenous growth theory during 
the mid 1980s. They endogenise technological advancement by integrating human capital as 
a third input factor in the production function. This significantly improved the empirical 
evidence of the growth model.   
 
Barro und Sala-i-Martin (1995) further developed this approach. They endogenise 
technological advancement by splitting capital between physical capital, K, and human 
capital, H.  
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The production function is: 
 
 
),( HKFY =  or 


⋅=
K
HfKY      (2.1) 
 
with Y: national income; K: physical capital; H: human capital 
 
 
There is an important difference between exogenous and endogenous growth models: in the 
aforementioned exogenous growth model, the second input factor next to capital, K, is 
labour, L, which is determined by population size. But L is not reproducible, as Solow 
assumes that a country’s population size does not change and cannot simply be changed. 
With an exogenous L, output growth can only be achieved by growing K, but the falling 
marginal returns of K result in a country’s income convergence in the Steady State. 
 
The key feature of the endogenous model is that both input factors, K and H, can grow 
simultaneously.  They are both considered endogenous and, therefore, reproducible. A 
simultaneous increase of K and H doubles output (constant returns to scale) and makes 
continuous growth without income convergence in the Steady State possible.2  
 
With perfect competition, returns in physical and human capital equal their respective 
marginal product:  
 
 KRK
Hf
K
H
K
Hf
K
Y
=


′⋅


−


=
∂
∂
      (2.2) 
HRK
Hf
H
Y
=


′=
∂
∂
         (2.3) 
 
As K and H are substitutable, in the equilibrium the net earnings for both kinds of capital are: 
 
rRR HHKK =−=− δδ      (2.4) 
 
with r  as interest rate (market price of capital) and iδ  as depreciation rate of K  and 
H resprectively.  
 
Equation (2.4.) determines a single, constant relationship K
H . 
If 


=
K
HfA  with A  as a constant, equation (2.1.) implies:   
 AKY =       (2.5) 
                                                 
2 Furthermore, it seems plausible for H  to assume constant marginal returns or even increasing marginal returns due to learning 
by doing, spill over-effects of a worker or company on others etc. (c.f. Arrow, 1962; Phelps, 1966; Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988). 
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In this simplified model, H is not produced independent of K by education, for example. 
Rather, it is assumed that capital investment implicitly raises human capital (cf. Romer, 
1986).  
 
Hence, a change in either A  or K  directly affects Y. This means that, when population size 
remains constant, Y will grow constantly at the growth rates of K  and H .  
 
A more detailed, modified AK-model by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) obtains the same 
result. The economists take a Cobb-Douglas production function with the input factors A 
(technological level of a country), K and H and combine it with optimising behaviour of 
households and companies: 
 
αα −
=
1HAKY       (2.6) 
 
This function also yields diminishing returns when K or H is increased separately, and it 
yields constant returns when K and H  increase at the same time. 
The rate of depreciation δ is assumed to be identical for K  and H . 
Output can be spent on consumption C and on investment in K and H ( KI  and HI ).  
 
Hence, the budget constraint for the national economy is:  
 
HK IICHAKY ++==
−αα 1     (2.7) 
 
 
 
Change in both capital stocks is given by: 
KIK K δ−=
°
      (2.8) 
HIH H δ−=
°
     (2.9) 
 
 
Drawing from the Ramsey growth model of 1928, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) now 
integrate the optimisation process of households into the model. The households chose 
consumption C and savings S so that their utility is maximised under the intertemporal 
budget constraint.  This raises the problem of dynamic optimisation within time: a utility 
function should be maximised subjecto to constraints, but these constraints are dynamic, 
since they describe economic development over time (changes in K and H).  
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Therefore, the current utility function, u, which depends on the level of consumption, C, is 
discounted with the following time-preference factor: 
 
te ρ−       (2.10) 
 
with  time preference rate 0>ρ .  
The present value of the benefits is smaller the later the benefits ocurr.  
The function that is to be maximised in a dynamic intertemporal case is called “Hamilton” 
function (analogous to the “Lagrange” function in the static case). 
 
 It reads:  
 
)()()( HIKIeCuJ Hk
t δµδυρ −⋅+−⋅+⋅= −  
)( 1 HK IICHAK −−−+
−ααω    (2.11) 
 
ω, υ  and µ are dynamic Lagrange multipliers.  
 
υ  and µ represent the actual shadow price (opportunity costs) of K  and H  and describe a 
change in the Hamilton function’s value due to a change in the capital stock (one unit). This 
is the value resulting from an increase in K or H, occurring at time t and expressed in utility 
units at time 0. The Hamilton function captures the overall effect of the level of consumption 
on utility. This is because the function takes into account that C directly affects u(C) and 
indirectly affects υ , as the level of consumption influences the changes in K and H.  
 
The utility function is specified as follows: 
 
)1(
)1()(
1
θ
θ
−
−
=
−CCu       (2.12) 
 
With 10 〉〉θ  as the constant elasticity of the marginal utility.  The elasticity of the substitution 
for this utility function is the constant θ
1 . The utility function, therefore, has the property of 
CIES (constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution). The larger θ is, the more the marginal 
utility will fall when C increases: households prefer today’s consumption over that of 
tomorrow.  
 
The first derivatives of the Hamilton function J  with respect to C , KI  and HI  will now be set 
equal to 0 to derive the optimality conditions. 
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°
υ , and 
°
µ  will be equated with the net marginal products of capital 
K
J
∂
∂
and 
H
J
∂
∂
.  
 
These first order conditions define the household behaviour in the optimum (consumption 
path), just like they do in the case of static optimisation. When inserting the results in the 
budget constraint and performing some simplifications, one obtains the following growth rate 
of consumption: 
 
 




−−


⋅⋅


=
−−
ρδα
θ
γ
α
Kc H
KA
)1(1
   (2.13) 
 
with KH
KA δα
α
−


⋅
−− )1(
   as net marginal product of K . 
 
The difference between the net marginal product of K  and ρ  determines whether 
households choose a bundle of consumption that increases, stays constant or decreases 
over time. The greater ρ  is in relation to the net marginal product, the greater is the current 
consumption, the less is invested, and the lower is the growth of future consumption. A large 
elasticity of marginal utility θ also limits consumption growth.  
 
The second first order condition of the Hamilton function reveals that the net marginal 
product of human capital equals the net marginal product of physical capital: 
 
δαδα
αα
−


⋅−⋅=−


⋅
−−
H
KA
H
KA )1(
)1(
      (2.14) 
 
 
This implies that the relationship between both capital stocks can be represented as: 
 
α
α
−
=
1H
K
         (2.15) 
 
 
This yields an identical net rate of return for H and for K: r* 
 
δαα αα −−⋅= − )1()1(* Ar  ,    (2.16) 
 
which is constant.  
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This implies:  
The ratio H
K is constant, which means that K  and H  actually do grow at the same rate.  
Output grows at the same rate.  
 
Moreover, equation (2.13) implies that consumption growth also is constant and equal to:  
 
[ ]ρδαα
θ
γ αα −−−⋅⋅


=
− )1(* )1(1 A      (2.17) 
 
 
The following applies to output: 
)1(1 α
α
α
−


 −
⋅= AKY        (2.18) 
 
 
The growth rate of K  and H  corresponds to the growth rate of Y  andC . 
All growth rates correspond to ∗γ . 
 
This is how Barro and Sala-i-Martin use their endogenous growth model to prove the impact 
of investments in human capital on economic growth.   
 
They also show that the restrictions KI  and 0≥HI  lead to an important result: The growth 
rate of output increases the more the actual value of H
K  and the Steady State value of 
H
K   deviates.  This goes for the two sorts of deviations: It has been empirically proofed that 
a small H
K -value (relative to the Steady State level) causes a lot of growth – for example, 
when a war destroys a significant amount of physical capital, but human capital remains 
intact. At the same time, a high H
K -value (relative to the Steady State level) also promotes 
growth – for example, during an epidemic, the majority of infrastructure remains intact.  
 
However, the graph in figure 2 illustrates how growth slows down when a national economy 
has more physical than human capital.  
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Figure 2 : Aggr. income growth in relation to the ratio physical / human capital 
 
 
 
 
Source: Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) 
 
 
A high H
K -value implies high costs of adjustment, as the process of building human capital 
is costly and time consuming.  The fact that a national economy can recover more quickly 
from a shortage of physical capital than from a shortage of human capital proves the 
importance of investments in research and development, in education and in advanced 
training for promoting long-term growth.  
 
Yet, advances in technology offer poorer countries the opportunity to grow. The rapid growth 
that took place in Asian tiger states, for example, occurred despite a relatively low physical 
capital base, because innovations in production could be cheaply imported from abroad 
(imitations). However, at the same time in Asian countries human capital levels were 
relatively high in comparison to developing countries in sub Saharan Africa, for example. 
Hence, developing countries would be immensely helped if they had both easier access to 
already-existing knowledge and more investments in education and professional training.  
 
 
1.1.3. The impact of women’s education on growth  
 
Knowles, Lorgelly and Owen (2002) try to answer how gender-specific dispersal of human 
capital influences a country’s growth. They use a neoclassical model of growth that uses 
female and male education as separate explanatory variables to clarify the impact of gender 
discriminating distribution within a national economy. Their model suggests that investments 
in women’s human capital have a positive impact on a country’s productivity and growth.    
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The model takes into account long-term effects of education by including the output elasticity 
of female and male human capital as well as of physical capital. Knowles et al. (2002) also 
model coefficients that represent differences in education between men and women.  
The aggregate production function is: 
 
 
( ) ψββαψββα −−−−= mfmf ititititititit LTXEMEFKY 1      (3.1) 
 
 
EF  stands for education of women, EM  for education of men and X  for health related 
capital. T  stands for the technology level and L  for the labour force of a country i  at time t . 
 
The production factors of the Cobb-Douglas production function all have constant returns to 
scale and positive, declining marginal returns. It is assumed that all countries have the same 
elasticities: mf ββα ,,  and ψ .  These elasticities represent the percentage change in output 
associated with every 1% change in input. The elasticities lie between 0 and 1. When the 
elasticities add up to 1, the returns to scale are constant. In that case, the Cobb-Douglas 
function is linear homogeneous.  
 
All variables are divided by LT ⋅  in order to achieve a production function that contains the 
output quantity per effective labour force: 
 
ψββα
ititititit xemefky mf=      (3.2) 
 
Labour force and technology are assumed to increase over time: 
 
 
tn
iit
ieLL 0=        (3.3) 
gt
iit eTT 0=       (3.4) 
 
with in  as growth rate of a country’s labour force and g  as growth rate of technology, which 
is assumed to be uniform for all countries.  
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) describe a continuous growth path with e as Euler’s Number. 
 
 
 
 25
The growth rates of the factors of production itit emefk ,,  and itx  are given as: 
 
( ) itiitkiit kgnysk δ++−=
°
     (3.5) 
( ) itiitefiit efgnysef δ++−=
°
    (3.6) 
( ) itiitemiit emgnysem δ++−=
°
    (3.7) 
( ) itiitxiit xgnysx δ++−=
°
     (3.8) 
 
with emiefiki sss ,,  and xis as shares of output (i.e. the savings rates) that are invested in 
itit emefk ,,  and itx  (with total savings S equal to investments I). δ  is the depreciation rate, 
which is the same over time and in all countries. The expression igk−  describes the 
following relationship: with advances in labour-saving technology, labour efficiency units 
increase while the number of workers remains the same. These additional units must be 
endowed with capital. Net investments, measured per efficiency units of workers, are 
reduced by population growth. It becomes clear that k  would fall according to the rates 
n,δ and g if 0=s . 
 
In the Solow model, the Steady State is defined by a constant capital stock per labour in 
units of efficiency. This is the case when *)(*)( kgnksy δ++= .  
With 1<ψββα +++ mf , equations (3.5) - (3.8) and (3.2) imply that in the Steady State: 
 
          
ηψββψββ
δ
1
1




++
=
−−−
∗
gn
ssss
k
i
xiemiefiki
i
mfmf
     (3.9) 
ηψβψβαα
δ
1
1




++
=
−−−
∗
gn
ssss
ef
i
xiemiefiki
i
mm
     (3.10) 
ηψψβαβα
δ
1
1




++
=
−−−
∗
gn
ssss
em
i
xiemiefiki
i
ff
      (3.11) 
ηββαββα
δ
1
1




++
=
−−−
∗
gn
ssss
x
i
xiemiefiki
i
mfmf
     (3.12) 
 
with ψββαη −−−−= mf1 .  
The Steady State values marked by * increase with s  and decrease with gn, and δ . 
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Because ∗∗∗ iii emefk ,,  and 
∗
ix  are constant in the Steady State, the Steady State output per 
labour force ∗iy  also remains constant.  
By inserting equations (3.4) and (3.9) to (3.12) into equation (3.2), by logarithmising and 
converting, one arrives at:3 
 
( ) ( ) ( )efifkiii
it
it ssgngtT
L
Y
lnlnln1lnln 0 η
β
η
αδ
η
η
++++
−
−+=


 ∗
 
( ) ( )xiemim ss lnln η
ψ
η
β
++       (3.13) 
 
The logarithm is used to obtain a linear relationship.  Equation (3.13) represents the output 
per worker in the Steady State as a function of the respective savings rates of the factors of 
production.   
 
When inserting the equation of the respective savings rates (that can be obtained by 
equations (3.10) to (3.12) in equation (3.13), one obtains a function that represents the 
output as a function of the Steady State sizes of the variables education and health.   
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )∗∗
−
+
−
+++
−
−+=



it
f
kiii
it
it efsgngT
L
Y
ln
1
ln
1
ln
1
lnln 0 α
β
α
αδ
α
α
 
( ) ( )∗∗
−
+
−
+ itit
m xem ln
1
ln
1 α
ψ
α
β       (3.14) 
 
Human capital influences growth by means of its effects on the level of output per worker in a 
Steady State, which, in turn, influences its growth rate.  Consequently, the elasticities of 
changes in output level as well as in output growth are important.     
By substituting the growth rate of technology g  with constant a  and the residual iε  one 
arrives at: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )∗∗
−
+++−
−
++=



it
f
ikii
it
it efgnsTa
L
Y
ln
1
lnln
1
lnln 0 α
βδ
α
α  
( ) ( ) iititm xem εα
ψ
α
β
+
−
+
−
+ ∗∗ ln
1
ln
1
      (3.15) 
 
                                                 
3 since TyLY =  
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Education coefficients are positive if mf ββ , and α  are between 0 and 1.  
The following algebraric rearrangement provides a basis for interpreting the impact of 
gender-specific differences in education ( ) ( )∗∗ − itit efem lnln  on a country’s output:  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )∗∗
−
+
+++−
−
++=



it
mf
ikii
it
it efgnsTa
L
Y
ln
1
lnln
1
lnln 0 α
ββδ
α
α  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) iitititm xefem εα
ψ
α
β
+
−
+−
−
+ ∗∗∗ ln
1
lnln
1
    (3.16) 
 
It becomes apparent that, when mβ and α  lie between 0 and 1, the elasticity of differences in 
education 
α
β
−1
m  is positive.  
 
This should be interpreted as follows: Given a fixed level of female qualification, an increase 
in male qualification increases the output. On the other hand, if the female educational level 
increases while the male level remains unchanged, the difference decreases. This shows a 
negative effect on account of the positive coefficient.  
 
Yet, the interpretation of the coefficient has its limits in this model, because the coefficient 
simply expresses the output elasticity of male education and α , and it leaves fβ  
unaccounted for.  
 
The interpretation has also limits in the following model in which education refers to male 
education as well as the gender difference in education:  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )∗∗
−
+
+++−
−
++=



it
mf
ikii
it
it emgnsTa
L
Y
ln
1
lnln
1
lnln 0 α
ββδ
α
α  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) iitititf xefem εα
ψ
α
β
+
−
+−
−
−
∗∗∗ ln
1
lnln
1
       (3.17) 
 
Whereas equation (3.16) suggests that the female level of education is the reference level for 
the population, equation (3.17) suggests that the population has the level of male education 
only. The larger the deviation between the male and the female level of education, the larger 
is the loss of a country’s growth.  
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In this case, the coefficient of the difference in education 
α
β
−
−
1
f  is negative, when fβ and 
α  lie between 0 and 1. The algebraic sign of the difference coefficient also depends on how 
other education variables are modelled. This means that, given the level of education of men 
and women, gender-specific differences in education have a negative impact on income. 
Thus, when gender-specific differences in education are large, rates of return to education 
are higher for women than for men due to falling marginal returns to human capital. The 
model of Knowles et al. (2002) shows that investment in women’s human capital raises a 
country’s human capital stock and hence output, underlining the importance of education for 
women and girls for a country’s labour force productivity. Nevertheless, the model also 
shows that  investments in men’s education also stimulate a country’s growth.  
 
Klasen (2002) adds the following arguments in order to illustrate the findings of the discussed 
model:  assuming that boys and girls possess evenly distributed capabilities and that children 
with high capabilities become better educated, it can be said that gender-specific 
discrimination in education reduces the potential talent pool of the labour force. If a person’s 
human capital stock consists of capability and education, discrimination in education reduces 
a nation’s average human capital stock, thereby also reducing the nation’s potential for 
growth.  
 
Yet, even though the model suggests that an increase in women’s human capital promotes 
growth, it is important to note that the term “human capital” is not ideal to describe a person’s 
productivity. Gardiner (2000) emphasises that even though there is some awareness that 
human capital is much more than formal education, difficulties in measuring other aspects 
such as experience, skills and social capital reduces the informative value of the term 
“human capital”. This is especially true for women with children, since human capital refers 
exclusively to market-related work, while house work and home production are not 
considered integral parts of human capital.  
 
 
1.1.4. The impact of women’s labour market participation on growth  
 
In the model discussed above, education directly affects output. However, female education 
also affects a nation’s income in more complex ways. More precisely, it impacts women’s 
wage expectations and therefore affects women’s labour market participation decision and 
fertility decision.  Galor and Weil (1996) investigate this chain of impacts by combining a 
growth model with endogenous labour supply (related to endogenous fertility) of women and 
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men with a household model that models the choice between unpaid household activities 
and paid labour.4  They show that economic growth raises relative wages of women (in 
comparison to wages of men), which, in turn, raises female labour market participation and 
lowers women’s fertility. According to Galor and Weil (1996), an increase in women’s labour 
market participation and a decline in fertility raise aggregate production and consequently a 
country’s economic growth.  
 
The following will show that an increase in capital per worker raises relative wages for 
women, because capital is more complimentary with respect to female labour input as it is to 
overall male labour input. Furthermore, an increase in wages decreases fertility by increasing 
women’s opportunity costs of staying at home to raise children. Galor and Weil (1996) 
demonstrate that the fewer women actively participate in the labour market, the the lower will 
be the country’s Steady State equilibrium. Due to the multiplicity of equilibria, an increase in 
women joining the labour force can be associated with an acceleration in the rate of growth.   
 
The production function is modelled with three input factors: physical capital ptK , physical 
labour ptL , which, simply put, can only be performed by men due to their physical strength 
required for such labour, and intellectual (mental) labour mtL , of which women and men are 
equally capable.  All factors have either decreasing or constant marginal returns.  
 
It is assumed now that an increase in capital raises income from intellectual labour by the 
same amount, while income from physical labour remains unchanged. The more developed 
a country is, the higher are the wages of intellectual labour compared to wages of physical 
labour b. Capital is invested in labour-saving, human-capital-intensive mechanical 
engineering, in management or in the service sectors. The production function reads: 
 
 
 ( )( )[ ] ptmtptt bLLKaY +−+= ρραα 11          (4.1) 
 
 
with 0, 〉ba ; 10 〈〈α  and 1〈∞〈− ρ . 
ρ  is the elasticity of substitution between capital and intellectual labour and is smaller than 
or equal to 1. The smaller ρ , the higher is the complementarity between both factors and the 
higher mtL  will increase with
p
tK . 
                                                 
4 For a more detailed discussion of the micro-economic principles of “intra household decision making” see chapter 3.  
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It is also assumed that all men and women of working age constitute couples: each man 
supplies one unit ptL  and one unit 
m
tL , while women, in contrast, offer only 0 or one unit 
m
tL . 
Hence, ptL  is the number of couples of working age, and the production function can be 
written in terms of units per couples by dividing through ptL : 
 
( )( )[ ] bmkay tptt +−+= ρραα 11        (4.2) 
 
with pttt LYy = ; 
p
ttt LKk = and 
p
t
m
tt LLm = with 21 ≤≤ tm .  
The input factors are compensated by their marginal returns.  Hence, the wage 
compensation of one unit of physical labour is:  
 
bwpt =        (4.3) 
 
and the wage compensation for one unit or intellectual labour is:  
 
( ) ( )[ ]( ) ρρρρ ααα /11 11 −− −+×−= tpttmt mkmaw .    (4.4) 
 
Men’s wages are mt
p
t ww + , while working women earn
m
tw  assuming no wage discrimination. 
Hence, in the case of unchanged labour input ratios tm , an increase in capital raises the 
return of intellectual labour mtw  and reduces gender-specific wage differences.  
 
The decision problem of the couple is determined by the utility of the children during the first 
period of their life t  (labour and family period) and by the utility of the consumption level 
during their second period of life 1+t  (seniority). The more children a couple has, the more 
utility the couple has in t, the less the couple can save for t+1 and the lower their 
consumption Ct+1  in t+1.  
 
The intertemporal utility function can for example be specified as a logarithmic form of a 
Cobb-Douglas function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1ln1ln +−+= ttt cnu γγ       (4.5) 
 
with tn  as the number of children per couple.  
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In the model, time is the only cost factor related to children, as time for child care can 
alternatively be converted into wage income in the labour market.  Thus, these opportunity 
costs of children are proportional to market wages and consequently are higher for men than 
for women.  
 
A couple’s income without children is mt
p
t ww 2+ .  With z  as time cost of raising children for 
one parent per child, opportunity costs of a child are mtwz ⋅  for the mother and ( )mtpt wwz +⋅  
for the father. The opportunity costs rise with the wage level. If the time used for raising all 
children is less than or equal to 100% of the time available to a parent ( z ⋅ nt is ≤1), the 
mother is solely responsible for the raising of children.  If the mother must contribute more 
than full-time to raising children, the father also contributes part-time to child rearing.  
 
The budget constraint during the first period of life divides a couple’s income between 
expenses for children and savings for the future: 
 
 
m
t
p
ttt
m
t wwsznw 2+≤+          if 1≤tzn  ( )( ) mtptttptmtmt wwsznwww 21 +≤+−++   if 1>tzn                 (4.6) 
 
 
Interest-bearing savings provide consumption for the second period of life: 
 
 
( )11 1 ++ += ttt rsc       (4.7) 
 
with r  as market rate of return on investment (interest rate).  
 
Figure 3 shows how utility and budget determine how many children a couple decides to 
have.  
 
The optimal allocation of time for child rearing and savings (present value  of future 
consumption) leads to three possible types of choices on the budget line (three intersections 
between the budged line and the utility curves).  
  
When the optimal allocation is achieved at 1〈tzn , say at point A on the budget line, this leads 
to the decision that the woman works part-time and the man works full-time.   
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At point B, the woman does not participate in the labour market and performs child rearing 
full-time and the man contributes to child rearing part-time. 
At point C, the parents share child rearing and labour market participation equally. 
 
Hence, the time required for raising one child, z , and the utility of a child determines the 
desired number of children, tn . 
 
 
Figure 3: Division of labour 
 
 
 
Source: Galor and Weil (1996) 
 
 
The total time allocated to child rearing results from maximising the utility function (4.5), 
which is subject to (4.6) and (4.7): 
 
 ( )[ ]mtptt wwzn /2 += γ   when ( )[ ] 1/2 ≤+ mtpt wwγ  
γ2=tzn                when 12 >γ  
1=tzn         otherwise       (4.8) 
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This shows that women spend ( )γ2,1min  of their time raising children.  
Case 1 implies that a higher percentage of women enter the job market when wage mtw  
rises.  
 
Figure 4 shows the effect of a shift of the budget line caused by a wage increase mtw  in point 
B. 
 
 
Figure 4: Budget increase 
 
 
Source: Galor and Weil (1996) 
 
 
A reduction in the number of children gives the woman time for wage employment.  The 
additional income provides more savings for the second period of life.  
 
Case 2 implies for 5,0>y  that women do not work independent of the wage level. However, 
it is empirically proved that the wage level influences a woman’s decision to work. This is 
why the restriction 5,0<y  is introduced and it reads: 
 ( )[ ]{ }mtptt wwzn /2,1min += γ      (4.9) 
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A couple’s savings, which depends on the woman’s time division between childcare and paid 
labour, while the man works full-time is represented by: 
 
( )[ ]mtptt wws 21 +−= γ    when 1≤tzn  
m
t
p
tt wws +=                         when 1=tzn         (4.10) 
 
From this equation 
( )
t
t
tt
p
t
m
t
t znL
znL
L
Lm −=−== 22      (4.11) 
 
and from equations (4.3), (4.4), (4.9)  results for 5,0<y : 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )( ){ }[ ]ρρρρ αααγ −− −×−+−×−+= 11 21212,1min tpttt znkznabzn     (4.12) 
 
Consequently, time for child rearing, tzn , falls when capital intensity increases.  Women 
devote their time only up to a minimal amount of capital k* exclusively to the raising of 
children. Generally stated, this means: 
 
           )( tt kfzn =     for 
∗≥ kkt  
1=tzn                    for 
∗≤ kkt                  (4.13) 
 
A look back at equation (4.1) shows how higher labour market participation of women mtL , 
also raises output tY .  Equation (4.2.) shows that with increased capital, a shrinking 
population and a less than proportionate decline of mtL  in relation to
p
tL  will raise the output 
per couple. 
 
Hence, according to Galor and Weil (1996), accumulation of capital has a positive impact on 
women’s wages and women’s labour market participation and has a negative impact on 
fertility.  Galor and Weil (1996) argue that women’s higher income and lower fertility make 
greater savings possible. These savings raise the capital stock per worker and hence 
increase the income of a nation’s population. This is how Galor and Weil (1996) model a 
positive impact of women’s labour market participation on growth. Klasen and Lamanna 
(2003) augment this theoretical framework by the following argument: High levels of gender-
specific discrimination in employment artificially restrict the nation’s talent pool, because less 
qualified men push potentially highly qualified women out of the job market.  As a result, the 
average available labour force within a national economy is kept artificially low (measured in 
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units of productivity). Furthermore, Klasen (1999) argues that, as women’s income rises due 
to employment, so does women’s bargaining power within the household, allowing mothers 
to invest in the education and health of their children according to their own preferences. 
Assuming that women spend more on their children’s education than men, an increase in 
women’s income positively affects children’s physical and intellectual capacity, which later 
benefits the national economy in the form of raised human capital. 
 
Today, the positive impact of women’s labour market participation on growth is approved by 
the scientific community, but the positive impact of fertility reduction on growth assumed by 
Galor and Weil (1996) is partly contested. Indeed, Galor and Weil’s arguments are in line 
with the exogenous growth model based on Solow (1956), which provides a negative impact 
of fertility on economic growth. Yet several endogenous growth models, for example by 
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), suggest a positive impact of fertility on growth (for more 
precise information about this issue, see box below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Background information: the impact of fertility on growth  
 
The exogenous growth model based on Solow (1956) predicts a negative impact of fertility on 
macroeconomic growth because, as the savings rate is assumed to be fixed, population growth lowers 
GDP per capita. Preliminary population growth would lead to a new equilibrium at a lower level of GDP 
per capita. To avoid this “dilution” of capital induced by population growth, the savings rate would have 
to rise, which is not possible according to the assumptions of the exogenous growth model. As with 
population growth, the ratio of capital to labour falls, productivity of labour and consequently wages 
also decrease. As labour is abundant and capital is relatively rare, the interest rate of capital 
increases. This phenomenon is called “capitalistic intensification”.  
 
Solow’s negative impact of population growth on income per capita is in line with the arguments of 
Malthus (1798). Malthus sketched the picture of a “population trap” by emphasising that income 
growth leads to population growth, which in turn leads to an income decline. Ricardo (1815) agrees 
with Malthus in asserting that population growth precedes an expansion of a nation’s resources, 
especially food resources. Thereafter, population growth, via the finiteness of natural resources, leads 
to pauperisation.   
                                                                                                                                                                               
The predictions of the exogenous growth model present a logical problem, however: According to 
Solow, a continuous population decline would be extremely growth stimulating, even if the population 
size goes towards zero. Moreover, the model’s predictions do not correspond to the observations that 
can be made for the 18th and 19th century in Europe, where rapid population growth went hand in hand 
with GDP per capita growth, especially in times of industrialisation (c.f. Blanchet, 2002).  Boserup 
(1965, 1981) explains this phenomenon by recognising the human capacity to increase food supply:  
food scarcity in times of population growth, as predicted by Malthus, was the motor for new 
innovations in agriculture in the 19th century. New techniques, division of labour and specialisation 
lead to agricultural extension and intensification (“Green Revolution”, c.f. also Nerlove and Raut, 
1994). Hence, population growth stimulates innovations due to resource limitations. These innovations 
increase productivity and enable further income growth.  
 
 36
Boserup’s arguments were developed in several endogenous growth models that integrated 
technological progress by considering human capital as third production factor. Arrow (1962), for 
example, considers technical advancement as a key element of economic growth and emphasises 
that innovations are driven by “learning by doing”, which means that increased productivity is achieved 
through repeated practice and self-perfection. Phelps (1966) completes this idea by highlighting that 
the learning processes of each worker have positive externalities and spill over effects on other 
workers, which leads to economies of scale. Consequently, returns to human capital can not be 
considered as decreasing, but must be considered as constant individually and as increasing in 
aggregate (see also Romer, 1986). Lucas (1988) adopts Arrow’s and Phelps’ concept to explain even 
increasing individual returns to human capital. As technical progress is generated by the accumulation 
of human capital, not only education but also fertility constitutes an economic advantage: population 
growth increases the number of workers available to the economy and the size of manpower 
stimulates research efforts (c.f. Phelps, 1966). The bigger the labour force, the bigger is a nation’s 
“talent pool” and the bigger are the spill over effects within the workforce. In addition, the higher the 
density of a population, the faster is the technology transfer and the knowledge exchange within a 
country (c.f. Lee, 1986). 
 
However, the predictions of the endogenous growth models also present a logical problem: a 
continuous population increase would always be growth stimulating, even if the population size goes 
towards infinite. Klasen (1999) puts this proposition into perspective by emphasising that the quality 
aspects of the labour force should not be underestimated. Whereas Phelps (1966) points out that the 
quantity of the labour force induces quality by spill over effects, Klasen (1999) accentuates a possible 
trade-off between the quantity and the quality of the labour force. Lower fertility sets free money to 
invest more in the human capital of each individual, which rises individual intellectual capacity. 
Especially in the case of increasing individual returns to human capital, a nation’s talent pool would 
rather profit from a rise in the individual quality instead of a rise in the quantity of its human capital 
stock. Thereafter, a high welfare equilibrium would result from low fertility rates combined with high 
individual levels of human capital, whereas a low welfare equilibrium would result from high fertility 
rates combined with low levels of human capital.  
 
The theoretical arguments suppose an ambiguous impact of population growth on income. There is a 
series of further arguments that take into account other aspects, as for example labour market or age 
structure dynamics, pension schemes or even ecology. Yet, even considering several additional 
arguments does not reduce the ambiguity of findings. The trade-off Klasen (1999) refers to suggest 
that there may exist an “optimum size” of population for each country and that the impact of fertility on 
growth depends on a country’s specific development stage. Empirical investigations do not find a clear 
impact of fertility on growth and what is more, they do not confirm the existence of an optimum 
defining equilibrium. Kelley and Schmidt (1994), for example, find a negative impact of fertility on 
growth in the short run for developing countries. On the other hand, Blanchet (1991) ascertains that 
most early empirical studies from the 1960s to the 1980s find a small but positive impact of population 
growth on GDP for developing countries. Recent empirical studies agree that not population growth in 
general, but growth of a qualified work force, which is partly driven by population growth, positively 
impacts a nation’s macroeconomic growth (c.f. Prskawetz et al., 2006; Bloom and Canning, 2001). 
They underline that in this field, more empirical research is needed, especially concerning the impact 
of the age structure within the workforce on growth (demographic transition). 
 
 
 
1.2. Empirical evidence of the impact of women’s empowerment on growth 
 
The fact that women’s education and employment have a positive impact on economic 
growth is now generally accepted within the field of economics. Yet this positive impact 
suggested by theory has not always been undisputed due to contradictory and unclear 
empirical findings. The inconclusive early findings result mainly from the problem of reverse 
causality, which leads to the fact that the impact of women’s education, employment and 
income on macroeconomic growth is not easy to investigate empirically.  The double-sided 
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and indirect impacts of women’s empowerment relative to education, employment and 
income on growth present several challenges to empirical estimation methods. 
 
The first empirical studies produced unexpected results that made waves within the research 
community: Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) estimate in their growth regression that education 
of women has a negative impact on growth. Their methods and results are presented in a 
first step in the next section. Their study motivated many other economists to investigate the 
impact of women’s education, employment and income on growth; the general consensus 
was that more complex data collection and estimation methods were necessary.  
 
Dollar and Gatti (1999) and Knowles, Logelly and Owen (2002) criticise Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995) for their inadequate consideration of collinearity and endogeneity problems.  In 
a second step, I present their main criticism and then show how further development of 
estimation methods improved the significance of estimation results and proved a positive 
impact of women’s education and employment on growth: Most notably, Klasen (1999 and 
2003) made seminal advances in this line of research.  I discuss the estimated impact of 
women’s education on national income according to Klasen (2002). Then, I analyse the 
estimated impact of women’s labour market participation on national income, according to 
Klasen (1999), Klasen and Lamanna (2003) and Seguino (2000).  
 
 
1.2.1. The negative impact of women’s education on growth 
 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) observe economic growth of several countries over time. A 
comparison of growth rates of per capita income (GDP) in 24 countries between the years 
1965 and 1985 shows that the growth rates vary greatly from country to country. Some 
countries experience negative growth during the specified period, as low as -0.9% per capita 
(these countries include Mozambique, Nicaragua and several countries of Sub-Saharan 
Africa). In contrast, other countries in East Asia experience growth rates over +4.5%. Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin investigate a series of potential determining factors of these growth 
differences empirically. In contrast to hypotheses derived from the model, they estimate a 
negative impact of women’s education on growth.  
 
The countries’ data were divided into 2 decades for the regression analysis: The first decade 
from 1965-1974 contains 87 countries. The second decade from 1975-1985 contains 97 
countries.  
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The endogenous variable, the growth rate of real per capita income (GDP), is measured as 
the average rate for both decades (two endogenous variables: average growth rate 1965-
1974, average growth rate 1975-1985). This is how the panel data set is transformed to 
apply a cross country regression.  
 
The following exogenous variables are taken into consideration as growth determinants: 
 
•  The natural logarithm of GDP per capita of the base year (represented in the 
regression table as log(GDP). The exogenous log(GDP) variable for the 1965-1974 
growth rates as endogenous variable is the initial observation of the year 1965 of 
each country. The exogenous variable log(GDP) for the 1975-1985 growth rates as 
endogenous variable is the initial observation of the year 1975 of each country. This 
verifies Solow’s convergence thesis, which states that poor countries (with a limited 
level of per capita income) grow faster than wealthy countries. According to Solow’s 
growth model, it is expected that log(GDP) will have a negative correlation coefficient. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)  use the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in order 
to capture proportional rather than absolute differences in the distribution of GDP 
levels among countries.  
•  Human capital, measured on the basis of the proxy variables education and health.  
Life expectancy proxies health (log (life expectancy)).  
Education is divided in male education and female education; The educational 
variables contain the number of years in primary school (years of schooling until 10 
years of age), the number of years in secondary school and the number of years in 
higher education (male primary education, female primary education, male secondary 
education, female secondary education, male higher education, female higher 
education).  
According to the theory of Knowles et al. (2002), one can expect that human capital 
positively impacts growth and that women’s education has a larger impact on growth 
than men’s education due to higher marginal returns).5 
•  The ratio of education expenditures to GDP (G-educ/Y) is supposed to indicate 
education quality, since years of schooling only reflect the quantity of education 
received. This ratio is expected to impact growth positively, as according to Klasen 
(1999), for example, the quality of the labour force is growth stimulating.  
•  The ratio of government expenditures to GDP (G-cons./Y). 
                                                 
5 depreciation among other factors makes it difficult to measure the level of physical capital and its evolution and definitions of 
physical capital vary widely across countries. Because the measured level education and health implicitly reflects a country’s 
capital stock, the level of physical capital is not included in this regression.  
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This ratio is expected to impact growth negatively as it is assumed – by Abu-Ghaida 
and Klasen (2002) for example, that income taxation in order to finance government 
consumption distorts household decisions.  
•  The relationship between investments and GDP (I/Y). 
•  The spread of the black market for foreign currencies as a proxy variable for market 
distortions (log(1+black-market premium)). 
•  Changes in terms of trade (growth rate terms of trade). 
•  Fertility rates (log(FERT)).  
•  The countries political instability (political instability). 
 
 
The ordinary least squares method (OLS) searches for a linear estimator that best fits the 
empirical values by minimising the sum of residual squares:   
 
∑= 2ˆminmin iQ ε         (5.1) 
 
The OLS-estimation yields a linear estimation with minimum possible variance. The OLS-
estimates represent a change in the endogenous variable when a separate exogenous 
variable is increased, while all other exogenous variables remain constant. The estimated 
coefficients are not biased, consistent and efficient if the specification is correct and various 
assumptions of the regression model are satisfied6. 
 
The random-effects-model is better at avoiding an omitted variable bias because unobserved 
exogenous variables that vary from country to country but remain constant over time are 
captured by an additional residual.  
 
Another problem is that several exogenous variables, like for example those who contain 
information about education, risk to be correlated with one another (multicollinearity). 
 ( ) 0, ≠ji xxCov        (5.2) 
               with i, j = different variables 
 
With multicollinearity, interpreting a regression coefficient is difficult, as the coefficient 
indicates how much the endogenous variable changes when one single exogenous variable 
is increased while all other exogenous variables stay constant hypothetically. If the 
                                                 
6 classical assumptions for regression analysis with OLS are for example: the error is a random variable with a mean of zero 
conditional on the explanatory variables; the independent variables are error-free; the predictors are linearly independent, the 
errors are uncorrelated, the variance of the error is constant across observations. 
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exogenous variables correlate with one another, it is impossible to increase one exogenous 
variable while keeping the other exogenous variables constant. Consequently, it is 
impossible to find out  which determinants causes changes in the dependent variable. 
 
Furthermore, the variables risk following a time trend (non-stationarity). A trend correction 
with the help of deterministic or stochastic filters brings stationary time series data, in which 
all influences that come from the time trend are captured by the residual. However, this can 
lead to autocorrelation, which means that the residuals correlate with one another. 
 ( ) 0, ≠jiCov εε      (5.3) 
            with i, j = different time periods 
     
In this case, the estimates are on average not distorted and still consistent, but no longer 
efficient. Therefore, irregular residuals must be tested for their random character. This can be 
done with the help of autoregressive models (AR-models) that measure the 
interdependencies between the observations of a time series and adapt the OLS-estimator in 
a way that efficient parameters are obtained. When applying an AR-process, it is assumed 
that a series of observations yt is dependent upon its own past values. An AR-coefficient 
shows to what extent the values of a time series depend on their past values.  
 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin limit time series variations by dividing the measured time period into 
only two decades (1965-1975, 1975-1985). Table 1 in the appendix shows the first part of the 
regression results. 
 
The results of the first column were estimated with the SUR-method (Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression) without taking into account potential correlation problems. This means that 
several equations could actually be estimated separately, yet they are estimated together 
(simultaneously). The SUR-method allows for the restriction that the coefficients of the two 
estimation equations representing both decades are identical. The information in the data is 
used efficiently by taking into account a possible correlation of the two residuals. The AR(1)7-
correlation coefficient of the residuals is relatively small, at 0.21 (the coefficient measures the 
serial correlation of the second decade residual upon the first decade residual).   
 
Now one must avoid that the exogenous variables are correlated with the residuals due to an 
endogenous relationship between growth and its determinants.  
 
( ) 0, ≠ii xCov ε      (5.4) 
                                                 
7 The number (1) indicates that the time series is generated by prior influences that lie one period in the past. 
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This would lead to biased and inconsistent estimators. Therefore, an instrumental variable 
estimation is performed. The results are shown in column 2 of Table 1 in the appendix. An 
instrument that controls for endogeneity must be highly correlated with the exogenous 
variables and not at all with the endogenous variable. Investments in education in the 1950s 
can, for instance, serve as instrumental variable for the education level of 1965, because 
these investments directly impact the later level of education, but they can not be influenced 
by economic growth from 1965 on. This is why Barro and Sala-i-Martin use previous period 
observations (lagged variables) of exogenous variables as instruments. 
 
Now I discuss the instrumental variable (IV) regression results in the second column. The 
variable log(GDP) represents per capita income of the years 1965 and 1975 (representing 
the first and second decade). Earlier values are used as instruments so that the income 
convergence rate is not overestimated.8 The correlation coefficient for log(GDP) (–0,026) 
accounts for the conditional convergence hypothesis: The negative coefficient shows that 
poor countries grow more strongly than wealthy countries and, therefore, the income levels 
of countries will equal over time given the hypothetical constancy of other growth factors. 
This means that only countries with the same characteristics in terms of education, health, 
government expenditure, etc., will converge in income. 
 
The graph in figure 5 shows a simple plot of the variables income growth and income level. 
 
If the income level was the only variable affecting income growth, there would be a positive 
relationship between the two variables. Hence, wealthy countries would grow faster than 
poor countries, which would disprove the absolute growth convergence hypothesis. Yet, 
when one takes into account other growth determinants, the coefficient for log(GDP) 
becomes negative. This means that, when given the same national structure, poor countries 
grow more strongly than wealthy countries (conditional convergence of income). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 For example, when log(GDP) for 1965 is measured too small, growth from 1965 to 1975 would be overestimated, since log 
(GDP) of 1975 does not have the same measurement error. 
 42
Figure 5: Per capita growth rate 1965-85 against (nat. log) real per capita GDP 1965 
 
 
 
 
Source: Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) 
 
 
 
The coefficients of male secondary schooling and male higher education are 0.0164 and 
0.050, respectively. The values in parenthesis are standard errors. The coefficient 0.0164 
means that, with respect to the first decade, a rise in male secondary schooling by the extent 
of the standard deviation (0.68 years) increases the growth rate by 1.1 percentage points per 
year. This shows the following algebraric deduction:  
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Source: own calculation  
 
The growth effect of an additional year of male higher education is larger than the growth 
effect of an additional year of male secondary schooling. 
 
The coefficients of female secondary schooling and female higher education are, at –0.009 
and –0.079, negative. The coefficient of female secondary schooling is insignificant and the 
coefficient of female higher education is only marginally significant, but a F-test of common 
significance shows a p-value of 0.007, according to Barro et al. (not shown in the table). 
Therefore, the coefficients of both female education variables are unequal to zero at a 
significance level of 1%. 
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The growth reducing effects of female education contradict the theoretical findings. Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995) reason that this result emerges due to the high income level in wealthy 
countries. High gender differences in education can be seen as signs of economic 
underdevelopment and, therewith, as signs of high potential for income growth (convergence 
mechanism). Most wealthy countries with high income levels and low growth potential have 
smaller gender-specific differences in education. According to Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995), this could be the reason why a growth regression (including growth rates instead of 
levels of GDP as endogenous variables) results in a negative impact of female human capital 
on growth. 
 
The coefficient of government expenditures on education in relation to GDP (G-educ./Y), 
which represents a country’s quality of education, is also important to note. The coefficient is 
significantly positive, at 0.23. A country’s quality of education, therefore, promotes growth. 
 
In column 4, primary education of men and women were added as additional exogenous 
variables. The variables are neither separately nor jointly significant. This closely relates to 
the fact that secondary and higher education produce higher growth rates than primary 
school. The additional variable primary schooling does not significantly change the 
coefficients of secondary and higher education. 
 
The regression results in column 8 of table 2 in the appendix contain the growth effects of 
fertility rates. The coefficient is significantly negative. Hence, population size negatively 
impacts growth, which is consistent with the theory discussed by Solow (1956). The 
additional variable fertility does not change the coefficients of secondary and higher 
education significantly.  
 
Column 20 of table 3 in the appendix shows the regression results for an estimation including 
dummy variables for the regions Latin America, East Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Under-
average growth was measured for many Latin American and African countries, and above-
average growth was measured for East Asia. It could be that growth in these countries 
cannot be adequately described by the exogenous variables discussed above. 
Consequently, omitted exogenous variables would bias the estimation results.  
 
The dummy variable regressors are significantly negative for Latin America, negative but not 
significant for Sub-Saharan Africa, and positive but not significant for East Asia. This means 
that the previous exogenous variables describe economic growth for Sub-Saharan Africa and 
East Asia quite well, yet they do not adequately describe Latin America’s weak growth 
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performance. Barro and Sala-i-Martin assume that essential aspects of Latin American 
politics during the 1970s and 1980s, such as corruption and a lax economic policy, are not 
adequately taken into account by the exogenous variables included in the regression.  
 
Furthermore, the introduction of regional dummy variables changes several of the 
aforementioned regression results. What is most interesting is that the impact of female 
secondary schooling on growth becomes significantly positive. At the beginning of the time 
period measured, education was relatively uniformly distributed among women and men in 
Latin America compared to the other regions, and it grew little throughout the measured time 
period. Hence, in the regression without dummy variables, unobserved growth determinants 
in Latin America down biased the female education coefficients. 
 
To conclude, the discussed regression results cannot fully describe the macroeconomic 
impact of women’s education, employment and income. The mostly significant negative 
impact of female education on growth raises questions about how data was gathered and 
measured, which I discuss in the next section. Nevertheless, Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s 
empirical results do present several important findings. The growth of a country is 
determined by a series of variables. One can observe that fast and slow growing countries 
differ mainly in terms of government consumption, as well as in terms of expenditures on 
education and investments.  
 
Furthermore, the economists show that female education has a significantly negative impact 
on fertility and a significantly positive impact on health (regression results not shown here); 
these results strengthen the notion that women’s education generates growth also indirectly 
by affecting fertility and health. Because indirect effects are not considered in the growth 
regression discussed above, one can assume that the effects of female education on growth 
are significantly underestimated. The empirical estimates of Klasen (2002) presented in the 
next but one section deal with this problem.   
 
 
1.2.2. Methodological problems 
 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) describe their estimation results, which suggest a negative 
impact of female education on growth, as “puzzling findings.” They explain the results with 
the effect of underdevelopment as well as with the omission of a dummy variable for Latin 
America. Since then, data collection and estimation methods have been analysed and further 
developed and a number of economists have concentrated their research on the growth 
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effects of female education.  The advancement of empirical methods allowed for more 
trustworthy results, the majority of which demonstrate that gender-specific differences in 
education and employment hinder a country’s economic growth. This section gives an 
overview of scientific reactions to Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s regression results. 
 
Underdevelopment effect 
Dollar and Gatti (1999) do not accept Barro’s reference to an underdevelopment effect, 
because the estimation equation already included initial per capita income as exogenous 
variable, which reflects a country’s development stage.  
 
Mulicolinearity 
Klasen (2002) states that Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s estimation does not sufficiently account 
for the high colinearity between female and male education. The correlation between both 
variables is over 90%, according to Klasen. This problem of multicollinearity makes it almost 
impossible to separate the impacts of female and male education on growth. The relatively 
large standard errors of the education coefficients also points to this problem. 
 
Endogeneity 
Furthermore, Klasen (2002) refers to an insufficiently solved endogeneity problem between 
growth and education. A higher human capital stock may generate growth, but inversely a 
country’s growth may promote investments in education (cf. Galor and Weil, 1996). This 
inverse causality makes estimations with appropriate instrumental variables necessary. Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin’s use of lagged variables as instruments did not perfectly solve the 
endogeneity problem. Dollar and Gatti (1999) recommend religion and civil rights as 
instruments for education; these variables may influence gender-specific distribution of 
education yet do not influence a country’s growth directly. Dollar and Gatti (1999) note, for 
instance, that educational difference among men and women are prominent within Muslin 
and Hindu cultures, while there is less of an educational gap between men and women in 
predominantly Protestant regions. Moreover, Dollar and Gatti (1999) justify their 
consideration by emphasising that predominantly Protestant countries tend to grow faster 
than countries in which the Muslim and Hindu religion are dominant. However, the use of 
religion as proxies for education, or more general for economic development, is 
questionable. To rely on the statistical correlation between the two variables bears the risk of 
encouraging a simplistic discussion about development restraints of non-Christian countries.  
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Estimation errors and omitted variable bias 
Forbes (2000) names another central problem of measuring growth: the lack of access to 
data over long time periods. Countries often have very different measurement conceptions 
and methods for the variables economists are interested in. Data are often incomplete and 
inconsistent in terms of time.  Estimation errors and omitted variables due to missing data 
reduce the estimation’s significance (omitted variable bias). Systematic measurement errors 
lead to either positively or negatively biased estimators, which is dependent on the 
correlation between estimation errors and other variables in the regression. If countries tend 
to tone down the gender-specific difference in education that they report (that is, they report 
a smaller gap than actually exists) and if these countries have an under-average growth at 
the same time, the negative impact of gender-specific educational differences on growth will 
be underestimated. If variables that increase inequality between men and women and reduce 
growth, such as the degree of corruption for example, are omitted in the regression, the 
negative impact of gender-specific educational differences on growth will be overestimated. 
Furthermore, the omitted dummy variable for Latin America causes an omitted variable bias, 
too.  Unobserved country-specific effects, such as production technology standards that are 
not represented by proxy variables, go into the residuals of the estimation equation. OLS- 
and Generalized Least Square9-Methods (among others, SUR) will produce consistent 
estimators only if country-specific residuals are not correlated with exogenous variables. Yet, 
in Barros and Sala-i-Martin’s dynamic cross-section analysis, residuals are correlated with 
initial per capita GDP. This biases the estimators. Klasen (2002) recommends applying a 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation method for dynamic panel data 
(combination of aggregated cross-country and time series data), in which the estimators 
eliminate growth determinants that are unobservable and/or difficult to measure and remain 
constant over time (country-specific effects such as climate and geography or a country’s 
political and legal system) by using differences.   
 
The following is a simplified mathematical representation of this method: 
 
tttt zxy εββ ++= 21        (6.1) 
 
with x as observable and z as an unobservable exogenous variable, that does not change 
over time since 1−= tt zz  
 
( ) 12111 0 −−− −+⋅+−⋅=−⇒ tttttt xxyy εεββ     (6.2) 
 
                                                 
9 GLS-methods are more general OLS-estimation methods that control for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
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Hence, the regression coefficient for x is no longer biased. The next chapter will illustrate the 
procedures and results of Klasen’s (2002) growth regression.  
 
 
1.2.3. The positive impact of women’s education on economic growth  
 
Klasen’s (2002) regressions are based on cross-country data as well as on panel data 
(combination of cross-country and time series data) and analyse whether limited schooling of 
women and girls reduces a country’s growth. His empirical analysis proves both direct and 
indirect growth effects of uniformly distributed education among women and men. 
Educational discrimination is a direct hindrance to growth because it reduces a country’s 
human capital stock. Moreover, education of women has both direct external effects, 
because children profit from their mothers’ education, and indirect external effects, as it 
reduces population growth. Klasen explicitly models these indirect effects. A regression that, 
for example, models fertility only as an exogenous variable, underestimates the total growth 
effect of educating women.  
 
The effects measured are robust against changes in specification. The estimation method 
considers endogeneity problems. About 0.4-0.9 percentage points of growth difference 
between fast growing countries in East Asia and slow growing countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, South Asia and the Middle East can be explained by gender-specific differences in 
education.   
 
Insufficient data availability makes measures of the impact of female education on growth 
somewhat problematic. Women’s household and child rearing activities are measured only in 
a few countries and overall changes in quantity and quality of this sector are generally not 
measured. It can therefore be assumed that growth effects from women’s education are 
underestimated, because advances in productivity within private realms remain unaccounted 
for. 
 
Klasen uses data from 109 countries that spans three decades, 1960-1992, and, therewith, 
measures long-term growth more effectively than did Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), whose 
estimations were based on a time period that covers only 20 years. First, Klasen does a 
cross-country regression based on average values of all observations for the years 1960 to 
1992. He measures growth as change over time in a country’s “Purchasing Power Parity” 
(PPP) per capita. The PPP allows for a better comparison between countries because it 
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accounts for different price levels between countries and, therewith, makes it possible to 
compare standards of living. 
 
 
The endogenous variable is the average growth rate in PPP from 1960-1992 (growth). This 
variable is determined by a series of exogenous variables:  
 
 population growth (Popgro)  
 labour force growth (LFG) 
 degree of openness (free trade) (OPEN)  
 investment rate in relation to GDP (Inv)  
 regional dummy variables 
 education 
 
 
Education is specified by the variables ED60, RED60 GED, and RGED: 
 
 ED60 measures the adult (age 15 and on) population’s total years of schooling in the 
year 1960.  
 RED60 measures total years of schooling of women in relation to total years of school 
of men (again, age 15 on) in the year 1960. The closer the variable RED60 of a country 
is to 1, the more evenly distributed education was in 1960.  
 GED measures the averages growth in total years of schooling of the adult population 
between the years 1960 and 1990. 
 RGED measures the average growth of the ratio of total years of schooling of women 
and total years of schooling of men between 1960 and 1990. 
 
 
The following equation estimates the direct impact of the aforementioned determinants on a 
country’s growth rate: 
 
6060 6543211 REDGEDEDLFGPopgroInvg ββββββα ++++++=    
εββ +++ XRGED 87      (7.1) 
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Equations (2) to (4) estimate the impact of education on investments, population growth and 
labour force growth:  
 
6060 1312111092 REDGEDEDLFGPopgroInv βββββα +++++=    
φββ +++ XRGED 1514          (7.2) 
ϕβββββα ++++++= XRGEDREDGEDEDPopgro 20191817163 6060   (7.3) 
γβββββα ++++++= XRGEDREDGEDEDLFG 25242322214 6060    (7.4) 
  
A path analysis shows the overall growth effect of education, which indirectly impacts growth 
via investments, population growth and labour force growth. Hence, the overall growth 
effects of total years of school of women in relation to total years of school of men in 1960 
(RED60) is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1102332319182181136 βββββββββββββ ∗∗+∗+∗∗+∗+∗+        (7.5.) 
 
The first term describes the direct growth effect, the second term the indirect growth effect 
via investments, the third term the indirect growth effect via population growth, the fourth 
term the indirect growth effect via population growth and investments, the fifth term the 
indirect growth effect via labour force growth, and the sixth term measures the indirect 
growth effect via labour force growth and investments.  
 
Equation (7.6) measures only the growth effects of education and omits other growth 
determinants (reduced form which contains the risk of obtaining biased estimation results 
due to missing determinants): 
 
υβββββα ++++++= XRGEDREDGEDEDg 30292827265 6060    (7.6)  
 
The somewhat complex modelling of education with four variables helps avoiding 
multicollinearity problems. ED60 and GED represent a country’s overall human capital stock; 
RED60 and RGED describe gender-specific differences in education. The correlation 
coefficients between Klasen’s education variables, that means between ED60 and RED60 as 
well as between GED and RGED,  are smaller than the correlation coefficients between the 
education variables specified by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). The smaller correlation 
makes it easier to identify different effects. One is able to measure if a country with a small 
gender-specific difference in education grows faster than a country with larger gender-
specific educational disparities, given the same human capital stock in both countries.  
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The estimations of proxy variables for ED60 and GED are based on two different 
assumptions: 
 
1) If one assumes that a reduction in educational differences is possible when the level 
of education for men remains constant, the number of school years of men can be 
used as a proxy for measuring the average total years of schooling of a population in 
1960 and its increase (ED60 and GED).  
2) If one assumes that investments in women’s education partly reduce investments in 
men’s education, an estimation with the aforementioned proxy overestimates the real 
growth effect of a reduction in gender-specific educational differences. If one 
assumes that investments in the education of women reduce investments in the 
education of men in equal shares, the number of average school years of men and 
women can be used as a proxy of average years of schooling of an adult population 
in 1960 and its increase (ED60 and GED). This procedure would underestimate the 
real growth effect of a reduction of gender-specific differences in education. 
 
It is difficult so say which of the two assumptions corresponds better to reality. Klasen (2002) 
states that for developing countries, it is probable that investments in women’s education 
partly and initially reduce investments in men’s education as long as these countries still face 
important resource constraints. On the other hand, Goldin (1994) states for the USA, for 
example, that the enormous investments in female education in the 1920s and 1930s have 
lead to a catching up of female education levels without reducing male education levels. 
 
A further problem is endogeneity, as here again it is possible that a country’s growth 
influences investment in education (inverse causality), which would bias the estimation 
results. A remedy would be to perform an estimate using instrument variables. Klasen (2002) 
tries to solve this problem by using lagged variables as instruments in a way that is similar to 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s (1995) approach, yet Klasen carries out a more complex, three-
step procedure.  
 
Firstly, the educational level of the population (25 years old and over) in the year 1970 is 
entered into the regression. This variable is not influenced by economic growth after 1960, 
because the primary educational level of a 25-year-old in 1970 would have been impacted by 
investments in education that occurred between 1940 and 1955.  
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In the second step, expenditures on education, fertility rates of 1960 as well as changes in 
the fertility rate are introduced into the regression as instruments for changes in school years 
GED and changes in gender-specific school years RGED. 
 
In the third step, the model is estimated with a panel data set in which the variables are 
divided into 3 decades (1960-1970, 1971-1980 and 1981-1990). The education variables of 
1960 (ED60 and RED60) are the only exogenous variables used in this regression. 
 
The first column of table 4 in the appendix shows regression results from the first estimation 
equation. The significantly positive coefficients of the investment rate (Inv) and the degree of 
openness (open) confirm their growth promoting impact. Population growth has a 
significantly negative impact and labour force growth has a significantly positive impact on 
growth. Regional dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America are 
significant.10  
 
Total school years of the adult population in the year 1960 (ED60) as well as the average 
increase in school years of the adult population between 1960 and 1990 (GED) have a 
significantly positive impact on growth. 
 
The most relevant coefficients are those of the total school years of women compared to 
men in 1960 (RED60) as well as of the average increase in the ratio between total school 
years of women and men between the years 1960 and 1990 (RGED). Both coefficients are 
significantly positive. An increase in RGED, from 0.5 to 1.0 (in other words, the number of 
school years of women doubles and becomes identical to the number of school years of 
men), would raise the annual growth rate about 0.4 percentage points.  
 
This shows the following calculation:  
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] =×∗∗+∗+∗∗+∗+∗+ 5,01102432419192191147 βββββββββββββ  
 
[ ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )056,081,022,055,022,0056,028,169,0 ∗−∗−+−∗−+∗+  
( )( ) ( )( )] 3965656,05,0056,06,213,062,013,0 =×∗∗−+∗−+  
 
Source: own calculation 
 
                                                 
10 Significance shown in table: values in brackets are t-values; * significance at 90%-level, *** significance at 95%-level;                
*** significance at 99%-level.  
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Column (2) of table 4 in the appendix shows the investment coefficients from equation (2). 
Investments are significantly positive correlated with labour force growth and openness.  The 
higher ED60 and RED60, the higher is a country’s investments. This also applies to GED 
and RGED, though these coefficients are not significant. Nevertheless, the positive 
coefficients confirm the indirect impact of education and its distribution on growth via 
investments.  
 
Column (3) and (4) show regression results for population growth and labour force growth, 
based on equations (3) and (4). The results show that a reduction in gender-specific 
differences in education time (an increase of RGED) reduces population growth and labour 
force growth over time.  
 
Column (5) shows the regression results of the reduced form (equation (5)). The coefficients 
in the fifth column are significantly higher in value than the results presented in the first 
column. This confirms that education has large indirect impacts on a country’s growth – 
above all, in terms of its impact via investments.  
 
The sixth and seventh regression estimate equation (1) and (5) by using average human 
capital of women and men instead of only human capital of men as a proxy for education. 
The coefficients remain significant, but are as foreseen somewhat smaller than those in the 
first and fifth column. This proves that the estimation results are robust against changes in 
specifications.  
  
Klasen’s calculations, shown in table 5 in the appendix, show what share (in percent) in  
growth differences between countries with strong growth (East Asian and pacific regions) 
and  countries with little growth (Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and North 
Africa) can be explained by unequal distribution of education (RED60 and RGED). The first 3 
columns show results for the specification in which education of men is used as a proxy for 
average human capital (overestimation). The last 3 columns show results for the 
specification in which education of both men and women is applied as a proxy for human 
capital (underestimation). 
 
The coefficients in the first column indicate the following: growth in Sub-Saharan African and 
East Asian/Pacific countries over the years 1960-1992 differs by 3.3 percentage points. 0.45 
of the total percentage points comes from educational differences between women and men, 
of which 0.08 points represent educational differences in 1960 (RED60) and 0.37 points 
represent educational differences throughout the years after 1960 (RGED). The indirect 
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effects of educational differences are very small; for instance, only 0.07 percentage points of 
the difference in growth comes from investment channels.  
 
When direct and indirect effects are added together, the resulting coefficient is 0.56. Overall, 
0.43 percentage points of the difference in growth between Sub-Saharan African and East 
Asian/Pacific countries come of RGED and 0.13 percentage points come from RED60. 
Concerning the growth difference between South Asia and East Asia/Pacific, between 0.95 
and 0.77 percentages come from unequally distributed education. Concerning the growth 
difference between the Middle East/North Africa and South Asia/Pacific, between 0.86 and 
0.69 percentage points are caused by educational discrimination. This shows that impact of 
av uneven distribution of education on the growth difference between regions is massive, as 
it accounts for approximately one fourth of the difference in percentage points.  
 
Klasen (2002) estimates equations (1) and (5) using a panel data set covering 3 decades to 
control for possible endogeneity. He also conducts a two-step OLS regression; the 
instruments are government expenditures for education (relative to GDP), the fertility rate in 
1960 as well as the change in fertility rates from 1960-1990. These factors directly affect 
education and only indirectly affect economic growth Both estimations do not change the size 
and the significance of the education coefficients essentially (results not shown here).  This 
shows that education and its distribution have a significant impact on a country’s economic 
growth and overweight the reverse effect – that is, the impact of growth on education. 
 
Lastly, Klasen controls for country-specific effects. He divides the countries into homogenous 
groups and repeats the estimations for each group separately. The coefficients do not 
undergo any significant change.  
 
To conclude, Klasen’s empirical analysis confirms that education and its equal distribution 
among men and women have a significant positive impact on growth. In Sub-Saharan 
African countries, which experience the smallest average growth in per capita income per 
year (0.9% per year, which is only 40% of the world average), the average woman in 1960 
received 1.09 years of schooling. The number of years has increased at an under average 
pace through to 1992. Booming regions like in East Asia/Pacific experienced similarly low 
education rates of women and girls in the 1960s, but investments in female education has 
since surpassed that of men by 44%. This speaks for a positive impact of investments in 
female education on economic growth.   
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The estimation results are robust against different specifications. Problems of 
multicollinearity and endogeneity are taken adequately into account. According to Klasen, an 
equal distribution of education always yields a win-win situation for a country: economic 
growth and other essential developmental goals, such as reduction of child mortality, go 
hand in hand. 
 
 
 1.2.4. The impact of women’s labour market participation on growth                                 
 
The impact of women’s  labour market participation and income on growth has been studied 
empirically much less than the impact of women’s education on growth, and the relevant 
studies have all been conducted in the past 10 years. Studies on the growth effect of female 
labour market participation have been done primarily by Klasen, and studies on the growth 
effect of female wage have been done primarily by Seguino. Klasen (1999) estimates a 
positive growth effect of an increase in women’s labour market participation which is 
presented in this section.  Seguino (2000) estimates a (conditional) positive growth effect of 
wage differences between women and men. This means that a country’s growth is greater 
the less women earn in relation to their male colleagues. The conditions for this conclusion 
are described in detail in the following section. 
  
According to Klasen (1999), an increase in female labour market participation generates 
growth, because an less than proportional employment of women in formal labour sectors 
distorts the selection of productive workers. The average ability of a country’s labour force is 
artificially reduced. This hinders a country’s ability to be internationally competitive. 
Furthermore, Klasen draws from of Galor and Weil (1996), that women’s employment and 
earned income promote growth by increased savings. Moreover, a less than proportional 
employment of women reduces growth due to a measurement effect: household and child 
rearing activities are usually not captured by economic measures. Substituting these 
activities with employment, which is recorded as data, raises a country’s measured economic 
output. 
 
For the regression, Klasen uses the same data set that he uses as discussed in the previous 
chapter (109 countries, time period 1960-1992). The data set shows that women in Africa, 
South Asia and the Middle East are under-represented in the labour force over the whole 
time period. The percentage of women in the official labour force in Africa, for example, 
increased from 1970 to 1990 by only 1.6%. 
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The exogenous variable, which is the change in the purchasing power parity per capita, is 
explained by the following endogenous variables: 
 
 the natural logarithm of the initial income level of the year 1960 (LNINC60) 
 the degree of openness (Open)  
 the four known education variables (ED60, RED60, RED60 und RGED)  
 growth in the female labour market participation  
 
Growth in the female labour market participation is specified by the variables GEMPF and 
CHFSLS: 
 
 GEMPF: growth in the share of women working in the formal labour sector in the 
number of all women of working age. Data for this variable is only available for 66 
countries, as many countries do not record data about women who do not work.  
 CHFSLS: change in the share of women working in the formal labour sector in the 
country’s entire labour force (women and men who work). Because for this variable, 
observations of the working population only are necessary, data are available for all 
109 countries.  
 
The estimation results are shown in table 6 in the appendix. Column (6) shows a significantly 
positive coefficient for GEMPF of 0.8. The coefficient for CHFSLS (Column 7) is positive, but 
not significant.  
 
Because of the incomplete data base, it is impossible to find an appropriate instrument to 
control for possible endogeneity. Consequently, the estimation results have to be interpreted 
with care. They do suggest a positive selection and measurement effect that overestimate 
the impact of female labour market participation on a country’s measured growth. 
 
Klasen (1999) calculates that low female labour market participation contributes to about 0.3 
percentage points to the difference in growth performance between strongly growing 
countries in East Asia and slowly growing countries in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and 
the Middle East.  
 
Klasen and Lamanna (2003) do the same regressions based on a larger data set containing 
a longer time period (1960 to 2000). They conclude that while gender-specific differences in 
education are essentially reduced in the Middle East and North Africa, the gender-specific 
differences in employment are barely reduced. 
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1.2.5. The impact of women’s income on economic growth  
 
Seguino (2000) analyses growth determinants for half-industrial, export-oriented countries. 
She concludes that a limited relative wage for women, who make up a large percentage of 
the labour force within the export sector, stimulates growth. The empirical analysis shows 
that there is a positive correlation between unequal pay among women and men and a 
country’s GDP growth. 
 
Seguino (2000) explains this phenomenon with the following arguments: Half-industrial 
export-oriented countries export finished goods and import intermediate and capital goods as 
well as technical licenses from industrial nations. These countries’ specialisation in specific 
manufacturing sectors – for example, East Asia’s specialisation in textile production – allows 
for economies of scale and, therewith, competitive prices. In almost every country, there are 
concentrations of women within certain employment sectors (job segregation), such as in the 
field of fine handwork. Today in half-industrialised countries, the majority of workers in the 
export industry tend to be female. International competition causes the export sector to exert 
wage pressure on employees. The bargaining power of workers is limited, and women within 
this sector are paid little for their productivity. The resulting cost savings represent a 
Ricardian comparative cost advantage for half-industrialised countries. While finished 
products are exported, new technologies that improve production processes are imported 
(spill over effect). Employees must adapt to new technologies quickly. This is why low wages 
can not be the only generator of growth; it is also important that women are well trained and 
highly productive at the same time. Consequently, only a real discrimination in wage 
promotes growth in these countries – that is, when women with the same qualifications as 
men earn less than men. The less increases in education are reflected in women’s wages, 
the more the country benefits from wage discrimination with respect to growth. 
 
Seguino uses data from 20 half-industrialised export-oriented countries that spans the years 
1975-1995. The majority of these countries are in East Asia (for example, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Korea, Hong Kong, Thailand and Malaysia). Export-dominated branches include 
textiles, electronic, shoe, plastic and rubber manufacturers. Seguino’s use of average 
periods eliminates time series effects.   
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The determinants of growth in the regression are:  
 
 the change in capital stock dlogK  
 the level of human capital HK as the share of people aged 15  and over who have 
obtained secondary schooling 
 the wage gap between men and women 
 
 
The wage gap between men and women is specified by the variables WGAP1, WGAP2 and 
WGAP3:  
 
 WGAP1 stands for absolute differences in wage between women and men  
 WGAP2 stands for differences in wage relativised by differences in education among 
men and women (pure wage discrimination) 
 WGAP3 stands for the interaction between WGAP2 and average schooling in order to 
control for the assumption that growth in exports based on large difference in gender-
specific wages is only possible when the human capital stock is high.  
 
The regression results are shown in table 7 in the appendix. The coefficient of WGAP1 is 
significantly positive. An increase in wage differences of 0.1 percentage points raises a 
country’s growth by 0.15 percentage points. The coefficients of the relativised wage 
differences WGAP2 and WGAP3 are also significantly positive. An increase in wage 
differences according to the definitions WGAP2 and WGAP3 of 0.1 percentage points 
increases a country’s growth by 0.1 percentage points. The positive coefficient of WGAP3 
confirms that wage discrimination and education of women form a complementary 
relationship.  
 
Seguino (2000) repeats the regressions based on 5 year averages instead of period 
averages to control for country and time specific effects. All the three wage difference 
coefficients remain significantly positive.   
 
The empirical analysis shows that – under the condition that education is equally distributed– 
wage differences between women and men promote a country’s export level and thereby, 
increase output. However, it is important to note that the empirical analysis is based on 
export-oriented, semi-industrialised countries in East-Asia only and therefore, the result 
should not be considered to be universal. There are several arguments that suggest a 
positive impact of women’s income on growth. Galor and Weil (1996) emphasise that an 
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increase in women’s income can be growth promoting due to higher savings. Klasen (1999) 
argues that women’s income promotes growth because it allows mothers to invest in the 
education and health of their children. These arguments suggest that further empirical 
research is needed concerning the impact of women’s income on growth.  
 
It is important to note that Seguino (2000) does not include women’s labour market 
participation as exogenous variable in the regression. High labour market participation of 
women means that there are also less productive women participating in the labour force. 
This lowers both average productivity and average wages of women. It can be assumed, that 
including women’s labour market participation in the estimation would reduce the growth 
effect of gender-specific wage discrimination.   
 
Seguino (2005) underlines that in East Asia, women’s wage discrimination contributes 
significantly to the countries’ boom in economy while women do not personally benefit from 
the fruits of their work. According to Seguino, economic integration and liberalisation of 
international markets can have negative consequences for women’s wages and working 
conditions. Economic growth spurts in East Asia have not improved the situation for working 
women. In 1999, 40 years after Korea’s economic boom, Korean women still earn only 
55.6% of what men earn and in Taiwan, women earn 60% of what men earn. Moreover, 
wage differences in these regions have actually been increasing since the 1980s.  
  
 
1.3. Conclusion 
 
The overview of the theoretical and empirical analysis concerning the impact of women’s 
empowerment shows that it is nowadays recognised that women’s education and 
employment greatly contribute to a country’s macroeconomic growth performance. This 
finding is supported by the models discussed in this chapter as well as by the presented 
empirical studies. Furthermore, the finding that gender specific inequalities reduce growth is 
is in line with today’s knowledge that inequalities of any kind reduce growth, for example due 
to an inefficient allocation of resources caused by wrong selection mechanisms or due to 
social conflicts (c.f. for example Bénabou, 1996; Alesina and Perotti, 1996). 
 
However, the analysis also showed that this insight has not always been so intuitive and 
generally accepted as it is now, neither on the theoretical nor on the empirical side. 
Exogenous growth models, mainly developed in the 1950s and 1960s, did not attribute a 
positive impact of human capital on growth, and hence according to these theoretical 
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frameworks, gender discrimination in education does not impact a country’s economic growth 
performance, neither in a positive nor in a negative way. It was not until the 1990s that 
endogenous growth models did not only consider human capital, but also it’s gender-specific 
distribution as a growth determinant and modelled a negative impact of gender discrimination 
in terms of education on growth. Other endogenous growth models that suggest a negative 
impact of gender discrimination in terms of employment and income followed soon thereafter.  
 
The overview of empirical studies estimating the impact of women’s empowerment on growth 
also shows that the assertion that a reduction of gender discrimination is growth promoting 
has not always been proven easily in empirical terms. The first estimations found a negative 
impact of women’s education on growth. However, it did not take long until this finding was 
disproved by other empirical studies that took into account methodological problems more 
accurately and applied estimation corrections. Hence, recent empirical studies unanimously 
prove a purely positive impact of women’s education and employment on growth. Therefore, 
while there is undeniable social value in dismantling discrimination in terms of education and 
employment of any kind, a reduction in gender discrimination no longer can be seen as an 
“aim of its own”, but is also meaningful in economic terms. Moreover, the presented empirical 
studies even risk to underestimate the positive impact of women’s education and 
employment on growth because of data quality problems. As women’s household and child 
rearing activities are not measured, women’s advances in productivity within private realms 
remain unaccounted for. Measures of female labour market participation risk to be 
underestimated because female work is often informal and therefore unrecorded and non-
paid work (i.e. contributing family workers) and independent work (i.e. street vendors) are 
rarely included in the statistics.  
 
The overview of empirical studies also shows that there is no empirical evidence for a growth 
promoting effect of women’s income. We have seen that gender-specific wage discrimination 
(that is, lower compensation for women than men that is not explained by differences in 
education) can have a positive impact on growth. Nevertheless, this finding is valid only 
under special conditions. These conditions occur especially in semi-industrialised export-
oriented countries, namely in South-East Asia. Here, producers in manual labour intensive 
fields achieve a comparative advantage by paying lower female wages than producers in 
other countries. Women are faced with pure wage discrimination, as their productivity far 
exceeds their wage compensation. At the same time, cheap production and a relatively 
qualified workforce allow these countries exporting worldwide at low prices, which, -in turn- 
promotes growth. Nevertheless, it is questionable that the growth promoting effect of gender 
discrimination in terms of income is universally valid.  We have seen several theoretical 
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arguments which suggest a positive impact of women’s income on growth. For example, 
higher wages for women can be growth promoting due to an increase in savings and 
consumption as well as an increase in investments in health and education of children. 
These arguments suggest that further empirical research is needed concerning the impact of 
women’s income on macroeconomic growth. 
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2. Link two: The impact of macroeconomic growth on women’s economic 
empowerment  
 
 
This section discusses a series of theoretical models and empirical studies that investigate 
the impact of macroeconomic growth on women’s economic role in terms of employment.  
The previous section has shown that it is nowadays recognised that gender differences in 
employment lower a country’s growth performance.  This section shows that the reverse 
impact of growth on women’s employment is still much less clear, neither in theory nor on the 
empirical side.  
 
Firstly, I show that on the theoretical side, there are two different approaches explaining the 
impact of growth on female labour market participation. The first approach suggests an 
increase of female labour market participation across all stages of economic development. 
This approach is called the “modernisation neoclassical approach”, based on Becker (1957), 
and has been enhanced by arguments by Trinker (1976) and Standing (1999). The second 
approach supports the “feminisation U” hypothesis, which suggests a convex impact of 
growth on female labour market participation. According to this approach, in early stages of 
development growth first lowers female labour market participation, and increases it in the 
middle and long run only, at higher stages of development. The “feminisation U” hypothesis 
is based on Boserup (1970). I finish the theoretical overview by showing how Goldin (1994) 
develops and completes Boserup’s approach by introducing further arguments.  
 
In a second step, I present the most important empirical findings concerning the impact of 
growth on female labour market participation. The descriptive and empirical studies 
presented in this section all test the “feminisation U” hypothesis, but none of them clearly 
prove its validity.  I discuss descriptive time series studies by Goldin (1994), Marchand and 
Thélot (1997) and de Vries (1994), which suppose a U-shaped pattern of female labour 
market participation along a country’s economic development path. Yet the validity of the 
findings is weakened by measurement problems. I show that empirical cross-country studies 
by Goldin (1994) and Cagatay and Özler (1995) also assume the “feminisation U” 
hypothesis, but like the time series studies, they suffer from data weakness and therefore do 
not yield precise results. Furthermore, I elaborate that the shortcoming of the empirical 
results is also caused by endogeneity problems that are not sufficiently taken into account by 
the applied estimation methods. Finally, my detailed analysis of today’s scientific consensus 
concerning the impact of growth on female labour market participation shows that the lack of 
clear empirical findings represents a research gap. 
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2.1. The impact of growth on women’s empowerment in theory 
2.1.1. The positive impact of growth on women’s labour market  
           participation: the “modernisation neoclassical approach” 
   
Early studies within a neoclassical economic approach suggest that gender inequalities 
decline with economic growth (c.f. Mincer, 1958; Weiss, Ramirez and Tracy, 1976; Norris, 
1987: Clark, 1991). The most systematic presentation of this approach is given by Becker 
(1957), known as the “modernisation neoclassical approach”. 
 
Becker’s (1957) assumptions in his standard neoclassical model lead to the conclusion that 
any sort of discrimination can only be temporary. Discrimination cannot prevail in a 
competitive environment, because discrimination is not consistent with an agent’s optimal 
behaviour that maximises income or utility. In his model, Becker presents two groups with 
similar productivity profiles, white and afro-American workers. The model shows that in the 
presence of some employers who prefer profits to prejudice (competitive condition), all 
workers are employed and paid the same wage. In the following, I show how Becker’s model 
can be adapted to the case of gender discrimination.11 
  
Like Becker (1957) does with white and afro-American workers, I treat male and female 
workers as two separate groups or sectors, as if they were separate countries in an 
international trade model. I analyse discrimination under the assumption that the male sector 
has a higher ratio of capital to labour than the female sector. If there is no discrimination, a 
capitalist in the male sector would export capital (or import labour) to the point where the 
marginal products of capital (and labour) are equal in both sectors.  
 
 
Men and women have identical production functions: 
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with: 
 
mY :  total real income of the men’s sector 
wY :  total real income of women’s sector 
f : common production function 
mL : quantity of labour used in men’s sector 
                                                 
11 Adoption based on Becker’s (1957) model presented by Krueger (1963). 
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wL : quantity of labour used in women’s sector 
mK : men owned capital stock 
wK : women owned capital stock 
E : quantity of capital exported by men’s sector 
 
The production function f  is assumed to be first order homogenous and twice differentiable. 
The marginal products of labour and capital ( lf  and kf ) are positive. The second partial 
derivatives of output with respect to labour and capital ( llf  and kkf ) are negative.  
 
Men’s real output is the total output produced in the male sector plus the payment received 
by exported men’s capital used in the female sector. Women’s real output is the total output 
produced in the female sector minus the payment to imported men’s capital used in the 
production in the female sector.  
 
The sum of men’s and women’s incomes tY  is maximised when the marginal product of 
capital in the male sector equals the marginal product of capital in the female sector: 
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If the marginal product of capital is equal in the male and female sector, the marginal product 
of labour must also be equal in the two sectors.  
 
To maximise men’s income, one has to differentiate partially with respect to capital exports:  
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For a maximum: 
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Since 0〈
wkk
f , the marginal product of capital in the male sector 
mk
f should be lower than the 
marginal product of capital in the female sector 
wk
f to maximise men’s income. 
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The assumption that capital will be paid its marginal product implies the demand for capital in 
the women’s sector. The elasticity of demand for imported male capital in the female sector, 
dn , will be the elasticity of demand for capital weighted by the inverse of the proportion 
men’s capital represents of total capital used in the women’s sector. 
 
If kn  is the elasticity of demand for capital and kf  is the price of capital, then  
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substituting into equation (8.6): 
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Since 0〈dn , men will maximise their incomes by having a lower price (marginal product) of 
capital in their own sector than in the women’s sector. This is similar to national trade theory: 
men, who behave as perfect competitors concerning their allocation of capital, will do less 
well than if they impose an optimum tax. This is analogous to a sector, which can improve its 
own welfare by imposing an optimum tax being faced with a less than perfectly elastic supply 
curve. 
 
 
If men are concerned only with maximising their own incomes, the optimal differential 
between home and foreign returns (the “optimum tax”) will be:  
 
1
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Hence, men’s aggregate income may increase with appropriate discrimination against 
exporting capital to the women’s sector. Yet, in the male sector, capitalists’ income would be 
lower if discrimination were not practiced. Moreover, men’s labour income would be higher if 
discrimination was not practiced. Consequently, in the case of full employment in the male 
sector, capital owners in the men’s sector would not discriminate if they would maximise their 
own incomes and had no preference for discrimination.  
 
Hence, what Becker (1957) showed for the discrimination of white against afro-American 
workers is valid for the case of gender discrimination in the labour market, too: the disparities 
in education, employment and income between men and women are supposed to decrease 
with increasing growth, because countries have to be competitive. This can be illustrated with 
the help of the example of market expansion. Market expansion represents the 
competitiveness of a country and goes hand in hand with economic growth (cf. Rodrik, 
Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004). Market expansion not only requires producer goods but 
also human capital. In order to foster human capital, it becomes necessary for countries to 
improve access to human capital resources. Discriminating women in terms of education 
lowers a county’s average human capital stock (or in other words the country’s potential 
“talent-pool“, c.f. Klasen, 2002). Consequently, girls and women receive more education with 
increasing market expansion and growth. This enables them to enter the labour market. 
Furthermore, higher female participation in the labour market leads to higher competition 
between men and women. If men and women are equally qualified, discriminatory practices 
such as the payment of higher wages to men entail additional costs for the employers. 
Hence, with perfect competition, competition between male and female workers reduces 
discriminating practices (c.f. Aigner and Cain, 1977; Goldberg, 1982; Lundberg and Startz, 
1983). 
 
Becker’s model supposes that persisting inequalities between two groups of workers are 
mainly caused by average differences in the expected value of productivity. An individual’s 
productivity is determined by his or her level of human capital (education, skills and expected 
length of labour market participation). According to this approach, persisting inequalities in 
employment and income between men and women are only due to differences in their levels 
of human capital. These human capital differences go back to the gender-specific traditional 
division in the family, which implies that women accumulate less labour market experience 
than men. Furthermore, because women anticipate shorter and more discontinuous careers, 
they invest less in formal education. Lower education and lower work experience reduce their 
human capital stock and consequently lower their earnings relative to those of men. Becker 
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(1985) also postulates that the longer hours that women spend on housework may also 
decrease the effort women put into their professional careers, which also has a detrimental 
effect on their productivity and their wages. Hence, differences in human capital can explain 
persisting gender inequalities in employment and income, but according to Becker’s model 
differences in education, and hence in employment and income, are supposed to decrease 
with increasing growth and market expansion.  
 
Dollar and Gatti (1999) enhance Becker’s arguments by emphasising that market expansion 
assumes a reduction of all sorts of market imperfections. Some of these market 
imperfections hinder women-specific investments. For example, in many developing 
countries, an imperfect pension system makes parents to rely on sons’ support for their 
retirement, thereby favouring male education. This market failure, which leads to an 
underinvestment in women’s education, declines with rising economic growth as the country 
fosters its capital markets and hence develops capital-covered pension systems. 
  
This implies that the expansion of markets leads to a greater reliance on the functioning of 
free market mechanisms. The achievement of optimal resource allocation including labour 
becomes an important factor for growth. Sociological theoretical arguments complete this 
approach: Durkheim (1964) and Weber (1978) highlight that gender-discriminatory practices 
in employment hinder the functioning of market mechanisms as they represent traditional 
structures and patriarchal norms, often justified by religious beliefs. Ramirez, Soysal and 
Shanahan (1997) confirm that overcoming traditional norms significantly contributes to a 
reduction of gender differences in the labour market. This overcoming is „increasingly a 
product of the transnational environment rather than of local or national forces”.  
 
Yet, Becker (1957) qualifies his conclusions, enlarging his model by introducing a “taste for 
discrimination” (not formalised here). The introduction of a preference for discrimination 
acknowledges that existing gender gaps in employment may partly be due to the persistence 
of “pure discrimination” (employment and income gap despite gender equality in education 
and qualification). This discrimination can arise due to the discriminatory tastes of all sorts of 
agents, as employers for example. In the model, the assumption that capitalists in the male 
sector prefer to use their capital only within the male sector would represent such a taste for 
discrimination. Such capitalists can be induced to export capital to the women’s sector only 
at a sufficiently compensatory return, which is a higher return than they get at production in 
the men’s sector. In case of an export of capital to the women’s sector, the extra return can 
be seen as a payment to offset the “costs” (here in terms of utility) to capitalists of exporting 
capital to the female sector.  
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In addition to Becker’s additional insights, there are a series of other studies that focus on the 
persistence of gender discriminating practices in terms of wage income. Trinker (1976) and 
Ward (1984) for example, suppose that, on the one hand, growth raises women’s education 
and labour market participation, but can increase gender segregation and gender wage 
differences at the same time. This approach is supported by many governments’ gender and 
development (GAD) aid programs, for example the AUSAID (Australian Government’s 
Overseas Aid Program) and therefore is called the “GAD-approach”. Trinker (1976) and 
Ward (1984) argue that neither high levels of economic prosperity nor development of 
women’s “human capital” through education and work experience necessarily result in 
increased income for women, not to mention in increased access to authority positions for 
women. This is because gender discriminating practices in pay provide benefits for 
employers due to the opportunity to employ discriminated groups at relatively lower wages 
(c.f. also Darity, 1989).  
 
This argument was taken up and developed further by Standing (1999). Standing argues that 
globalisation supports the feminisation of the labour market, but worsens the gender-specific 
income distribution. Since the 1970s, there has been a strong growth of international trade in 
goods and services, increasing foreign direct investments and a reinforced international 
division of labour. The importance of cost cutting increases the emphasis on labour costs. 
Consequently, across the globe, countries are confronted with erosions of labour regulations 
and social protection systems. Less regular full-time work, more informalisation of 
employment, more temporary labour, part-time labour and less protection of labour interests 
are on the advance. The globalisation-led shift towards casual labour, outsourcing, part-time 
work, home working and sub-contracting reduces job security and hence favours women’s 
employment. Furthermore, competitive countries are those who dispose not only of cheap 
and flexible labour, but of skilled labour at the same time. Consequently, countries in which 
workers earn less as workers in other countries with the same qualifications and productivity, 
dispose of a Ricardian comparative cost advantage. The demand for skilled, but low paid and 
flexible work increases the proportion of women occupying jobs. With their comparative 
advantage in relatively low labour costs, developing countries have a chance to participate in 
global trade. We have already seen that Seguino (2000, 2005) empirically proved Standing’s 
arguments for export-oriented, growing tiger economies in South-East Asia. Seguino 
illustrates Standing’s arguments by substantiating that in these countries, globalisation has 
led to a large increase in the share of export-led labour-intensive manufacturing in the 1980s 
and until the late 1990s, which benefitted the employment of women. Female labour market 
participation is rising sharply, especially in the manufacturing sectors (textile, footwear, 
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garment, electronics…), but the jobs in these sectors do not offer status or the chance of 
accumulating technical skills for women and mostly imply low pay as well as insecure and 
bad working conditions. 
 
 
 2.1.2 The convex impact of growth on women’s labour market participation:  
                 the “feminisation U” hypothesis 
 
The “feminisation U” theory, supposing a convex impact of growth on women’s labour market 
participation, goes back to Boserup (1970). This approach emphasises, more so than Trinker 
(1976) and Standing (1999), the vulnerability of women over the course of economic 
development. While Trinker (1976) and Standing (1999) suppose that growth raises the 
female labour market participation but may reinforce segregation and gender wage 
discrimination, Boserup (1970) supposes that growth can also lower female labour market 
participation. In the “feminisation U” theory, which is supported by the WID (Women in 
Development)12 program and therefore is also known as the “WID-approach”, Boserup 
(1970) argues that there is a curvilinear relationship between economic growth and women’s 
employment:  Growth first lowers female labour market participation, and then increases it in 
the middle and long run.  
 
The arguments behind the convex impact of growth on female labour market participation 
that is suggested by Boserup (1970), are best illustrated as three stages:  
 
Stage one: high female labour market participation in developing countries  
In developing countries, characterised by low income standards and a large agricultural 
sector, women’s labour market participation is high. Most women work on farms in home 
workshop production. They either pursue subsistence activities or work as contributing family 
workers or as self-employed workers. This activity “at home” allows women to have children 
at the same time. Women in developing countries have a strong incentive to have children, 
because the number of children raises the family’s income and status, older children can 
work as contributing family workers at the farm and adult children care for the parent’s old-
age security. Moreover, other family members such as grandparents live at the same place 
and hence are available to care for younger children. Consequently, in developing countries, 
both female labour market participation rates and fertility rates are high. 
 
                                                 
12 The WID is an institution of USAID (an independent federal government agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance 
from the Secretary of State in the USA).  
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Stage two: falling female labour market participation in industrialising countries 
At the beginning of the economic growth process, urbanisation and industrialisation polarise 
working activities of men and women and therefore increase gender differences in 
employment and income. Firstly, the reduction of the rural sector as well as the growing 
demand for labour mobility make it more difficult for women to combine family and work. 
Family networks weaken or dissolve and children become a barrier to women’s wage 
employment. Secondly, industrialisation and technological change lower the demand for low-
skill workers relative to workers with technical and high level skills that are important to 
operate machines or computers. Men find work more easily in industrialised sectors than 
women, because they have privileged access to education and hence can adapt more easily 
to new production technologies. Men earn more now and are able to financially maintain the 
family on their own. Hence, urbanisation and industrialisation initially reduce female labour 
market participation, mainly due to structural change and an income effect. Boserup (1970) 
stresses that the polarisation and hierarchisation of men’s and women’s work roles in times 
of industrialisation also result from individual preferences of both employers and workers that 
become embedded in discriminatory practices within institutional arrangements. During the 
industrialisation process, well paid job positions that offer career perspectives are still limited 
and only slowly become accessible to a broad mass of workers. Consequently, men tend to 
monopolise access to technological innovations and education in order to outstrip 
competitors. Moreover, women face labour restrictions due to their childcare responsibilities. 
This raises their relative labour costs, which leads to employers’ preference for male 
workers. 
 
Stage three: rising female labour market participation in developed countries 
With further economic development, female labour market participation rises due to 
mechanisms known from the modernisation neoclassical approach. The exclusion of women 
from wage activities results in tight labour markets and in a rising demand for female 
workers. Competitive countries are urged to optimise their “talent pool”, and consequently, 
women receive more education and training.  Employment opportunities for women increase, 
which raises women’s opportunity costs of staying at home. Domestic labour gets 
commodified and fertility rates decline. Therefore, female labour market participation 
increases in the medium and long run, mainly due to women’s adaption to the new 
qualification and requirement profiles of the labour market and a dominating substitution 
effect. Boserup (1970) adds that in the long run, shifts in the distribution of political power 
accompanying the process of democratisation may promote greater intolerance against 
discriminatory practices, including gender discrimination. 
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Based on Boserup’s arguments, Goldin (1994) presents a theoretical framework to illustrate 
the changes in women’s labour market participation across all stages of economic 
development. Goldin complements Boserup’s arguments by suggesting that women’s 
decrease in paid work during a country’s industrialisation process appears not only through 
an income effect, but also depends on the existence of social norms. Goldin states that 
factory work, which increases during early stages of industrialisation, is abhorred by most 
married women, which can not exclusively be explained by the absence of women’s specific 
skills in manufacturing and machinery. Social norms imply a “social stigma” against married 
women working in manual occupatios, which are “dirty and physical” labour in factories, away 
from home. This is because a husband who lets his wife work in manual labour is seen by 
society as “lazy” and “incapable” to provide for his family. Not only in developing countries, 
married women who stay at home are seen as a signal of the family’s prosperity and wealth. 
For example, the fact that until recently, many married women in Germany stayed at home, 
could be interpreted as “phenomenon of the middle class”, serving to distinguish oneself from 
poorer families (prosperity effect, c.f. Fagnani, 2004).  However, the social stigma against 
married working women does not exist for clerical work (office work, sales, teachers, nurses 
etc…). This can be attributed mainly to the fact that clerical work stands for higher and high 
education levels, which can be interpreted as a woman’s social “licence” to work for pay. 
Goldin illustrates this by saying that “a married woman working in the clerical sector can have 
either a lazy and poor or a hardworking and rich husband”. Hence, women’s work in the 
clerical sector does not allow society to infer a family’s social status from the woman’s 
activity, and thus the social norm can not take effect.  
 
In order to model a convex impact of growth on female labour market participation, Goldin     
(1994) presents two frameworks, one which takes into account the existence of a social 
stigma and one which presents a non-stigma equilibrium. Both frameworks obtain a U-
shaped female labour force function with increases in per capita income, but the evidence for 
the “feminisation U” appears more consistent in the stigma-case. 
 
Goldin (1994) assumes:  
 
•  A married woman can produce a good G either in a factory or at home.  
•  G produced by the firm and G produced at home are perfect substitutes (textiles for 
example). 
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•  Poorly-educated women can work in the factory as blue-collar workers (operatives, 
manual or machinery work). Higher educated women can work in the factory as 
white-collar workers (office work as clerical assistance, for example). 
•  Women can use time T in three different ways: for production of G at home, for 
production of G at the factory and for child care C. There is no leisure time. 
•  The amount of good G produced by a family is governed by a production possibilities 
frontier (PPF). An increase of the family’s income lifts the PPF by ∆G. 
 
Women’s utility function is given by: 
 
SCGUU ∂−= ),(       (9.1) 
 
S:   utility value of the social stigma  
∂ :  0/1 indicator variable: 1=∂  if the woman works in the blue collar sector 
 
Goldin (1994) considers 3 periods:  
 
 
Period 1: developing country: 
no employment options in factories, neither for wife nor for husband  
 
Period 2:  early industrialisation process: 
appearance of a factory  
first: male education rises, husband works in factory 
then: wife gets option to work in factory as blue-collar worker 
→ family income rises  
 
Period 3: industrialised country: 
female education rises time-lagged to male education; 
 wife can work in factory as white-collar worker  
→family income rises further  
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Figure 6 shows the time allocation choice of a married woman.  
 
 
Figure 6:  Time allocation choice of a married woman 
 
 
Source: Goldin (1994) 
 
 
Period 1:  initial position: point a on the PPF 
wife works AT hours in home production to produce G  
and 0A hours for child care C 
Period 2:  appearance of a factory 
first: husband’s income increases lifts PPF by ∆G: point b 
wife reduces time of home production to produce G to BT 
and increases hours for child care to 0B 
(pure income effect) 
then: paid work in blue collar sector is offered to wife  
assumption that wife’s wage (relative to price of G) exceeds the  
slope of the PPF at  point b: line v2 
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>  no stigma-equilibrium: 
no home production of G, but production of G by wife in factory rises 
family income and therewith utility from 2U  to 
'
2U  
point c: increase of time for G production to CT 
and decrease of time for childcare to 0C 
>  stigma-equilibrium: 
wife hesitates between point c and point b:  
work in blue collar sector raises family income and therewith  
utility from 2U  to 
'
2U , but social stigma S lowers utility 
if SUU 〉− 2'2  wife moves from point b to point c 
if SUU 〈− 2'2  wife stays at point b 
Period 3:  wife gets work opportunity in white collar sector: 
further wage increase: line v3 
point d: woman increases time for G production in factory to DT  
and decreases time for childcare to 0D 
 
In both equilibria, the non-stigma and the stigma-equilibrium, female labour market 
participation first decreases and then increases across the process of economic 
development, provided that women’s employment opportunities in both the blue-collar and 
the white-collar sector arise time-lagged to those of men. Furthermore, Goldin’s model shows 
that in the stigma-case, the increase in female labour market participation is delayed in 
comparison to the non-stigma equilibrium. Hence, the U-shape of a curve illustrating the 
convex impact of economic growth on women’s labour market participation would be more 
pronounced in the social stigma case in comparison to the non-stigma case.  
 
Boserup (1970) and Goldin (1994) list a range of determinants that help understand the 
impact of growth on female labour market participation. Among them, there are education 
and technical knowledge, fertility, migration into cities and falling apart of family networks. 
There are many other possible determinants, economic and non-economic ones. The non-
economic determinants are more difficult to quantify and therefore rarely find their way into 
theoretical or empirical frameworks. Yet, by introducing the existence of social stigma into 
the model, Goldin (1994) takes into account an important non-economic determinant of 
female labour market participation. Other non-economic determinants were mentioned in the 
previous section, as traditional patriarchal structures and norms that can be based on 
religious beliefs (c.f. Weber, 1978) or on the taste for discrimination (c.f. Becker, 1957).  
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There are many other important determinants to mention. In order not to go beyond the 
scope of this work, l do not give a complete overview and limit the discussion to some 
examples. One may think, for example, of the impact of medicine on women’s labour supply 
and fertility decisions. The World Bank (2001) emphasises that medical advancement lowers 
fertility rates, as woman are less confronted with infant mortality. Hence, medical 
advancement contributes to explain rising female labour market participation rates across the 
process of economic development. Furthermore, institutional arrangements play a role for 
female labour market participation, like for example the form and the functioning of pension 
systems (capital based pensions or pay-as-you-go financing or dependence of family 
members, statutory retirement age, amount and duration of entitlements, voluntary or 
obligatory payment of contributions etc., c.f. Sinn, 2004). Another important factor for female 
labour market participation is a country’s institutional arrangement to encourage a 
reconciliation of work and family life (c.f., OECD, 2007). Today, in many developed countries, 
family policies are seen as one of the most important factors that determine women’s fertility 
and labour supply decision.  
 
Chapter 3 presents a detailed discussion of the impact of family policies on female labour 
market participation in Europe. Another important determinant of female labour market 
participation is the advancement of legal equality between men and women in the course of 
a country’s economic development. Legal protection against discriminatory labour practices 
certainly encourages female labour market participation, but is an achievement that can be 
attributed to highly developed countries only. Even in these countries, the effective 
implementation and control of antidiscrimination laws is not always assured (c.f. OECD, 
2007). In a wider sense, legal and effective protection from political instability, lawlessness 
as well as violence and intimidation within and outside the household play also an important 
role on women’s decision-making ability in terms of labour supply. Other labour market 
aspects such as working conditions or unemployment rates can also be seen as 
determinants of female labour supply. The “added-worker effect”, for example, states that 
unemployment of husbands leads to an increase in the wife’s labour supply due to the risk-
sharing arrangement of marriage (c.f. Serneels, 2002). Touching on labour supply decisions, 
it becomes clear that mechanisms of intra-household decision making, as discussed by 
Chiappori (1988), for example, may be worth considering more concretely. Not only macro- 
but also micro-determinants may help explain the evolution of female labour market 
participation. As this chapter focuses on macro-economic determinants of female labour 
market participation, a detailed discussion of intra household decision processes at this point 
would go beyond the scope of this chapter. The analysis of the impact of family policies on 
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female labour market participation proposed in chapter 3 takes into account intra household 
decision processes more precisely. 
 
 
2.2. Empirical evidence of the impact of growth on women’s                                  
       labour market participation 
 
On the empirical side, previous studies could not identify a clear effect of growth on female 
labour market participation. On the one hand, in most Western economies the economic 
situation of women in a wider context increased with growth during the last decade, 
supporting the modernisation neoclassical approach. On the other hand, there is evidence in 
support of criticisms brought up by Trinker (1976) and Standing (1999). Deininger and Squire 
(1996), for example, find no systematic effect of growth on the change of income distribution 
between men and women. They find that growth can even increase gender inequalities in 
income. Furthermore, Deininger and Squire (1996) suppose that one can not say that growth 
clearly lowers gender inequalities even when focussing only on employment. An example 
that illustrates this assumption would be Saudi Arabia: With a yearly GDP per capita of 8.974 
US$ in 2004, Saudi Arabia belongs to the 20% of the richest countries in the world, but at the 
same time Saudi Arabia has one of the lowest female shares of the labour force (15%) in the 
world and women suffer from severe repression (i.e. obliged to wear a headscarf in public, 
forbidden to drive a car, male tutelage...). A counter-example is countries of the former 
Easter Bloc: despite relatively low GDP-level,  in the 1980s and early 1990s these countries 
had relatively high levels of female labour market participation. For example, in 1990, 
Slovakia denotes a female share of the labour force of 46% and a GDP per capita of 3.703 
US$.13 Hence, the assumption that GDP growth invariably promotes female labour market 
participation has to be put into question. 
 
There exists a series of empirical studies that intend to verify empirically the “feminisation U” 
hypothesis. Some of them are time series studies; others focus on cross country data. Yet, 
measurement and estimation problems inhibit clear and universal conclusions. 
 
 
2.2.1. Time series analysis 
 
Several time series studies - in this work exemplified by Goldin (1994), Marchand and Thélot 
(1997) and de Vries (1994) - suggest a U-shaped progression of women’s labour market 
                                                 
13 Data for Saudi Arabia and Slovakia: World Bank World Development Indicators (2006).  
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participation across the process of economic development. Yet, as these studies are based 
on the observations of single countries and therefore focus on within-country variation only, 
they do not prove the universal validity of the “feminisation U” hypothesis. Furthermore, these 
studies substitute economic growth with time, suggesting that a country’s income level grows 
constantly over time. Hence, the presented studies observe the evolution of women’s labour 
market participation in the course of time, yet they do not propose empirical estimations of 
the impact of a country’s growth or income level on female labour market participation. None 
the less, in comparison to cross country studies (presented in the following section), the 
existing time series studies provide a closer look at country-specific determinants that help 
understand why there is a convex impact of growth on women’s labour market participation.  
 
Goldin (1994) observes the evolution of women’s labour market participation between 1890 
and 1980 in the United States. She states that for the USA, one has to edit and adapt data 
from the nineteenth century to today’s measurement standards to be able to observe the 
declining branch of the “feminisation U”. Data for the nineteenth century is very fragmentary 
and the definitions and methods of data collection at that time were very heterogeneous, 
which causes serious measurement problems.  
 
If one used the available data as it is, the “feminisation U” would not be observed. This is 
because at the end of the nineteenth century, US citizens were registered as participants of 
the labour force only when their occupation could be seen as “gainful employment”. 
Consequently, women who worked intermittently or only a few hours a week were not 
reported. According to Goldin (1994), the social stigma for women working in manufacturing 
also contributed to the fact that not all working married women were actually reported as 
working. Besides, contributions to family work and black market activities were not reported 
either. So, in 1890, women’s labour market participation was listed at 3% only. The official 
statistics show a constant rise from 1890 on up to 49,3% in 1980. Hence, a falling portion of 
the U is not visible in official data. Consequently, the rising female labour market participation 
dominates the US literature on female labour market participation in the twentieth century, 
supported by theories that emphasise a permanent domination of the substitution effect over 
the income effect (c.f. for example Mincer, 1962). 
 
However, Goldin’s archival research indicates that a greater percentage of women than 
reported were economically active in the end of the nineteenth century. Unregistered, but 
economically active women were for example those who produced for the market sector or 
took part in their husband’s trade when business was operated in the family’s domicile. 
According to Goldin (1994), new adjusted estimations based on today’s knowledge yield a 
 77
female share of the labour force of 15% for the end of the nineteenth century. The bottom 
was reached around 1920 approximately, and from the 1920s on female share of the labour 
force rose continuously.  
 
The reasons given by Goldin (1994) for the fall in the early twentieth century are rather 
vague. Goldin points out that in this period, a strong income effect must have dominated a 
weak substitution effect due to relatively low female wages. Furthermore, changes in 
agricultural technology may have reduced the demand of female workers. Goldin’s further 
analysis is focused on the reasons for the turn in the curve progression in the USA in the 
1920s. Goldin finds out that the change in women’s locus of production from the home to the 
factory has occurred some time after a strong increase in secondary schooling for boys and 
girls. From 1910 to 1950, secondary school enrolments and graduation rates advanced 
remarkably. The strongest increase was recorded from 1920 to 1937. For example, the 
graduation rate in non-South regions of the USA rose from less than 10% in 1910 to about 
50% in 1937. As early as 1920, girls were 1, 25 times more likely to graduate from secondary 
schooling than boys all over the country. The gender neutral investments in educational 
attainment in the USA were due to a universal public funding of primary and secondary 
schooling. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the US still faced important resource 
constraints that lead male education to be favoured. From 1910 on, economic growth freed 
resources and female secondary education levels converged to those of males. 
 
However, to explain the curve’s turning point, not only secondary schooling but also the 
social stigma for married women working in the blue collar sector and rising wages in the 
clerical sector have to be considered as key points. Girls attended secondary and higher 
schooling for longer periods than boys. This is because due to social stigma, it was advisable 
for girls to avoid a manufacturing job and to get an office job. In addition, wages in the 
clerical sector began to rise in the 1920s and attained a maximum in the 1950s and 1960s, 
which is why a substitution effect came to dominate. The clerical sector first offered women 
jobs as typists, stenographers or secretaries, but rather soon the field was expanded, for 
example to sales, teaching and nursing. In this context, Goldin (1994) suggests a 
“feminisation” of the clerical sector: In 1890, 15% of office workers were female and only 4% 
of them were married. In the 1920s, 50% were female and 26% were married, and in the 
1950, 62% were female and 42% were married. 
 
The rise of secondary school enrolments and graduation rates and the rise of office work in 
the 1920s and 1930s were important components of the increase in women’s labour market 
participation in the 1950s. Besides, the female work force was increasingly composed of 
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married women working in the clerical sector and older than 40, whereas before 1920 young 
unmarried women working in manufacturing formed the majority of the female US-American 
work force. Hence, the fact that it became socially accepted for married women to work 
allowed them to stay in the labour market longer. 
 
As Goldin (1994) does for the USA, Marchand and Thélot (1997) observe male and female 
labour market participation for France. They make statements about the evolution of male 
and female activity rates from 1800 onwards. One more, the principal difficulty is access to 
data. In France, the first credible population census was made in 1896, then in 1946 and in 
1954, implying that data for the nineteenth century is very fragmentary and measurement 
methods are heterogeneous. Marchand and Thélot (1997) state, that the active population 
has doubled within two centuries and that in general, one can observe a feminisation of the 
active population over the whole observed time period. However, at looking precisely on the 
data, like Goldin (1994), Marchand and Thélot (1997) confirm the “feminisation U” 
hypothesis.  Similar to Golding’s findings for the USA, they find out that in France the female 
activity rates decreased during the first half of the twentieth century. In contrast to the US, in 
France female activity rates increased significantly only from the 1950s on. They obtain the 
highest level at the end of the observed period, which is the end of the twentieth century.  
 
De Vries (1994) analyses the evolution of female labour market participation from 1700 to 
1980 in Britain, the first land of Western industrialisation. Over the whole observed period, 
De Vries (1994) finds a “double U” in the evolution of female labour market participation, with 
a minimum point around 1700 and around 1950. During the eighteenth century, De Vries 
(1994) confirms a continuous rise in female labour market participation. He suggests a 
revision of the history of industrial revolution in Britain by introducing the term “industrious 
revolution” for the country’s economic occurrences in the eighteenth century. The term 
serves to supplement the well known term “industrial revolution” which stands for the 
economic occurrences in the nineteenth century. According to de Vries (1994), the 
eighteenth century in Britain was characterised by an extension of urban networks, growth of 
agricultural output and fertility changes as well as mortality changes that facilitated 
industrialisation. Growth rates and wages were low, but at the same time de Vries assumes 
an increasing consumer demand. Focusing on the household and family behaviour in the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, de Vries confirms an increase in both the households’ 
supply of marketed commodities, the households’ supply of labour and the households’ 
demand for marketed products. The initial demand for goods and services for direct 
consumption changed into a demand for marketed commodities, which lead to an 
intensification of work. An extensive use of female and child labour (up to exploitation) and a 
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reduction of leisure time was the consequence. At the same time, human capital formation 
for women and children was totally neglected in the eighteenth century. In the first half of the 
nineteenth century, female labour decreased and stayed low until the middle of the twentieth 
century.  The existent family model was replaced by a “breadwinner - homemaker 
household” model, which De Vries (1994) calls the “capitalistic patriarchy” model. Male full-
time labour rose due to an increase in male wages, which lead to a detachment of women 
from the labour market. The family shifted its focus on a new set of household commodities 
related to services, health, hygiene, human capital formation, domesticity and comfort of the 
house (prosperity effect). The period from 1960 to today in Britain represents a second 
“industrious revolution” for de Vries (1994). He argues that, again, families’ demand patterns 
have shifted from family-consumed commodities to individualised consumption and market-
supplied goods. Consequently, in Britain women’s labour market participation increased 
significantly from the 1960s onwards.  
 
 
2.2.2. Cross country analysis 
 
Several cross country studies examine empirically the impact of growth on female labour 
market participation. In comparison to the time series studies mentioned above, the cross 
country studies do not substitute economic development with time, but provide empirical 
analysis based on an estimation model that contains exogenous and endogenous variables. 
Yet the cross country studies are based on data with limited time periods (pooled data that 
cover a time period up to 15 years maximum) and therefore  focus on between-country 
variation. The time series analysis shows that a country’s whole U-shaped curve stretches 
over a much longer time period (at least 60 years for the US, for example). Hence, it is 
unlikely that the cross country studies can universally prove the “feminisation U” hypothesis, 
either. Moreover, in comparison to the time series analysis, the cross country studies pay 
less attention to complex causal relationships and arguments behind the convex impact of 
growth on female labour market participation.  
 
Goldin (1994) examines the impact of the natural logarithm of GDP per capita on the share of 
the labour force participation of 45 to 59-year old women. Data on the female share of the 
labour force comes from the United Nations WISTAT collection. The relatively high age 
group of women was chosen in order to exclude unmarried women and those whose fertility 
decisions impact their labour supply decisions. This older age group, however, contains 
widows and abandoned women, which also makes it difficult to isolate the relevant 
determinants of the female share of the labour force. Furthermore, within the limited age 
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group, it is difficult to control for the impact of educational changes, which are more relevant 
for younger women, on women’s labour market participation choices.  
 
Goldin (1994) first graphs the (log) per capita GDP of 1985 for 68 countries against the 
female share of the labour force of 1980. The graph is shown by figure 7 and suggests a U-
shaped relationship.  
 
Figure 7: Per capita GDP 1985 (nat. log) against  female share of the labour force 1980 
 
 
 
 
Source: Goldin (1994) 
 
In a second step, Goldin (1994) tries to empirically prove an income effect, which decreases 
female share of the labour force, as well as a substitution effect, which increases the female 
share of the labour force.  
 
The empirical regression in based on observations of 82 countries, registered in 1980. 
 
The endogenous variable is: 
 
•  Female share of the labour force (45 to 59 year old women)  
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The exogenous variables are: 
 
•  % male labour force in white-collar sector 
•  %FCLER:  % female labour force in clerical sector 
•  FSCHL:  years of schooling of adult women 
•  %FCLER x FSCHL 
 
The regression results are presented in table 8 in the appendix. The results suggest that the 
female share of the labour force decreases with an increase in the percentage of men 
employed in the white-collar sector, indicating a negative income effect on women’s labour 
market participation. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients of the last three exogenous 
variables shown in the table suggest that the female share of the labour force increases with 
increases in the share of women in the clerical sector, but only when female education levels 
are above 7 years (secondary school level). This indicates a positive substitution effect on 
the female share of the labour force. It is remarkable that the impact of female schooling on 
the female share of the labour force is significantly positive only when interacting female 
schooling with the share of women in the clerical sector.  This finding may refer to a convex 
impact of growth on the female share of the labour force. It may be suggested that at low 
levels of economic development, education increases more for boys than for girls. With the 
rising income of men, female labour market participation decreases due to an income effect. 
As economic development proceeds, girls also receive more education, women receive job 
opportunities on higher wage levels and a substitution effect starts to dominate, which raises 
women’s labour market participation.  
 
Yet, Goldin’s (1994) empirical estimation suggests rather than proves the U shaped function 
of the female share of the labour force with respect to GDP per capita. It is unclear at what 
levels of economic development female education converges to those of males. 
Furthermore, it is unclear at what levels of economic development the substitution effect 
dominates the income effect, which leads to a turn in female labour market participation 
(curve’s minimum point). Moreover, the presented regression model does not explicitly test 
the hypothesis of a convex relationship between economic growth and the female share of 
the labour force, as GDP per capita is not modelled as an exogenous variable.  
 
Cagatay and Özler (1995) propose an all-in-one estimation model with the female share of 
the labour force as endogenous and the natural logarithm of GNP per capita as exogenous 
variable. They estimate the impact of lnGNP per capita on the share of the labour force of 45 
to 59-year old women, based on cross-country data that includes observations of 96 
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countries, pooled for 1985 and 1990. Data on the female share of the labour force comes 
from the World Bank data bases.  
 
A descriptive analysis of the data shows that the most advanced industrialised regions have 
experienced a feminisation of the labour market from 1985 to 1990. This concerns Europe, 
but also the East Asian Caribbean, Latin America and Middle East and North African 
countries. A defeminisation process can be observed in Sub-Saharan-Africa. At the same 
time, Chagatay and Özler (1995) emphasise very large variations between countries with 
respect to the female share of the labour force. The share is relatively high in Sub Saharan 
African countries in comparison to industrialised regions. Furthermore, the analysis shows 
that factors other than economic growth seem to have an impact on female labour market 
participation. These are primarily demographic factors, such as urbanisation, education and 
fertility, but cultural and ideological factors seem to play a role, too. In Eastern Europe, for 
example, one can observe high female shares of the labour force, which can be associated 
with the Socialist commitment to women’s economic participation 
 
In order to control for the U-shaped pattern of the female share of the labour force across the 
process of economic development, Cagatay and Özler (1995) include lnGNP and (lnGNP)² 
as exogenous variables in the regression model. To confirm the “feminisation U” hypothesis, 
the estimated coefficient of (lnGNP)² must be significantly positive as an indicator of the 
curve’s convexity, which implies that there exists a minimum in the data.14  
 
In addition, Cagatay and Özler (1995) want to find out whether structural adjustment policies  
(SAP) impact the female share of the labour force. These policies intend to reinforce 
macroeconomic stability and trade openness by focussing on the expansion of export 
oriented sectors. As we know from Trinker (1976) and Standing (1999), these sectors are 
labour intensive sectors that favour the employment of low paid women, so it is likely that 
structural adjustment policies positively impact the female share of the labour force. On the 
other hand, in countries with persisting gender gaps in education, structural adjustment 
policies may crowd women out of the labour market, because the expansion of the export 
sectors requires an adoption of techniques that demand skilled labour. 
 
The endogenous variable of the empirical model is: 
 
 FSH:  female share of the labour force  (45 to 59-year old women)  
 
                                                 
14 second derivation of estimation equation > 0 → minimum point 
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The exogenous variables are:  
 
 LGNP:  nat. log of GNP per capita measured by the real dollar value of GNP                         
                  in 1987 U$ dollars 
 LGNP²:  the square of LGNP 
 URB:  share of urban population (demographic variable) 
 INGP: investment share of GNP (indicates the degree of expansion) 
 XGP:   exports to GNP ratio (indicates trade openness) 
 INFLAT:  inflation as a proxy for income distribution15 
 
 ALA:  Dummy variable that takes the value 1  for countries that have undertaken a  
                   World Bank or an IMF adjustment program 
 EIA:  variable that takes the value 1  for countries that have received two structural  
                  adjustment loans or three adjustment operations or more 
 WBA:  variable that takes the value 1  for countries that have undertaken a World  
Bank adjustment program up to two years prior to the year in the sample (to 
allow time to have an impact) 
 WBA#:  weightened dummy variable version of WBA: weights numbers of adjustments 
 
 AFRICA, SOUTHA (Southasia), MEAST, CARAIB, LATIN, ASIA, XSOC (former  
Socialist economies) (geographic region dummies) 
 DUM85:  year dummy variable 
 
Cagatay and Özler (1995) estimate the model by ordinary least squares (OLS). Region and 
year dummies control for unobservable characteristics that are not included in the model. 
Table 9 in the appendix shows the estimation results with FSH as endogenous variable.  
 
The estimation results of Cagatay and Özler (1995) indicate that the “feminisation U” 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at high levels of confidence in the sample, as indicated by the 
“t” values of the positive LGNP coefficient and the negative LGNP² coefficient. Yet, in fact the 
significantly negative coefficient for LGNP² rejects the “feminisation U” hypothesis, and 
Cagatay and Özler (1995) falsely argue that the “feminisation U” hypothesis can not be 
rejected. 
                                                 
15 Economic theory and empirical evidence suggest a high negative correlation between inflation and income distribution (high 
inflation worsens the income distribution).   
The economic variables INGP, XGP and INFLAT are used as long term average values (for 1985: average 1975-1985; for 1990: 
average 1975-1990).  
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The significant negative parameter value of URB, however, suggests that an increase in the 
urban share of population leads to a defeminisation of the labour force, which is consistent 
with the theoretical arguments of the “feminisation U” hypothesis. The intercept terms for 
African, Caribbean and Former Socialist economies are significantly higher than the omitted 
group (the industrialised economies), and the intercept terms for Middle East and South Asia 
are lower. Furthermore, all adjustment variables have a significant positive impact on the 
female share of the labour force. Cagatay and Özler (1995) prove the robustness of the 
positive impact of structural adjustment policies on female labour market participation by 
using alternative measures of income distribution, adjustment policies and demographic 
indicators, which are not presented here. The estimated coefficients for LGNP and LGNP² 
stay unchanged. Cagatay and Özler (1995) also include measurements of adjustment 
policies that take into account economic variables in the regression and conclude, that 
structural adjustment policies lead to an increase in the female share of the labour force via 
increased trade openness, but worsen a country’s income distribution, which is in line with 
Standing (1999) and Seguino (2000, 2005).  
 
Goldin’s (1994) cross country study does not yield precise results to validate the 
“feminisation U” hypothesis, and the cross country study of Cagatay and Özler (1995) 
provides contradictory findings. However, it would be premature to reject the “feminisation U” 
hypothesis, because the estimation results suffer from measurement and estimation 
problems.  
 
 
2.2.3. Measurement problems 
 
Measures of female labour market participation are subject to serious measurement errors.  
There exists a strong risk of underestimating female labour market participation, because 
female work is often informal and therefore unrecorded. Non-paid work and independent 
work are rarely included in the statistics. This holds especially for women’s subsistence 
activities in the agricultural sector in the third and second world (for more precise information 
about this issue, see box below). Aside from women’s activities in the informal sectors, other 
working activities, such as household, child-rearing and other family-related activities, are not 
captured by national accounts. Therefore, changes in the quantity and productivity of these 
activities can be measured only insufficiently or not at all (c.f. Waring, 1988; Klasen, 2002). 
The UNDP (1995) shows that in the 1990s, around two third of the female productive 
activities in developing countries are not captured by national accounts, compared to only 
one forth of male activities. 
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Background information: women’s informal activities in agriculture 
All over the world, women are over-represented in informal employment (c.f. Gideon, 2007; Carr et al, 
2000; Chen et al, 1999; Pearson, 2004; Prugl, 1999). Being in informal employment renders women 
vulnerable to poverty, economic shocks and natural disasters. Low and insecure income on one hand, 
and lack of any type of social protection on the other, can be detrimental for many women around the 
world.  
Understanding why women are over-represented in informal work compared to men is of primary 
importance in alleviating the constraints related to it. Multiple factors explain the over-representation of 
women in informal work and their concentration in low quality jobs. The main factors are:  
 Barriers to education and vocal training (c.f. Chen, 2001; Clark, 2003) 
 Barriers to credit, to entrepreneurial activities and assistance and to  business networks  
         (c.f. Esim and Kuttab, 2002) 
 Barriers to entry into specific sectors (segregation) (c.f. Beneira, 2001; Chen, 2001) 
 Family norms: patriarchal structures and gender division of labour within the household  
         (c.f. Heintz and Pollin, 2003) 
 Economic restructuring: globalisation, shifts from public to private sectors, shifts from agriculture   
         to non-agriculture (c.f. Lastarria-Cornhiel, 2006; Chen, Vanek, Lund and Heintz, 2005).  
In most countries, the proportion of informal employment is much greater in the agricultural sector than 
in the non-agricultural sectors. As the share of the agricultural sector in the economies of developing 
countries started to decline in the 1970s, and since men have been leaving agriculture for better-
paying work in other sectors, the involvement of women in agricultural activities has been rising. Many 
countries have experienced a “feminisation of agriculture” in recent decades where women are over-
represented in farming activities. In many developing countries, work in agriculture is the most 
common form of female labour market participation and the largest source of income for women (c.f. 
Lastarria-Cornhiel, 2006; Esim and Kuttab, 2002; Agarwal, 2003; Heyzer, 2006). However, in 
developing countries, almost all female activities in agriculture can be considered to be informal (c.f. 
Lastarria-Cornhiel, 2006; Esim and Kuttab, 2002, Unni and Rani, 2000).  
For many women, unregistered subsistence farming is a survival strategy; the informal character of 
their work is in most cases involuntary, largely because they are given no choice (c.f. UN, 2005). In 
many developing countries, women’s informal subsistence farming is still seen as a woman's 
obligation to the family, which results from women's lack of control over agricultural resources (c.f. 
Rebouché, 2006). The patriarchal nature of most rural societies does not provide women with the 
same rights to land as it does men. In most Muslim countries for example, inheritance laws and 
governmental land-grant programs are favouring men (c.f. Lastarria-Cornhiel, 2006; Agarwal, 2003). In 
Kenya, women are still denied the property rights to land upon divorce or separation from their 
husbands or even following the death of their husbands (c.f. Rebouché, 2006). Even when women do 
own land, male family members often take control over it. However, even in some further developed 
countries, women rely on informal subsistence farming. In some of the former Communist countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe, as for example in Romania, the introduction of the market economy in 
the 1990s has sharply decreased the options for women in formal employment and pushed women 
into informal subsistence farming (cf. Esim,  2001; OECD, 2008). 
In addition, differences exist in terms of the activities women perform in agriculture, compared to men. 
Women largely work to contribute to their family's income, whereas men in informal agricultural 
activities tend to work as self-employed farmers: In developing countries, on average 69,1 % of 
women work as contributing family workers against 30,9% of men, whereas 71% of men are self 
employed in informal work in agriculture against 29% of women (c.f. OECD, 2008). Moreover, women 
tend to work in subsistence farming and in smallholder production, in traditional agro-export agriculture 
(crops grown on plantations such as coffee, sugar or cocoa) and in the labour intensive field of non-
traditional agro-export agriculture (horticulture crops such as vegetables, flowers, fruits), whereas men 
in agriculture  tend to work in machinery-driven, large-scale production of non-traditional agricultural 
exports (non-food items) and tend to be involved in supervision and management (c.f. Lastarria-
Cornhiel, 2006;  Chen, 2001). Consequently, informal work in agriculture is characterised by strong 
gender-based differences in status and income when compared to informal work in the non-
agricultural sectors. Women’s informal work in agriculture is often low paid, non-paid or in paid in food 
rather than wage (c.f. OECD, 2008; Rebouché, 2006). Esim and Kuttab (2002) show that in West 
Bank and Gaza, women in agriculture still are mainly in unpaid family labour, whereas women’s 
informal activities in non-agriculture are mainly remunerated. 
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This limited data availability leads to serious measurement problems, biasing the estimation 
results in three possible ways:  
 
•  Economic growth may increase informal female economic activities. But as this will 
not be sufficiently recorded, the positive impact of growth on female labour market 
participation may be underestimated.   
•  As economic growth may bring greater access to the formal labour market, growth 
may substitute unrecorded female labour with recorded female labour in the formal 
sectors. The measured female labour market participation would then increase, 
though women’s work intensity has not increased. The positive impact of growth on 
female labour market participation may then be overestimated.  Furthermore, 
economic growth may substitute unrecorded housework and caring activities with 
recorded female labour: Since home production and housework is not accounted in 
the natinal accounts, women’s labour now becomes visible and the positive impact of 
growth on female labour market participation will be overestimated (accounting 
effects). 
•  Economic growth may inversely substitute recorded female activities for non-recorded 
activities (process of “informalisation” of female work). This would lead to an 
overestimation of the negative impact of growth on female labour market 
participation.  
 
Furthermore, measures of female labour market participation are often not comparable 
across countries as definitions and measurement concepts of women’s labour market 
participation differ (c.f. Bardhan and Klasen, 1999; Forbes, 2000). In addition, measurements 
disaggregated by gender are often incomplete and inconsistent in terms of time.  As Goldin 
(1995) emphasises, there are few consistent data series on employment by gender, 
especially for developing countries. This goes particularly for specific measures of female 
labour market participation such as female labour market participation divided by sector, by 
age group, by qualification, by family status, by work time etc. Consequently, estimations 
based on a large group of countries and several time periods have to focus on very general 
measures of female labour market participation. Moreover, the lack of access to specific data 
in the field of gender and labour markets means that significant exogenous variables (such 
as family policies for example) can not be included in the estimation equation, which bears 
the risk of generating omitted variable bias. Hence, the problematic statistical and conceptual 
practices lead to a gender bias in official statistics and concepts of female labour market 
participation. Findings of the impact of growth on female labour market participation may 
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therefore bias the true relationship. As the quality of the results can only be as good as the 
quality of the available date, the regression results must be interpreted with care. 
 
 
2.2.4. Estimation problems 
 
Endogeneity 
It is likely that in the cross country analysis, Cagatay and Özler (1995) insufficiently solve the 
problem of endogeneity, which exists due to the feedback effects between GNP per capita 
and the female share of the labour force. Cagatay and Özler (1995) estimate the impact of 
lnGNP on the female share of the labour force participation (FLF), based on the following 
simplified estimation model: 
 
iiii GNPGNPFLF εβββ +++= 2321 )(lnln     (10.1.) 
 
The estimation model describes the conditional expectation of the best linear approximation 
of iFLF  given lnGNPi and (lnGNPi)². There is no possible interpretation of the model unless 
assumptions are made about the error term iε . The error term includes all unobservable 
factors that affect the female share of the labour force. The required assumption is that the 
exogenous variables lnGNP and (lnGNP)² are not correlated with the error term. Only in this 
case the OLS estimators are consistent.  
 
Yet it is likely that this condition does not hold for the estimation model of Cagatay and Özler 
(1995). The discussed empirical analysis by Klasen (1999) showed that a country’s income 
growth promotes female labour market participation. The two-way causality between the 
endogenous and exogenous variables suggests that the exogenous variables lnGNP and 
(lnGNP)² are actually endogenous. This endogeneity problem leads to the fact that the 
exogenous variables lnGNP and (lnGNP)² are correlated with the error term in the regression 
model: 
 
( ) 0ln, ≠ii GNPCov ε      (10.2) 
 ( ) 0)(ln, 2 ≠ii GNPCov ε      (10.3) 
 
Consequently, the OLS estimation method produces regression coefficients of lnGNP and 
(lnGNP)² that are biased and inconsistent.  
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Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity means that exogenous variables are correlated with one another. This could 
be the case for lnGNP and the share of urban population URB, for example.  
 
( ) 0,ln ≠URBGNPCov i     (10.4) 
 
With multicollinearity, it is difficult to interpret the regression coefficients. This is because the 
coefficients show how much the endogenous variable changes when changing the 
exogenous variable, given that all the other exogenous variables stay constant. If the 
exogenous variables are correlated, it is not possible to change one exogenous variable 
while keeping the other exogenous variables constant. The estimation method then is not 
able to ascribe the change of the endogenous variable to a certain determinant. Large 
standard errors of the concerned exogenous coefficients point to multicollinearity. 
Furthermore, the increased variance of the OLS-estimator leads to smaller t-statistics. As the 
exogenous variable (lnGNP)² is a function of the exogenous variable lnGDNP, there exists 
perfect multicollinearity between the two variables. Consequently, the estimated coefficients 
of the two variables can not be interpretated separately.16 In any case, multicollinearity does 
not reduce the predictive power or reliability of the estimation model as a whole.  
 
Non-stationarity 
The data used by Cagatay and Özler (1995) contains pooled observations for two time 
periods (1985 and 1990) and the observations for the female share of the labour force as 
well as the observations for all the exogenous variables including lnGNP vary over time. 
Non-stationarity appears if a determinant’s observations over time are marked with a trend, 
meaning that one observation of the process is correlated with previous values of the same 
process. Figuratively speaking, this means that the data ”keep their own past in memory”: 
This is the case if, for example, after a boom period the GNP does not entirely fall back on its 
original level. The observations over time of GNP would then be non-stationary. It could also 
be that, in this context, a strong growth of a country’s GNP (boom period) leads to a rise in 
the female share of the labour force, but when the GNP falls back to its normal level, the 
female labour market participation does not fall back to its starting point but stays on a higher 
level. If this is the case, the observations over time also would suffer from non-stationarity. In 
these cases, the OLS-estimators would be unbiased, but inefficient. This means that the 
standard errors and the t-values would not be estimated correctly. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 See chaper 2, section 3.1.,  for detailed information about the interpretation of the two coefficients (mathematical explanation). 
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2.3. Conclusion  
 
The presented literature overview does not offer a clear answer to the question how growth 
affects the female labour market participation.  
 
On the theoretical side, there exist two different approaches. Whereas the arguments of the 
“modernisation neoclassical approach” suggest a positive impact of growth on female labour 
market participation, the “feminisation U” theory provides arguments that suggest a convex 
impact. 
 
On the empirical side, the results are ambiguous, either. Descriptive time series studies for 
single countries as well as recent empirical work based on cross-country data assume a 
“feminisation-U”. However, the time series studies do not offer precise results because of 
data weakness caused by measurement problems and limited data availability.  Serious 
measurement problems concerning very early observations of the nineteenth and the 
beginning of the twentieth century weaken the tenability of evidence. The findings of the 
presented empirical cross-country studies are also unclear. Goldin’s (1994) cross country 
study does not yield precise results to validate the “feminisation U” hypothesis, because she 
does not present an all-in-one estimation model, and hence, it is not possible to ascertain a 
convex relationship between growth and female labour market participation. Cagatay and 
Özler’s (1995) cross country study contains an all-in-one estimation model, which includes 
not only income determinants, also other macro-level determinants such as structural 
adjustment policies  (SAP) that are supposed to influence female labour market participation. 
Nevertheless, the empirical results provide contradictory findings, supposing a concave 
instead of a convex impact of growth on female employment, even though Cagatay and 
Özler (1995) do not consider their estimation results a rejection of the “feminisation U” 
hypothesis. However, the detailed discussion of the applied estimation methods and the 
linked methodological problems proposed in this section shows that it would be premature to 
generally reject the “feminisation U” hypothesis because of the contradictory findings of 
Cagatay and Özler (1995). It becomes clear that problems caused by endogeneity, in 
particular, merit more consideration, because the inverse causality between growth and 
female labour market participation risks significantly biasing the estimation results. 
Furthermore, non-stationarity problems need more consideration, because estimators risk 
being inefficient.  
 
So far, the overview of today’s empirical evidence on the impact of growth on female labour 
market participation has shown that the “feminisation U” hypothesis has not been clearly 
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proven empirically. Nevertheless, what we can say so far is that the unclear estimation 
results do not speak in favour of the validity of the “modernisation neoclassical approach”, 
either. The lack of clear empirical findings represents a research gap. Closing this research 
gap is necessary, because the validity of the “feminisation U” hypothesis would imply that, to 
promote gender equality in the labour market, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the positive 
effects of maturing growth, but gender promoting institutions and policies are necessary. In 
order to close the research gap, it is necessary to empirically test the “feminisation U” 
hypothesis by applying further empirical methods that specially address endogeneity 
problems. This is possible by using a large macro panel data set (combination of time-series 
and cross-country data), because the structure of panel data allows using System-GMM 
estimation and lagged variables as instrumental variables (2SLS). These techniques raise 
the probability of obtaining unbiased and efficient estimation results. Chapter 2 suggests an 
empirical estimation of the impact of growth on female labour market participation based on a 
large panel data set including observations of over 180 countries that span over four 
decades.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 91
Chapter II:  
The impact of macroeconomic growth on women’s labour market  
participation: Do panel data confirm the “feminisation U” hypothesis? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
In this chapter, I present an empirical investigation on the impact of growth on female labour 
market participation based on macroeconomic panel data (combination of cross-country and 
time-series data). 
 
Due to the recent, more sophisticated empirical analyses presented in chapter I, the research 
community today unanimously recognises that women’s empowerment, and more precisely 
women’s participation in the labour market, positively impacts a country’s economic growth. 
Economic theory and empirical analysis give clear evidence for this positive impact, as 
shown in chapter 1. On the theoretical side, taking into account the accumulation of human 
capital in endogenous growth models was a first step towards these findings (c.f. Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Knowles, Lorgelly and Owen (2002) theoretically show that equalising 
the gender distribution of human capital has a positive impact on growth. Galor und Weil 
(1996) argue that the rise of women’s labour market participation increases growth. Several 
recent empirical studies support the theoretical arguments: Klasen (2002) finds a significant 
positive impact of the level of female education (measured by the female-male ratio of total 
years of schooling of the people aged 15 and over) on growth. Furthermore, Klasen (1999) 
finds that women’s labour market participation impacts positively on economic growth.  
 
The inverse impact of growth on the economic status of women, and more precisely on 
female labour market participation, is much less researched. The theoretical discussion 
maintains several contradictory arguments. Whereas the “modernisation neoclassical 
approach”, based on Becker (1957) suggests a positive impact of growth on female labour 
market participation, the “feminisation U” hypothesis, based on Boserup (1970), suggests 
that growth convexly influences the female labour market participation: At first, growth lowers 
female labour market participation relative to male labour market participation and then 
increases it in the long run. Most of the empirical analysis, for example by Goldin (1994) and 
by Cagatay and Özler (1995), assume the “feminisation U” hypothesis, but do not prove the 
universal validity of a convex impact of growth on female labour market participation. The 
hitherto existing empirical estimations are based on pooled cross country data. The limited 
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time periods of these data as well as estimation problems lead to imprecise and contradictory 
findings.   
 
The deficient empirical evidence of the impact of growth on female labour market 
participation represents an essential research gap. Answering the question if growth 
unambiguously promotes female labour market participation or if growth inconclusively 
impacts female labour market participation is of scientific and of political interest. Policy-
makers risk assuming that growth promoting policies automatically encourages female labour 
market participation. Consequently, they tend to renounce implementing special policies to 
empower women’s status on the labour market. Yet, if policy makers wrongly assume that 
they can trust the equalising effects of growth, female labour market participation will be less 
than its potential level. This leads to high economic costs not only for women, but for society 
as a whole, because gender-specific employment differences lower a country’s growth 
performance and therefore reduce aggregate welfare. Empirical evidence for the 
“feminisation U” hypothesis, which assumes that the impact of growth on women’s labour 
market activities is not strictly positive, would suggest that an explicit enhancement of 
women’s economic opportunities is advisable in order to increase a country’s long term 
economic potential. 
 
Today, newly available data allows empirically testing the “feminisation U” hypothesis based 
on a large macro panel data set. I refer to “panel data” when talking about the combination of 
cross-country and time-series data. I test the “feminisation U” hypothesis based on panel 
data including observations of 184 countries from 1965 to 2004.  
 
Because panel data sets are typically larger than cross-sectional or time-series data sets, 
and explanatory variables vary over two dimensions (individuals and time), estimators based 
on panel data are quite often more accurate and more efficient. More precisely, the 
availability of panel data allows for two main improvements in comparison to the cross 
country studies by Goldin (1994) and Cagatay and Özler (1995): Firstly, the larger data set 
provides the opportunity to test for the robustness of the empirical findings by using different 
specifications for female labour market participation. Secondly, the longer time period 
provides the opportunity to better control for possible endogeneity problems by introducing 
lags -or more general deviations- of the exogenous variables as instrumental variables. This 
procedure limits the risk of obtaining biased estimation coefficients caused by inverse 
causality. 
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To address endogeneity problems I use specifically prepared data and several econometric 
methods for dynamic panel data. The econometric analysis, based on OLS-, FE-, IV- and 
System-GMM estimations, globally confirms the “feminisation U” hypothesis, but suggests 
that the U-curve is more dominated by between-country variation than by within-country 
variation. 
 
The following section presents the empirical model, the econometric specifications and the 
database I have chosen for my analysis. The estimation results are shown in a second step. 
Subsequently, I present additional techniques of data analysis: a detailed cluster analysis of 
the data, an econometric method dealing with time-specific effects and the concept of 
Granger causality.   
 
 
2.  Econometric specifications and the database 
  2.1. The empirical model 
 
The empirical investigation analyses the impact of the gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita on female labour market participation. The main novelty of this paper is that the 
estimated models are built on two-dimensional panel data (combined cross-sectional and 
time series data), which allows to control for endogeneity. Consequently, estimators are 
more accurate and more efficient in comparison to cross country studies 
The results will show whether the “feminisation U” hypothesis, which suggests that growth 
first lowers female labour market participation and then increases it from higher levels of 
economic development on, can be confirmed empirically. In other words, it will be shown 
whether female labour market participation is a square function of the natural logarithm of 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.  
 
The basic model is:  
 
itititit GDPGDPnrticipatiourMarketPaFemaleLabo εβββ +++= )²(lnln 321       (11.1) 
1β  represents the constant term, lnGDP the log of GDP per capita and (lnGDP)² the square 
of lnGDP, capturing the “feminisation U”, and ε  represents the random error term distributed 
normally with mean zero. 
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To confirm the “feminisation U” hypothesis, the coefficient 3β  must be significantly positive 
as an indicator of the curve’s convexity, which implies that there exists a minimum point in 
the data plot (second derivation of equ. (1) > 0 → minimum point). 
 
A wider model includes other possible determinants of female labour market participation 
and controls for country- and time-specific effects: 
 
it
itititit
it
MUSLIMsDVsDV
sDVsDVMENASSAEALA
OECDEDUFERTGDPGDP
nrticipatiourMarketPaFemaleLabo
εβββ
ββββββ
ββββββ
++++
++++++
+++++
=
151413
121110987
654321
19901980
19701960
)²(lnln
   (11.2) 
with: 
FERT:  Fertility rate 
EDU:   Percentage of women of the population aged 15 and over who have 
successfully completed secondary schooling.  
OECD:  Dummy OECD countries 
LA:   Dummy Latin America 
EA:   Dummy East Asia 
SSA:   Dummy Sub-Saharan Africa 
MENA:  Dummy Middle East and North Africa 
MUSLIM:  Dummy for countries with a Muslim population ≥ 0,5 
DV1960s, DV1970s, DV1980s, DV1990s: Time specific dummy variables 
 
Including fertility and the educational attainment of women in the model captures some of the 
indirect effects of GDP on the female labour market participation. The theoretical analysis in 
the previous chapter has shown that there is a series of other explanatory variables that 
could be included in the estimation model, like the share of the agricultural sector, the degree 
of urbanisation, the average years of male education, the average male and female income, 
equalising institutions etc. Yet, as these variables are not available for all countries and all 
periods, I do not include them in the estimation model in order to maintain a high number of 
observations. Moreover, I capture exogenous variables that are constant over time by fixed 
effects.  
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2.2. The endogenous variable: women’s labour market participation  
 
Female labour market participation is the best available indicator for the economic role of 
women when the purpose is to take into consideration several decades and over 150 
countries. Surely it would be interesting to measure the impact of growth on economic 
empowerment of women and not only on their labour market participation. Examining the real 
economic role of women would not only entail measuring female labour market participation, 
but also taking into account women’s working hours (full time, part time), women’s 
qualification and income, their detailed working conditions (precarity, degree of social 
security) and their part of decision making in the economy, in politics and society, for 
example.  
 
However, the limited data availability makes it impossible to include all this information in the 
estimation model. Firstly, it is not possible to create an “female empowerment index” for all 
184 countries and four decades, because available data are fragmentary. Missing 
observations, especially for development countries and early time periods, would bias the 
estimation results to a great extent. Secondly, creating an indicator for the empowerment of 
women based on several variables weakens the overall view and the transparency of the 
estimation results. Nevertheless, there exist several wider measures of female empowerment 
today. The United Nations Development Program, for example, offers a Gender Related 
Development Index (GDI), which represents a gender specific Human Development Index 
(HDI)17 that tries to capture women’s well being. The GDI takes into account women’s life 
expectancy, education and income and penalises gender disparities in these fields. The GDI 
index is available for a large set of countries, but for a large set of countries the database 
contains observations only from 2006 on, and therefore the data can not be used in the panel 
data framework. The same problem applies also to another existing index which is the GEM 
(gender empowerment measure), a composite indicator that captures gender inequality in 
political participation and decision-making (women’s and men’s percentage shares of 
parliamentary seats), economic participation and decision-making power (women’s and 
men’s percentage shares of positions as legislators, senior officials and managers and 
women’s and men’s percentage shares of professional and technical positions) and power 
over economic resources (women’s and men’s estimated earned income in PPP US$). 
Hence, in order to keep the panel data framework it is advisable to concentrate on the female 
labour market participation as indicator of the economic role of women.  
 
                                                 
17 For more information on the HDI, see next section.  
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Nevertheless, even simple measures of female labour market participation are confronted 
with serious measurement problems.  Data weakness arises because female work is often 
informal and therefore unrecorded. In developing countries, the major part of women works 
informally in the agricultural and in the black market sector (c.f. Chen et al. 1999). In addition, 
non-paid work, domestic and family-related activities and self-employed work are rarely 
included in the statistics (c.f. Waring, 1988; Klasen, 2002). The UNDP (1995) shows that 
66% of the female activities in developing countries are not captured by national accounts, 
compared to only 24% of male activities.  
 
It would also be useful to differentiate the female labour market participation by employment 
status, by sector, by working hours, by age or by the presence and number of children, and 
to separate female labour market participation into wage workers, unpaid family workers and 
self-employed workers. But there are large inconsistencies in the definition of specific labour 
market participation measurements across the world. Taking into account differentiated 
measures of female labour market participation would imply reducing the observations to 
developed countries of the Western World.18 Moreover, even data on general female labour 
market participation has to be handled with care, because the measurement methods and 
definitions can differ in quality and coverage between countries and data sources. 
Differences in statistical and conceptual practices lead to a gender bias in official statistics 
and concepts of labour market participation (c.f. Bardhan and Klasen, 1999). Hence, even 
when focusing on female labour market participation only, empirical findings can be biased 
due to measurement problems and the regression results must be interpreted with care.  
 
In view of these measurement problems, I use three alternative empirical specifications for 
female labour market participation to test the robustness of the findings (sensitivity analysis): 
 
•  FLF:  The female labour force in percentage of the total labour force. As the total 
labour force includes both men and women, measurements of the female labour force 
take into account the level of the male labour force.   
•  FAR: The female activity rate as share of female formal sector employees in the 
female working age population (in percentage points). This measurement does not 
account for the male activity rate. 
•  RAR: The ratio female activity rate / male activity rate 
 
Table 10 in the appendix gives an overview of the data used in this paper. The following 
sections describe the endogenous variables in detail.  
                                                 
18 See chapter 3 for a more specific analysis of female employment patterns in EU countries.   
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Female Share of the Labour Force (FLF) 
 
The female share of the labour force shows the extent to which women are active in the 
labour force. It is defined as the percentage of women in the total labour force, where the 
total labour force comprises men and women aged 15 and older who meet the ILO definition 
of the economically active population. It includes employed and self-employed workers as 
well as unemployed workers and first-time job-seekers. Furthermore, labour force measures 
generally include the paid workers in the agricultural sector, armed forces and seasonal or 
part-time workers. Yet it excludes homemakers, unpaid caregivers and workers in informal 
sectors (c.f. Morrisson and Jütting, 2005). 
 
Data on the female share of the labour force are drawn from the World Bank’s World 
Development Index Data Base (2006) and cover the years 1980 to 2004 for 186 countries. 
The 4668 observations are distributed quite evenly across years and across countries. Early 
observations and observations of developing countries are adequately represented. 
  
The female share of the labour force as percentage of the total labour force varies between 
5,05% and 54,04% with a mean of 38, 70% over all countries and all years (see table 10).19  
In 1980, the United Arab Emirates had the lowest female share of the labour force with 
5,05%, and Cambodia had the highest with 53,23%. In 2004, West Bank and Gaza had the 
lowest female share of the labour force with 13,10% and Mozambique had the highest with 
53,52%. The mean rose from 37,14% in 1980 to 40,24% in 2004, which shows that the range 
of the variable does not change very much over the 24 years. 
 
Regarding only OECD countries, the values vary between 25,13% and 48,02%, with a mean 
of 41,29% over all years. In 1980, Ireland had the lowest female labour force with 27,96%, 
and the Czech Republic had the highest with 47,14%.20 In 2004, Turkey had the lowest 
female share of the labour force with 26,43% and Finland had the highest with 43,64%. The 
mean of the female share of the labour force for all OECD countries rose from 38,90% in 
1980 to 43%  in 2004. Hence, the range of the variable does not change very much over the 
24 years in OECD countries, either.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 The male share of the labour force varies between 45,96% and 94,95% with a mean of 61,35%. 
20 Counting Mexico with a rate of 27,54% in 1980 as a country of Latin America and not of the OECD. 
 98
Female Activity Rate (FAR) 
 
The female activity rate is defined as the share of female formal sector employees in the 
female working age population aged 15 and over (in percentage points). Data on the female 
activity rate are drawn from the ILO Laboursta Data Base (2007) and cover the years 1960 to 
2005 for 171 countries. In comparison with the female share of the labour force (FLF), the 
time horizon concerning FAR-observations is almost twice as long, but instead of 4668 
observations for the FLF there are only 1453 observations for the FAR. The observations are 
irregularly distributed over time; there are much fewer observations for the 1960s and 1970s 
than from 1980 on. Moreover, Sub-Saharan Africa countries are strongly underrepresented.   
 
The female activity rate as a percentage of the female working age population varies 
between 2,50% and 93,10% with a mean of 42,19% over all countries and all years (see 
table 10).21 In 1960, Egypt had the lowest female activity rate with 5,20%, and Thailand had 
the highest with 81,40%. In 2005, Tunisia had the lowest female activity rate with 24,40% 
and Ethiopia had the highest with 78,80%. The mean rose from 32,53% in 1960 to 49,00% in 
2005. The range of the variable changes much more in comparison to the female share of 
the labour force because of the longer time period.  
 
Regarding only OECD countries, the values vary between 17,00% and 74,20%, with a mean 
of 45,47% over all years. In 1960, Portugal had the lowest female activity rate (17,00%), and 
Turkey had the highest (65,40%). Turkey’s female activity rate had constantly fallen over the 
whole sample period and in 2005, Turkey denotes the lowest female activity rate in the 
OECD (24,8%). Denmark is on top of the list with 73,90%.22 The mean of the female activity 
rate for all OECD countries rose considerably from 35,59% in 1960 to 50,8% in 2005.  
 
When interpreting data on female labour market participation, one has to distinguish between 
the female share of the labour force (FLF) and the female activity rate (FAR). These two 
indices of female labour market participation cannot be compared to each other. As the 
female share of the labour force (FLF) measures the share of women in the total labour 
force, its mean (38,65%) is naturally lower than that of the female activity rate (42,13%), 
which measures the share of working women in the female working age population.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 The male activity rate a percentage of the male working age population varies between 51,20%  and  97,00% with a mean of  
77,00%. 
22 Turkey’s total activity rate also fell, from 79,70% in 1960 to 48,30% in 2005. Turkey’s ratio female/male activity rate fell from 
0,70 in 1960 to 0,34 in 2005. 
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Ratio female activity rate /male activity rate (RAR) 
 
Data on the ratio of the female to the male activity rate are also drawn from the ILO 
Laboursta Data Base (2007) and include the years 1960 to 2005 for 171 countries. Like 
observations of the FAR, observations of the RAR cover a much longer time horizon than 
observations of the FLF, but there are also only 1453 observations. The observations are 
irregularly distributed over time and there are again much fewer observations in the 1960s 
and 1970s than from 1980 on and Sub-Saharan Africa countries are strongly 
underrepresented.   
 
The ratio female/male activity rates varies between 0,30 and 1,08 with a mean of 0,56 over 
all countries and all years (see table 10). In 1960, Egypt had the lowest ratio (0,06)  and 
Thailand had the highest with 0,91. In 2005, Turkey had the lowest ratio with 0,34 and 
Denmark had the highest with 0,68. The mean grew from 0,38 in 1960 to 0,68 in 2005.  
 
Regarding only OECD countries, the observations vary between 0,19 and 0,90 with a mean 
of 0,63 over all years. In 1960, Portugal had the lowest ratio (0,19), and Turkey had the 
highest (0,70). In 2005 Turkey had the lowest ratio (0,34) and Denmark had the highest 
(0,90). The mean of the ratio for all OECD countries rose from 0,41 in 1960 to 0,73 in 2005. 
 
 
2.3. The exogenous variable: macroeconomic growth 
 
I do not use growth rates of GDP, but levels of GDP per capita as exogenous variable. This 
procedure is advised in macroeconomic analysis in order to avoid the kind of estimation bias 
that Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), for example, are confronted with when estimating the 
impact of female education on growth. Chapter 1 shows that Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) 
falsely find a negative impact of female education on growth, mainly because they use GDP 
growth rates instead of GDP levels as endogenous variables.  We know from Solow (1956) 
that the higher the GDP levels of a country are, the lower are the yearly GDP growth rates 
(convergence mechanism). Hence, as poor countries have higher gender differences in 
education than countries with high levels of GDP, Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s estimation model 
falsely interpret low female education as growth promoting. 
 
In order to capture proportional rather than absolute differences in the distribution of GDP 
levels, I use the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (lnGDP), which is standard in most 
macro-econometric works as seen in chapter I. The natural logarithm of GDP does not 
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represent the growth rate of GDP. Only the difference of the natural logarithm                     
(lnGDPt  - lnGDPt-1  ) would approximate the year to year relative changes in GDP                   
( (GDPt  - GDPt-1)  / GDPt-1  ). The national logarithm reduces absolute increases in the GDP 
levels. 
 
GDP observations are the countries’ yearly GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US$). The 
gross domestic product per capita at purchaser prices is defined as the sum of the gross 
value added by all resident producers in the economy, plus any product taxes, less any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products, divided by the number of inhabitants.23 It 
is calculated without deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. 
 
Data on GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US$) are drawn from the World Bank’s World 
Development Index Data Base (2006). The data covers the years 1965 to 2004 for 184 
countries. The 5966 observations of lnGDP range from 4,03 to 10,88 (see table 10), implying 
that yearly GDP per capita varies between 56,52 US$ and 52.943,34 US$ with a mean of 
5.179,46 US$. The observations are distributed quite evenly over the years and over the 
countries. 
 
Just as female labour market participation insufficiently represents women’s empowerment, 
GDP per capita insufficiently represents a nation’s welfare, not to mention a nation’s well-
being or standard of living. First of all, measures of GDP discount the non-monetary 
economy and hence do not consider unpaid productive activities like voluntary work, 
domestic work and subsistence production. The evaluation and measurement of women’s 
housework is a difficult task, because housework, raising children and caring for family 
members is viewed as the opposite of market work and hence is not assigned an economic 
value. Only in a few countries, mainly in industrialised countries like Germany for example, 
there exist estimations of the equivalent value of housework (for Germany: time budget 
studies by the German Federal Statistical Office, available for the years 1991and 2001).  
Would all men and women dedicate equally many hours to housework and caring, it would 
suffice to measure GDP to capture differences in economic development across countries. 
As this is not the case, GDP is not an ideal measure of economic activity. Furthermore, GDP 
measures leave aside black market activities. These unaccounted activities bias income 
measures downward. Another consequence arising from these unrecorded activities is that 
GDP increases when non market production becomes marketable. This market shift biases 
measures of GDP upwards, for example when meals or other products that used to be made 
                                                 
23 Definition used by World Bank, OECD and UN. 
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at home are now sold at the market as semi-finished or finished products. Moreover, GDP as 
an indicator of a nation’s welfare is often criticised because it only reflects average national 
income, but does not indicate income distribution or expenditure patterns. GDP also ignores 
the quality of goods (durability) and negative externalities of growth such as the damage to 
the environment. As GDP assumes that if there were more goods in circulation, general 
welfare would automatically increase, GDP growth does not account for sustainability. Nobel 
Prize winner Joseph E. Stiglitz, for example, sees GDP as an imperfect indicator of a nation’s 
welfare because improvements in the quality of life, which do not show up in material 
consumption, do not increase GDP.  
 
In order to take into account other determinants of well being, various kinds of “quality of life” 
indices have been developed recently. The most influential indicator is the Human 
Development Index (HDI), which was introduced by the United Nations Development 
Program in its annual Human Development Report in 1995. Ideas of Nobel Prize winner 
Amartya Sen were influential in the development of this indicator. The HDI combines 
normalised measures of life expectancy, knowledge (literacy and educational attainment) 
and living standard (GDP per capita in PPP US$). The use of the Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) takes into account the countries’ different price levels and converts the data into a 
common currency. The PPP can be a better indicator of living standards, especially of less-
developed countries, because it compensates for the weakness of local currencies in world 
markets. A comparison of a country’s GDP and HDI can reveal a country’s policy choices. 
For example, Oman is a country with a relatively high GDP per capita, but has a relatively 
low HDI due to its relatively low level of average educational attainment. (c.f. UNDP, 1995). 
Yet, as even the HDI’s information value is limited, further research is made in the field of 
measuring “quality of life”,  or even “happiness”, which is assumed to correspond to the 
freedom to make personal choices. In 2007, French President Nicolas Sarkozy appointed 
Joseph E. Stiglitz to head a commission to find a new method of economic calculation that 
will include quality-of-life factors such as personal freedom, livelihood, compassion and 
sharing and that will make more room for moral and ethical values, including social and 
environmental concerns.24 
 
Today, the new indices are becoming a tool for judging the true wealth of nations, but due to 
limited data availability they rather enhance than replace GDP as a measure of a country’s 
well-being. The HDI is available from 1975 on, but not before 1975. In order to keep the data 
set large (with early observations from the 1960s on and from over 180 countries), I 
concentrate on GDP per capita as indicator for economic development, which is still the 
                                                 
24 Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (chair: Joseph E. Stiglitz, chair adviser: 
Amartya Sen, coordinator: Jean-Paul Fitoussi, OFCE and IEP Paris)   
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standard measure of welfare in economics. The major advantages to using GDP per capita 
as an indicator of standard of living are that it is measured frequently and widely. 
Furthermore, the technical definitions used within GDP are relatively consistent between 
countries. In addition, my empirical investigation of the “feminisation U” hypothesis, based on 
panel data, is directly linked to the cross country studies by Goldin (1994) and Cagatay and 
Ötzler (1995) discussed in the previous chapter, which use income levels instead of more 
complex welfare measures as growth indicators. Hence, my adherence to GDP per capita is 
mainly due to superior comparability of research results. 
 
 
2.4. Additional exogenous variables 
 
Contrary to Goldin (1994) and to Cagatay and Özler (1995), I use a large age group of 
women participating in the labour market in order to keep the data set large (with early 
observations from the 1960s on and from over 180 countries).  All measures of female labour 
market participation contain women aged 15 and older. However, the large age group 
contains young women whose fertility decisions impact their labour market participation 
decisions. Furthermore, the age group contains women whose changes in education impact 
their labour market participation decisions. Hence, fertility rates (FERT) and educational 
levels (EDU) are included as exogenous variables in part of the regressions in order to filter 
out their impacts on female labour market participation. 
 
Fertility (FERT) 
 
Data on fertility are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Index Data Base 
(2006) and include observations for 197 countries over the years 1960 to 2004. The 4629 
observations range from 0,84 to 8,50 (children per women) with a mean of 3,63 (see table 
10). The observations are distributed quite constantly over the years and over the countries. 
 
 
Educational Attainment (EDU) 
 
Data on the educational attainment of the female population are drawn from Barro and Lee 
(2000) and refer to the percentage of women of the population aged 15 and over who have 
successfully completed secondary schooling (at least). The over-15 age group corresponds 
better to the labour force for many developing countries as the over-25 age group that also 
can be drawn from Barro and Lee (2000). The percentage of the population that has 
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successfully completed secondary schooling is a way to show the population’s attainment of 
skills and knowledge associated with this level of education (c.f. Klasen, 2002). 
 
The data set provides estimates for 120 countries at five-year intervals for the years 1950-
2000. The 955 observations vary between 0,10 and 50,80 with a mean of 7,54 (see table 
10). The observations are distributed quite evenly across the years and the countries. Taking 
this educational variable into account may improve the fit of the model, but its number of 
observations is very low in comparison to the numbers of observations of the endogenous 
variables and the other exogenous variables. This is why the OLS-estimation based on the 
multivariate model (2) is carried out twice, with and without EDU, in order to see whether the 
results change fundamentally due to missing observations. 
 
 
2.6. Correlation patterns 
 
The relationship between the female share of the labour force (FLF) and economic 
development based on the available panel data can be seen in figure 8, which scatters the 
female share of the labour force against  lnGDP per capita.  
 
Figure 8:  Female share of the labour force (FLF) against lnGDP 
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Figure 8 already suggests a U-shaped relationship between the two variables.25 On the left 
upper side we find countries that have a high female share of the labour force (sometimes 
over 50%) and at the same time low GDP per capita levels (sometimes under 200 US$). 
These observations are mainly from the 1980s26 and largely contain Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries like Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, Ethiopia, Congo, Mozambique and Malawi. On the 
right upper side, we find countries that have both a high female share of the labour force 
(around 42%) and high GDP per capita levels (over 2000 US$). These observations are 
mainly from the 1990s and the years 2000-2004 and contain in big parts OECD countries. 
The lowest points of the figure, observations with a low female share of the labour force 
(under 25%) and medium-level income (between 1000 and 1500 US$), are represented 
mostly by Latin American and North African countries, like Venezuela, Mexico, Ecuador, 
Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria. The observations are mainly from the 1980s.  
 
So far, these observations are in line with the “feminisation U” hypothesis. Observations 
which are not in line with the hypothesis are the outliers in the bottom-right corner of figure 8. 
Countries with high GDP levels and low female shares of the labour force at the same time 
are oil exporting, Muslim countries of the Middle East, like the United Arab Emirates, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar or Kuwait. These countries owe their high income levels in big parts to the 
export of natural resources and obtain a rent which is hardly produced by human capital.  
 
Other observations that do not fit into the U-shaped curve are those in the upper middle 
within the curve. These are, in parts, observations from the former Eastern Bloc countries 
and the years 1980 to 1995. Within this period, countries like Slovakia, Hungary or Poland 
had very high levels of FLF relative to their average level of GDP per capita, mainly due to 
area-wide affordable child care infrastructure. 
 
The scatter of  the ratio female/male activity rates (RAR) against lnGDP can be seen in figure 
9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 The graph shows between-county variation at first sight, whereas the circles in line are observations from one country (within-
country variation). 
26 as data on the FLF are not available before 1980. 
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Figure 9: The ratio female/male activity rates (RAR) against lnGDP 
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Here, the suggestion of the figure is not as clear as in figure 8. As, in comparison to FLF, 
measures of RAR contain observations of the 1960s and 1970s, there are  somewhat more 
observations on the left side (low levels of GDP per capita). The relationship between the 
female activity rate (FAR) and lnGDP tells a similar story (not show here).   
 
 
2.6. The econometric methods 
 
Data preparation 
 
For all estimations methods described below, I do not use the panel data as it is, but I use 
the data in a prepared form. The data transformation helps to address the problem of 
possible endogeneity (inverse causality) and therefore lessens the risk of obtaining biased 
and inconsistent estimators.  
 
I prepare the data the following way: For every country, I use means of 5 years for the 
observations of the endogenous variables and observations of the beginning year of the 
respective mean for the exogenous variables. For example, if a country’s observation of FLF 
 106
is the mean of the years 1980-1984, the corresponding observation of lnGDP is from 1980. 
This implies that I use lagged exogenous variables. This procedure responds to possible 
endogeneity, because it impedes that FLF inversely affects lnGDP. It is not possible that FLF 
observed in 1984 impacts GDP per capita in 1980. 
 
The data preparation procedure provides quinquennial data. In order to avoid inverse 
causality, I also could simply carry out the estimations based on yearly observations and use 
one year lags of the exogenous variables. For example, if a country’s observation for FLF 
would be from 1985, the corresponding observation of lnGDP would be from 1984.  In fact, I 
use means of five years for the observations of the endogenous variables because the 
technical structure of the data is unknown. The data contains mainly yearly observations, but 
in some countries the data inquiry probably takes place only every five to ten years. The 
database from Barro and Lee (2000), for example, provides only observations at 5-year-
intervals for the educational variable EDU. Moreover, the partition of the measured time 
period in five year-sections limits time series variations, because five year-intervals are less 
likely to be serially correlated than annual data.  
 
The downside of the described procedure of the data preparation is that it reduces the 
numbers of observations. A comparison of table 10 to table 11 shows that data preparing 
leads to a reduction in the numbers of observations by 50 to 75% for each variable apart 
from EDU.27 Furthermore, the use of observations of the beginning year of the means for the 
exogenous variables also entails the risk of losing data.  If the observation of the beginning 
year is missing, all observations belonging to the left hand side (up to 5 observations that 
build the respective mean) drop out, too. The reduced numbers of observations increases 
the risk of biased and inconsistent estimates. On the other hand, in a complete case 
estimation based on unedited data, missing observations of the endogenous variable would 
reduce the database. Using means for the endogenous variable mitigates the problem 
caused by missing observations of FLF, FAR and RAR, which in turn lowers the risk of 
achieving biased and inconsistent estimates.  
 
As the  data contains observations that vary over time, it is possible that the cross sectional 
time series are marked with a trend. If this is the case, the data would  be non-stationary, 
meaning that the mean and the variance of a variable’s observations does change over time. 
Consequently, the estimated coefficients would be inefficient, because the standard errors 
and t-values would be estimated too high (spurious regression results). To test for possible 
non-stationarity, I apply a panel data unit root test that goes back to Levin, Lin and Chu 
                                                 
27 Apart from EDU, as the original database from Barro and Lee (2000) provides only observations at 5-year-intervals.  
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(2002). Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) assume that the stochastic process of a time series has a 
“unit root” when the coefficient of the lag is 1, meaning that the actual value of a variable 
“keeps its past value completely in memory”. If the coefficient is smaller than 1, the memory 
decreases with the size of the lag (geometric series), meaning that the time series is 
stationary. The test’s null hypothesis is that each variable’s time series contains a unit root 
against the alternative that each time series is stationary. The unit root test demands 
balanced panel data. Therefore I apply the test for a sub-set of the quinquennial data, using 
only observations of the OECD countries and the years 1980-2000. This seems appropriate 
since time trends are especially important for homogenous groups of countries. The 
drawback is that the balanced data have a smaller time dimension (only five periods) than 
the original data. I do the unit root test for four variables FLF, FAR, RAR and lnGDP.  Table 
12 shows the test results. The results reveal that the lagged level of all the four series is 
negative and significant, indicating that the presence of a unit root is rejected. This means 
that all four variables are stationary, which implies that it is appropriate to apply standard 
interference to the estimation results. Nevertheless,  it cannot be excluded that the test finds 
stationary processes because of the small time dimension of the data.  
 
 
OLS-estimation 
 
Based on the quinquennial data, I start with a pooled OLS regression that measures both 
between and within-country variation.  Pooled OLS results should be regarded with 
reservation, because the estimated OLS-coefficients may be biased and inconsistent due to 
omitted variables. This problem can occur if the estimation model omits important exogenous 
variables that are relevant to explain the levels of female labour market participation. It is 
very likely that estimation model (1) that contains only lnGDP and (lnGDP)² as exogenous 
variables produces biased OLS-estimates. Estimation model (2) only contains two more 
exogenous variables, FERT and EDU and captures further effects by dummy variables. High 
dummy variable coefficients would indicate that the estimation model does not sufficiently 
describe the endogenous variable. 
 
 
Fixed Effects-estimation 
 
The fixed effects model captures only within-country variation and therefore controls for level-
differences (between groups of countries of different income levels). Using a fixed effects 
model for panel data allows the exclusion of variables that vary from country to country but 
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are constant over time (country specific dummy variables). Therefore, the fixed effects model 
avoids biased estimation results caused by omitted variables that are constant over time.  On 
the other hand, by introducing country dummies in the estimation equation, which allows the 
elimination of time constant variables, the fixed effects model can weaken the significance of 
the estimated coefficients due to a dummy variable trap.  
 
 
Random Effects-estimation 
 
The random effects model captures both within and between-country variation by assuming 
that country-specific effects that are constant over time are random factors and that the 
exogenous variables are uncorrelated with the random effect. If this is the case, unobserved 
country specific variables that are constant over time are captured by an additional residual 
and the estimators are unbiased and asymptotically consistent. I carry out a Hausman test in 
order to see if this assumption is appropriate and in order to choose between the fixed 
effects and the random effects model. 
 
 
Instrumental Variables Estimator (2SLS) 
 
To further control for possible endogeneity apart from the data preparation, I use an 
instrumental variables estimator. For the basic model (1), I use lagged variables of lnGDP as 
instruments for lnGDP and lagged variables of (lnGDP)² as instruments for (lnGDP)². I create 
the lagged variables again by using the quinquennial data and I perform the IV-regression in 
two steps (Two Stage Least Squares Estimator). 
I start by estimating a reduced form in the first step: 
 
 
tititi GDPPDG ,1,21, lnˆln εββ ++= −                        (11.3) 
 
which regresses the endogenous regressor tiPDG ,ˆln  over the instrument 1,ln −tiGDP .  
Then I calculate tiPDG ,ˆln  based on the estimated coefficients 1β   and 2β  and I calculate 
2
, )ˆ(ln tiPDG  using tiPDG ,ˆln .  
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In the second step, I estimate the female labour market participation (FLF, FAR and RAR) 
based on 2, )ˆ(ln tiPDG  and on tiPDG ,ˆln : 
 
 
titititi PDGPDGnrticipatiourMarketPaFemaleLabo ,
2
,3,21, )ˆ(lnˆln εβββ +++=      (11.4) 
 
Concerning model (2), which includes other exogenous variables, I use lagged variables of 
FERT as instruments for FERT and lagged variables of EDU as instruments for EDU.  
 
 
System GMM-estimation 
 
A Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator is a dynamic panel-data estimator, 
appropriate to capture both between-country and within-country variation. GMM allows 
omitting unobserved variables that are constant over time and considers possible 
endogeneity at the same time. The GMM method goes back to Arellano and Bond (1991), 
who obtained additional instruments by introducing first differences of the endogenous and 
exogenous variables (difference GMM). The differencing process allows leaving out country 
specific variables that are constant over time, but it magnifies gaps in panels with missing 
observations. I use a one step System GMM estimator that makes orthogonal deviations 
instead of differencing (based on Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).    
Instead of subtracting the previous observation from the current one, it subtracts the average 
of all future available observations of a variable to minimise data loss. The System GMM 
combines the level equation and the difference equation as a “system”. Like differencing, 
making orthogonal deviations reduces the risk that the stochastic processess of the 
exogenous variables are non-stationary. Furthermore, the System GMM specification differs 
from the other estimation models by the presence of a lagged endogenous variable (L.FLF 
respectively L.FAR respectively L.RAR) among the exogenous variables. This allows 
controlling for the dynamics of adjustment.  
 
 
3. Estimation results 
 
Model (1), containing only lnGDP and (lnGDP)² as exogenous variables28, and model (2), 
containing also EDU, FERT and the country and time dummies as exogenous variables, are 
estimated with the five mentioned estimation methods (OLS, FE, RE, IV and System-GMM) 
                                                 
28 and a lagged endogenous variable for the System GMM estimation 
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and for all three specifications of female labour market participation (FLF, FAR, RAR). The 
models are estimated based on the complete data base as well as based on limited data sets 
(OECD countries only;  SSA countries only; non-OECD countries only; without observations 
of the 1960s and 1970s, without outliers). 
 
The combination of the various estimation models, estimation methods and specifications 
leads to a multitude of regression results. The following presentation of results highlights the 
most important ones, classified by specification. 
 
 
 3.1. Female share of the labour force (FLF) 
 
Table 13 shows the estimation results of model (1) with the female share of the labour force 
(FLF) as endogenous variable. The first and second column show the regression results for 
pooled OLS estimations, the second column for the fixed effects model, the third column for 
the random effects model, the forth column for the IV-estimation and the last column for the 
System GMM estimation.  
 
For pooled OLS, fixed effects, random effects and IV estimation, the coefficient of lnGDP is 
significantly negative, and the coefficient of (lnGDP)² is significantly positive. Comparing FE 
and RE results, the Hausman Test suggests that the fixed effect specification is superior the 
random effects specification in controlling for unobserved country-heterogeneity in the 
magnitude of the time-series relationship between the female labour market participation and 
economic development. The Hausman test’s Chi² (137,75) shows that the difference of the 
estimation results of both models is systematic. The Hausman test’s F-value (429,24) 
indicates that the hypothesis that the country specific variables have no impact on the 
endogenous variable must be rejected.29 Hence, the results of the random effects model are 
no longer presented. 
 
Concerning the IV-estimation results, the standard errors are not higher than those of the 
pooled OLS, FE or RE regressions. The fact that the coefficients of the IV-estimations are 
somewhat smaller than those of the pooled OLS regression indicates that the pooled OLS 
regression overestimates the real impact of lnGDP on FLF.  Furthermore, the specification is 
not over identified, as there are not more instruments than regressors and so the equations 
(moment conditions) do not outnumber the variables (coefficients).  
 
                                                 
29 Fixed effects estimation’s result: F test that all u_i=0: F(173, 3850) =   429.52; Prob. > F = 0.0000.  
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Concerning the System GMM estimation, table 13 shows coefficients for lnGDP and  
(lnGDP)² that are not significant. Only the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable L.FLF 
is significant, indicating that 86,2% of the female share of the labour force is explained by its 
own past values.  
 
The fit of the basic model is relatively weak for all estimation methods (R² varies between 
0.094 and 0.1498). As the fixed effects and the random effects models take explanatory 
variables which are constant over time into account, these estimation models have a slightly 
better fit than the OLS model.  
 
Table 14 shows the estimation results of the multivariate model (2) with the female share of 
the labour force as endogenous variable, for pooled OLS (with and without EDU), fixed 
effects, IV- and System GMM estimation. Now, also for the System GMM estimation, the 
coefficients of lnGDP and (lnGDP)² are significant. As the System GMM estimation is the 
most appropriate estimation method for the used data, I interpret the regression results of the 
last column in more detail. The positive coefficient of (lnGDP)² confirms the “feminisation U” 
hypothesis, as it indicates the curve’s minimum. As (lnGDP)² is a function of lnGDP, the 
coefficient of lnGDP (-3,111) and of (lnGDP)² (0,223) must not be interpreted separately. The 
first derivation of the estimated function shows that the impact of an increase of lnGDP on 
FLF depends on the level of lnGDP:  
 
)²(ln223,0ln111,387,18 GDPGDPFLF +−=                                  (11.5) 
GDP
GDP
FLF ln446,0111,3
ln
+−=δ
δ
 
7ln0
ln
=⇔= GDP
GDP
FLF
δ
δ
 
 
 
An increase of lnGDP decreases the female share of the labour force for small levels of 
lnGDP (lnGDP<7) and increases FLF from a higher level of lnGDP on (lnGDP>7). This leads 
to an U-shaped pattern between FLF and lnGDP.  
 
As the coefficients of lnGDP and (lnGDP)² can not be interpreted separately, they cannot be 
tested independently from each other. The F-tests (for pooled OLS, the fixed effects and the 
IV estimation) as well as the Wald Chi²-test (for the random effects) indicate a high common 
significance of lnGDP and (lnGDP)². 
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To illustrate the relationship between FLF and lnGDP indicated by the coefficients of lnGDP 
and (lnGDP)², I calculate the accompanying FLF for every level of lnGDP ranging between 
4,03 and 10,77, which are the minimum and the maximum of lnGDP according to the 
prepared data set (see table 2). The calculation is based on equation (5), which contains 
values of the constant and the coefficients for lnGDP and (lnGDP)² estimated by the System 
GMM model. As the illustration can only be two-dimensional, the other exogenous variables 
are not taken into account. Figure 10 illustrates a clear U-shaped relationship between FLF 
and lnGDP. 
 
 
Figure 10: Female share of the labour force against lnGDP: System GMM, model (2) 
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Source: own calculations 
 
 
Like the calculation above, the figure indicates that the minimum of the curve is located at a 
lnGDP-value of 7, which is around 1.100 US$ per capita per year. The corresponding FLF-
value is around 8%. According to the figure, FLF varies only between 8% and 11%, because 
L.FLF is included as exogenous variable in the System GMM estimation model, and 
therefore around 80% of the female share of the labour force is explained by its own past 
values.  
 
Figure 11 illustrates the U-shaped curve based on estimations that result from a System 
GMM estimation of model (2) without L.FLF as exogenous variable (estimation results not 
shown here). 
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Figure 11: Female share of the labour force against lnGDP: System GMM, model (2),    
                   without L.FLF as exogenous variable 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
 
 
Here, FLF varies between 30% and 60%. Without the exogenous variables L.FLF, FERT, 
EDU, DV1980s and DV1990s, FLF varies between levels of 20% and 50%, which 
corresponds to the variation supposed by the data scatter in figure 8.  
 
Furthermore, the correlation between the fertility rate and the female share of the labour 
force is negative for all estimation methods. The dummy variables for OECD and SSA are 
positively correlated with the dependant variable, whereas the dummies for Latin America, 
North Africa and the Middle East as well as that for Muslim countries are negatively 
correlated with the dependant variable. Compared to the estimation results of model (1) in 
table 12, taking other explanatory variables into account significantly improves the regression 
fit of all estimation methods (R² varies between 0,304 and 0,5418). On the other hand, the 
high values and high significance of most of the regional dummy variables indicates that 
country specific effects are very important. This implies that even model (2) does not capture 
the individual impacts on female share of the labour force very well. However, taking into 
account the educational attainment of women (EDU) in the pooled OLS regression does not 
improve the fit, but reduces the number of observations by about 40%. Moreover, the 
coefficients of EDU are not significant.  
 
I run the same regressions of model (2) again with a data set excluding the outliers pointed 
out by figure 8, which are observations of the oil exporting countries and the countries of the 
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former Eastern Bloc.30  For all estimation methods, the values of the coefficients of lnGDP 
and (lnGDP)² rise in value (estimation results not shown here). For the OLS regression with 
EDU as exogenous variable, for example, the coefficient of lnGDP is -12,50 and the 
coefficient of (lnGDP)² is 0,82. Hence, dropping the outliers further supports the validity of the 
“feminisation U” hypothesis suggested by the estimation results.  
 
 
3.2. Female activity rate (FAR) 
 
Table 15 shows the estimation results of model (2) with the female activity rate (FAR) as 
endogenous variable, for pooled OLS (with and without EDU), fixed effects, IV- and System 
GMM estimation. Regression results of model (1) are not shown here, because they are 
similar to those of model (2) and the goodness of fit of model (2) is better than of the basic 
estimation model (1). 
 
For all estimation methods, the coefficients of lnGDP and of log GDP² are in line with theory: 
The positive coefficients of log GDP² indicate the curve’s U-shape also for the FAR-
specification, which confirms the robustness of the findings. Yet, the coefficients of lnGDP 
and (lnGDP)² are not significant for the FE-model. The graph based on the FE results, 
illustrated in figure 12, shows a strictly declining branch and hence gives no evidence for a 
“feminisation U”.  
 
Yet, as the FE-coefficients of lnGDP and of (lnGDP)² are not significant, one can not make 
clear statements about the curve progression. 
 
One may think of differences in the data structure as reasons for the finding that the results 
of the FAR-specification are less convincing that those of the FLF-specification. For example, 
FAR-measures contain observations from the 1960s and 1970s whereas FLF-measures 
contain observations from 1980 on only. It is possible that the branch in figure 12 is strictly 
declining due to the observations from the 1960s and 1970s. This goes especially for SSA 
countries, because the lessening role of the subsistence economies mainly took place in 
these two decades and the Structural Adjustment Programs that brought back women in the 
labour market, started to have an effect only from the  1980s on (c.f. Stiglitz, 2002).  
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Oil exporting countries (OPEC): Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, Venezuela. Eastern Bloc: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania (without East-Germany).   
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Figure 12: Female activity rate against lnGDP: fixed effects, model (2) 
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Source: own calculations 
 
 
Hence, I re-estimate model (2) with FAR as endogenous variable based on data without 
observations from the 1960s and 1970s. Estimation results are shown in table 16. Here, for 
all estimation methods, the coefficients of (lnGDP)² stay positive, but those of the FE 
estimation do not become significant. The graph based on these insignificant FE results, 
shown in figure 13, still shows no evidence for a “feminisation U”.  
 
 
Figure 13: Female activity rate against lnGDP: fixed effects, model (2),  
                  without 1960s and 1970s 
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However, the significantly positive coefficients of (lnGDP)²  for the OLS, FE and System 
GMM model in table 16 imply that concerning the FAR-specification, the declining branch of 
the “feminisation U” is not only dominated by observations from the 1960s and 1970s. The 
graph based on the OLS results (with EDU) in figure 14 shows that even without 
observations from the 1960s and 1970s, the sharp bend in the curve does not disappear. 
 
 
Figure 14: Female activity rate against lnGDP: pooled OLS, model (2),  
                  without 1960s and 1970s 
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Source: own calculations 
 
 
Yet, the fact that the FE-results stay insignificant suggest that the additive observations for 
the 1960s and 1970s do not explain why the FE results of the FAR-specification are less 
convincing that those of the FLF-specification. 
 
 
3.3. Ratio female/male activity rate (RAR) 
 
Another difference in the data structure between FLF and FAR is that FLF measures the  
share of women in the total labour force and therefore FLF takes into account the number of 
working men in contrast to the female activity rate (FAR), which accounts for the share of 
active women in the female working age population. Hence, I re-estimate model (2) with the 
ratio of female to male activity rates (RAR) as endogenous variable. Like FLF, this variable 
takes into account the number of working men. 
 
Table 17 shows the estimation results of model (2) for pooled OLS (with and without EDU), 
fixed effects, IV- and System GMM estimation. For all estimation methods, the coefficients of 
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lnGDP and (lnGDP)² are consistent with the theory, but the FE-coefficients are still not or 
very little significant. Hence, the definition differences do not explain why the FE results of 
the FAR-specification are less convincing that those of the FLF-specification, either. 
 
 
4. Cluster analysis 
4.1. Country analysis 
 
It is possible that for the FAR- and RAR- specification, the insignificant coefficients of lnGDP 
and (lnGDP)² result from the FE-estimation technique itself, as the fixed effects model 
captures only within-country variation. To focus on within-country variation more precisely, I 
estimate the FE-model based on a smaller data set containing only subgroups of 
homogenous countries, namely OECD countries and SSA countries. Table 18 shows the 
regression results for the FLF-, FAR- and RAR-specification, based on model (2). For OECD 
countries, the coefficient of lnGDP is significantly negative and the coefficient of (lnGDP)² is 
significantly positive, not only for the FLF-specification, but now also for the FAR- and RAR-
specification. This suggests that for OECD countries, the “feminisation U” hypothesis can be 
confirmed also for within-country variation. For SAA countries however, the coefficients of 
lnGDP and of (lnGDP)² change sign and are not significant, regardless of the specification. 
Figure 15, which scatters the FLF against lnGDP for SSA-countries only, still supposes a 
“feminisation U” for SSA-countries, but suggests a dominating declining branch. 
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Figure 15: Female share of the labour force (FLF) against lnGDP: SSA countries 
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A closer look at the data shows that for several SSA countries, as for example Gambia, 
Kenya, Senegal or Zimbabwe, the relationship between female labour market participation 
and lnGDP is strictly negative, independent of the specification. At the same time, even 
though for the group of OECD-countries the “feminisation U” is confirmed for within-country 
variation, in some industrialised countries, like in the USA, in France or in Germany for 
example, there is a strictly positive relationship  between female labour market participation 
and lnGDP. Figure 16, which scatters the FLF against lnGDP for OECD countries only 
suggests a dominating positive relationship between the two variables. 
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Figure 16:  Female share of the labour force (FLF) against lnGDP: OECD countries 
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The only countries that suggest a U-shaped pattern between FLF and lnGDP within the 
observed time period are some growing tiger states of South-East Asia. Figure 17 shows the 
scatter of FLF against lnGDP for the Philippines. 
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Figure 17: Female share of the labour force (FLF) against lnGDP: Philippines 
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Yet, FLF ranges only between 36% and 39%. The “feminisation U” hypothesis, on the other 
hand, focuses on a much larger variation of female labour market participation along the 
economic development path (for FLF between 20% and 50% approximately, see figure 8). 
Hence, the scatter for the Philippines does not give country-specific evidence for the 
“feminisation U”. Furthermore, there are some countries that show atypical scatter forms. 
Some former Eastern Bloc countries, like the Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland, show a 
sudden extreme decline in the FLF in the early 1990s that is not accompanied by a similarly 
strong change in lnGDP (figures not shown here).  It is likely that in these countries, a 
change in the political and economic system in the early 1990s brought a decline in the 
state’s child care institutions. In addition, Turkey shows a strong decline of the FLF from 
1980 until today though, within that period, lnGDP increased, supposing a starting rise of the 
FLF (figure not shown here).  Furthermore, Saudi Arabia displays a rising FLF during a 
period of declining lnGDP since the 1980s, and still the country has one of the highest 
income levels and one of the lowest female participation rates in the world (figure not shown 
here).  
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What we can say so far is that the significant results of the pooled OLS, IV- and System 
GMM regressions confirm the “feminisation U” hypothesis, but the FE results and the data 
scatters for homogenous groups of countries suggest that the U-shaped curve is mainly 
founded on between-country variation. 
 
 
4.2 Time analysis 
 
To see whether certain time periods dominate certain sections of the U-shape curve, I scatter 
the FLF against lnGDP separated by decades (figures not shown here). The U-curve still can 
still be detected in all figures, but in the 1980s the negative relationship and in the 2000s the 
positive relationship is slightly dominant. A time specific cluster analysis separated for OECD 
and SSA countries shows that for OECD-countries, in all decades there is a dominating 
positive relationship. For SSA-countries, in all decades there is a domination negative 
relationship. This indicates that the observed time period is probably too small to observe a 
whole U shaped curve for groups of homogenous countries. As in many developing countries 
the urbanisation and industrialisation processes just started (c.f. Cohen, 2006), it is likely that 
the turning point implementing an increase in female labour market participation is in the 
near future. For industrialised countries, the observed time period may also be too small to 
observe a whole U-shaped curve. Goldin (1994) shows for the USA and Marchand and 
Thélot (1997) for France, that in these two countries the period of decreasing female labour 
market participation already took place in the first period of the twentieth century (see 
chapter 1). Hence, it is likely that the “feminisation U” exists not only for between-country 
variation, but also for variations within countries,  but can not be observed due to the limited 
time period of the data.  
 
Not only the figures, but also the regression results indicate that time effects play an 
important role when focusing on within-country variation. Table 17, for example, shows that 
the time-specific dummy variables are highly significant for the FE-regression. In contrast, 
they are not significant for the System GMM regression that captures both within- and 
between-country variation. In order to intensify the control for time effects, I use a two way 
fixed effects model. This means instead of time dummies for each decade, I include time 
dummies for each period of the quinquennial data (DV1960, DV1965, ... DV2005) for all 
specifications of female labour market participation. Now, the estimated coefficients for 
lnGDP and (lnGDP)² are even less significant, which may be due to a dummy variable trap 
(estimation results not shown here). Yet, the fact that the time dummies are again all highly 
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significant indicates that time effects, as for example time based shocks, need more 
consideration.  
 
 
5. Moving Average 
 
In order to smooth out time based shocks, such as periodical fluctuations of GDP, for 
example, I apply a moving average (MA) procedure. This procedure smoothes out short-term 
fluctuations and highlights longer-term trends or cycles. The moving average process creates 
a new series for each variable, in which each observation is an average of the nearby 
observations in the original series. A simple moving average (SMA) is the unweighted mean 
of a certain number of data points and therefore weakens the variation within a certain time 
period. Using the quinquennial data,I create uniformly weighted moving average-variables of 
all relevant variables (FLF, FAR, RAR, lnGDP, (lnGDP)², FERT and EDU) by using two 
lagged terms and three forward terms of each observation, and by including the current 
observation in the filter. Then I estimate the FE-model using the created moving MA-
variables.  
 
Table 19 shows the results for the OLS and the FE regression, with FAR (as moving average 
variable) as endogenous variable. The regression is based on model (2), meaning that 
lnGDP, (lnGDP)², FERT and EDU (as moving average variables) are included in the 
estimation model as exogenous variables. Comparing these results to the FE results of the 
regressions without moving average (table 15), the sign of the coefficient of lnGDP stays 
negative and the sign of the coefficient of (lnGDP)² stays positive. However, the most striking 
is that the FE-coefficients of lnGDP and (lnGDP)² are significant now. The corresponding 
graph based on these significant FE-coefficients, shown in figure 18, now shows a U-shaped 
form with a minimum point. 
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Figure 18: Female activity rate against lnGDP: fixed effects, model (2),  
                   Moving Average 
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The coefficients stay significant also when applying the two way fixed effects model. This 
suggests that, as the FE-estimation method only measures within-country variation, fixed 
effects is the model which is most susceptible to time specific shocks, and so, for the FE-
estimation, the use of moving average variables is the most appropriate.  The FE-estimation 
results, based on MA-variables, now also prove the validity of the “feminisation U” 
hypothesis. 
 
 
6. Granger Causality 
 
All estimation methods used in this paper examine the statistical correlation between lnGDP 
and female labour market participation, but one can not infer that there is a causal impact of 
economic growth on the female labour market participation.  To test for the causality between 
lnGDP on the one side and FLF, FAR and RAR on the other side, I use the concept of 
Granger causality, again by analysing variables that are not observed contemporarily (lags). 
First, to test the hypothesis that a change in lnGDP leads to a change in the female labour 
market participation, I test if lagged values of lnGDP provide statistically significant 
information about actual values of the female labour market participation. In a second step, 
to test the alternative hypothesis that a change in the female labour market participation 
leads to a change in lnGDP, I test whether lagged values of the female labour market 
participation provide statistically significant information about actual values of lnGDP.  
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The Granger causality test is based on the quinquenial data with means of 5 years for 
FLF/FAR/RAR and observations of the beginning year of the respective mean for lnGDP and 
(lnGDP)². This provides larger lagged observations than the use of the dataset with yearly 
observations would provide.  
 
I first do an OLS-regression with the female labour market participation as endogenous 
variable and lagged values of the female labour market participation and lagged values of 
lnGDP and (lnGDP)² as exogenous variables. For the FLF-specification, the estimated 
equation is as follows: 
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L.lnGDP stands for a one unit-lagged variable of lnGDP and L2.lnGDP stands for a two units-
lagged variable of lnGDP. For example, if a country’s observation of FLF is the mean of the 
observations between 2000 and 2004, the corresponding one unit-lagged observations of 
lnGDP and (lnGDP)² are from 1995 and the corresponding two units- lagged observations of 
lnGDP and (lnGDP)² are from 1990. The corresponding one unit- lagged observations of FLF 
are between 1995 and 1999 and the corresponding two units- lagged observations of FLF 
are between 1990 and 1994.  
 
The regression results (not shown here) show that both lagged values of lnGDP and 
(lnGDP)² provide statistically significant information about actual values of FLF. For the FAR 
and RAR-specification, this is not the case. It is possible that the female labour market 
participation reacts to changes in lnGDP only on the medium run, which means with a bigger 
delay than one or two time units. Therefore I run an OLS-regression with stronger lagged 
values of the female labour market participation and of lnGDP and (lnGDP)². I use three and 
four units-lagged values (15 years and 20 years lags) and expect a higher explanatory power 
of those of lnGDP and (lnGDP)². Table 20 shows the regression results. Indeed, all lagged 
values of lnGDP and (lnGDP)² show a higher explanatory power. Now, lagged values of 
lnGDP provide statistically significant information also about actual values of RAR.  
 
To test the alternative hypothesis that a change in female labour market participation leads to 
a change in lnGDP, I do an OLS-regression with lnGDP as endogenous variable and lagged 
values of the female labour market participation and lagged values of lnGDP and (lnGDP)² 
as exogenous variables.  
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For the FLF-specification, the estimated equation is as follows: 
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Table 21 shows the regression results. For all three specifications, none of the lagged values 
of female labour market participation (FLF/FAR/RAR) provides statistically significant 
information about actual values of lnGDP. The estimation results show that a change in 
lnGDP Granger-causes a change in the female labour market participation and that this 
effect appears time-lagged. Inversely, a change in the female labour market participation 
does not Granger cause a change in lnGDP. This supposes an unilateral impact from lnGDP 
to the female labour market participation, with the reservation that Granger causality does 
not imply true causality. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the question of how growth affects female labour market 
participation empirically. As it is recognised today that female labour market participation 
positively impacts growth, policy makers risk assuming intuitively that the inverse impact is 
positive, too. Yet, concerning the impact of growth on female labour market participation, 
until today both theory and empirical analysis show contradictory findings. On the theoretical 
side, the “modernisation neoclassical” approach, which implies a strictly positive impact, 
stands in contrast to the “feminisation U” approach, which suggest a convex relationship. 
Recent empirical studies assume a “feminisation U”, but the estimation results, which are 
only based on cross country data, do not confirm the “feminisation U” hypothesis.  
 
Hence, in this chapter I test the “feminisation U” hypothesis by using different specifications 
and further empirical methods, based on a large macro panel data set, which combines 
cross-sectional and time-series data. The panel data allows controlling for possible 
endogeneity problems, which exist due to an inverse causality between the exogenous and 
the endogenous variables. The use of lags and deviations of the exogenous variables limits 
the risk of obtaining biased estimation coefficients. I resort lags, respectively deviations, 
several times in this chapter, when preparing data, when creating instrumental variables 
(2SLS), when estimating with fixed effects and System GMM, when creating Moving Average 
variables and when applying Granger Causality tests.  
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Furthermore, the larger data set allows testing for the robustness of the empirical findings by 
using different specifications for female labour market participation. I use three specifications, 
namely the female share of the labour force (FLF), the female activity rate (FAR) and the 
ratio of the female to the male activity rate (RAR). 
 
The estimations are based on five estimation methods (OLS, FE, RE, IV and System-GMM). 
There are two main estimation models. Model (1) contains only lnGDP and (lnGDP)² as 
exogenous variables. Model (2) contains also education, fertility and country and time 
dummies as exogenous variables. The models are estimated based on the complete data 
base as well as based on limited data (only OECD countries, only Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries, without observations of the 1960s and 1970s, without OPEC and former Eastern 
Bloc countries as outliers). 
 
The econometric analysis confirms the “feminisation U” hypothesis. More precisely, the OLS, 
IV- and System-GMM results support the hypothesis for all specifications of the female 
labour market participation and all estimation models. An illustration of the  U-shaped 
relationship between FLF and lnGDP, based on a System GMM estimation model without 
controlling for the dynamics of adjustment and other exogenous variables, indicates that the 
minimum of the curve is located at a lnGDP-value of  7, which is around 1.100 US$ per 
capita per year. FLF varies between 20% and 50%.  
 
The empirical evidence that growth lowers women’s labour market participation at early 
stages of development is of political interest. It suggests that in developing countries, 
economic growth encourages women’s labour market participation only with policy-makers’ 
intervention. Accompanying growth promoting policies with decent and productive work 
opportunities for women is a major challenge to prevent women from dropping out of the 
labour market or from getting stuck in low paid jobs in the informal economy. This is all the 
more true since encouraging female employment is growth promoting not only for 
developing, but also for industrialised countries. 
 
Nevertheless, estimation results must be interpreted with care, because the estimation 
methods can not completely eliminate biases caused by endogeneity. The results are also 
biased because measures of female labour market participation are imperfect. In addition, 
the fixed effects-results lend weaker support to the “feminisation U”, especially for the FAR- 
and RAR-specification. A moving average (MA) procedure that smoothes out time-specific 
shocks effects confirms the U-curve also for the fixed effects model. However, the weaker 
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fixed-effects results and the time- and country-specific cluster analysis suppose that the U-
curve is dominated more by between-country variation than by within-country variation. This 
probably goes back to the limited time period of the data. For most countries it may not be 
enough to observe only 24 years (for FLF as endogenous variable) or 40 years (for FAR and 
RAR as endogenous variable) to show a country’s whole U-curve. The Granger causality 
tests also suppose that female labour market participation reacts to changes in lnGDP with 
considerable time delay. 
 
Furthermore, the atypical relationship between female labour market participation and 
economic development in countries like Saudi Arabia or the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland suggest that economic development alone can not always sufficiently explain the 
development of women’s labour market participation. The countries mentioned above rather 
suggest that political and social institutions have a fundamental influence on the female 
labour market participation (c.f. Morrisson and Jütting, 2005). Saudi Arabia for example has 
one of the highest income levels and one of the lowest female participation rates in the world. 
This can partly be explained by the fact that Saudi Arabia owes its high income level largely 
to the export of oil and hence obtains a rent which is hardly produced by human capital. 
Concerning the former Eastern Bloc countries, the rapid decline of female labour market 
participation in the 1990s can partly be explained by the fact that the transition to market-
oriented economies, which was accompagnied by a transformation of hidden unemployment 
to explicit unemployment, tended to effect women more then men. Moreover, the change in 
the political and economic system in the early 1990s brought a decline in the state’s child 
care institutions. 
 
In order to keep the data set large, political and social determinants that change over time 
are not included in the estimation model. The limited data availability also makes it 
impossible to specify measures of female labour market participation. It would be interesting 
to examine female employment patterns more specifically, for example full-time equivalent 
employment rates and part-time work, compared between mothers and women without 
children. However, the used data sets do not offer such precise information for all countries 
and all years. Especially for developing and semi-industrialised countries, such specific data 
are hardly available. Moreover, for all countries, it is difficult to get these specific data for time 
periods before 1990. Hence, it is not possible to estimate a more specific model based 
without reducing significantly the number of observations. An analysis that focuses on 
political and social institutions and specific employment patterns necessitates limitating the 
data set to industrialised countries and recent time periods. Chapter 3 provides an analysis 
of the impact of family policy instruments on female employment patterns in the European 
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Union (27), followed by a case study for France and Germany that takes into account specific 
information about the country’s socio-economic system and its prevalent family norms and 
values.  
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Chapter III:  
The impact of family policies on  
women’s labour market participation in  Europe  
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The Barcelona summit in 2002 confirmed the goals defined by the Lisbon European 
Employment Strategy by stating that member states should remove disincentives to female 
labour market participation. In Europe today, family policy is seen as a major instrument to 
encourage women, mothers in particular, to participate in the labour market (c.f. for example 
OECD, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007). In this regard, the European Commission expects a lot 
from extending childcare facilities.  All member states are required to develop childcare 
provisions to facilitate the reconciliation of work and family responsibilities. The Commission 
asked the European countries to each provide childcare for at least 90% of children between 
the ages of three and mandatory school age and for at least 33% of children under 3 years of 
age by 2010 (cf. European Council, 2002). 
 
Yet it is too early to appraise the effects of the Barcelona targets on female employment in 
Europe. Moreover, other family policy instruments like tax and cash benefits and parental 
leave schemes may also play an important role on women’s especially mother’s 
employment. In these fields, family policy varies widely across Europe and there are no clear 
targets set by the European institutions (c.f. Plantenga et al., 2007). In Europe, in addition to 
employment and demographic objectives policies supporting parenthood are also aimed at 
improving family life, the reconciliation between work and family obligations and the well-
being of children. Work–life balance has progressively gain ground on the policy agenda in 
most EU member states, as several surveys suggest that people who succeed in reconciling 
their work with family life are more satisfied with their family life. In general, the differents 
aims of policies supporting parenthood in Europe can be classified in three categories. The 
first aim is a reduction of family and child poverty (including the promotion of children’s well-
being). The second aim is a support of fertility. The third aim is an encouragement of 
women’s labour market participation and a reconciliation of work and family life (including 
equalisation aims like gender equality in terms of income, domestic work, social and political 
participation, work-life balance…).  
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Even though these three aims are regarded as equivalent by the European Commission, in 
many European countries family policies are designed mainly towards redistributive goals31 
at the expense of fertility and/or female labour market participation. Hence, in several 
European countries, family policy expenditures are high, but at the same time fertility rates 
and women’s labour market participation rates are deficient. This is mainly due to the fact 
that  these countries  consider only particular impacts of family policy measures and 
consequently,  policies supporting parenthood  are conflicting in terms of poverty prevention, 
fertility and women’s labour market participation. The analysis shows that in some countries, 
family policy instruments that mainly aim at reducing income poverty of families and children 
risk discouraging mothers from working. This is especially the case in countries with rather 
traditional family values (i.e. in Germany, Austria, several Southern European countries), in 
which the majority of policy makers regard mothers’ labour market participation as 
detrimental for the children’s well being and emphasise the importance of mothers’ time 
devoted to children as well as the importance of reducing children’s monetary costs.  
Nevertheless, the analysis also shows that the three objectives are not necessarily 
incompatible as such. Whether or not a country succeeds in effectively combining the 
objectives in a coherent family policy mix depends on the specific characteristics of the family 
policy instruments. 
 
The first part of this chapter gives an overview of the main family policy instruments in 
Europe and shows how the available literature discusses their impact of family policy 
instruments on mothers’ employment patterns. It becomes clear that elaborating not only the 
specific impact of one family policy instrument, but the overall impact of a country’s family 
policy on mothers’ employment necessitates detailed information about a countries socio-
economic system and its prevalent norms and values. Statistical complexity and data 
availability make it difficult to assess the overall effectiveness of various family policies that 
have been implemented to date in all the 27 EU member countries. Moreover, institutional 
differences complicate the comparison between the impacts of family policies between 27 
European countries.  
 
With a view to provide a detailed and compelling comparative analysis of family policy 
impacts, I focus on only two European countries in the second part of this chapter. I present 
a case study of France and Germany. These two countries are relatively well suited to a 
comparative analysis:  Despite the general similarity of their socio-economic systems, 
Germany and France display very different levels of fertility and female employment patterns. 
I investigate the intriguing question of whether differences in family politics can contribute to 
                                                 
31 Family policies may focus on redistributing income from high- to low-income families (vertical redistribution) or from small to 
large families (horizontal redistribution). 
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understanding the different levels of female employment. Several studies highlight the 
important differences in childcare infrastructure (in-kind benefits) between the two countries 
(c.f. Fagnani, 2004, for example). My analysis goes further in assuming that differences in 
financial assistance to families (cash benefits) between the two countries also play an 
important role in explaining the differences in female labour market participation.  
 
 
 
1. The impact of family policies on women’s labour market  
      participation in the EU (27)32 
 
In this chapter I examine the available literature on the impact of family policies on the labour 
market participation of mothers in Europe in recent years. The literature pesented in this 
chapter is organised as follows: Firstly, I scrutinise studies that make linkages between the 
presence of children and mothers’ employment:  I discuss the impact of children on mothers’ 
employment and unemployment rates in general. I specify the impact of children, their age 
and their number on mothers’ working time patterns, always comparing the effect of children 
on mothers’ employment to the one on fathers’ employment and I analyse the impact of 
children on the gender division of labour and on gender equality including income and career 
aspects. Secondly, I review the theoretical and empirical literature exploring the impact of 
family policies on mothers’ labour market participation. I divide family policy instruments into 
three main categories, which are the tax and cash benefit system, parental leave benefits 
and childcare assistance and I discuss the overall impact of family policies on female labour 
market participation for European countries by pointing out the limits of this approach.  
 
 
 1.1. The impact of children on women’s labour market participation 
 
The literature based on Eurostat and other international harmonised data suggests that the 
presence of children in households has relatively little effect on men’s working patterns but 
profoundly affects maternal labour market behaviour by interrupting, reducing or curtailing 
mothers’ involvement in paid work. Hence, the presence of children partly explains the lower 
earnings for women. The impact of children on mothers’ labour market behaviour and  
earnings, their economic security and their career opportunities are presented more broadly 
as “indirect” costs of children (c.f. OECD, 2007). Increasing female employment rates have 
                                                 
32 Section 1 developped on the basis of the collaboration with Marie-Thérèse Letablier (CNRS Paris), in the course of the 
elaboration of a comparative study of the “costs of raising children and the effectiveness of supporting parenthood policies in 27 
European countries” for the European Commission. 
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become a key component in the European Employment Strategy (c.f. Thévenon, 2004), as 
an attempt is to offset the economic effects of population decline and ageing. The target set 
by the European Union’s Summit of Lisbon in 2000 is 60%  for female employment rates in 
every European country33. 
 
In recent decades, in Western Europe, mothers have increased their labour market 
participation. Yet, this is not valid for all European counties, although much of the literature 
tends to generalise from observing the EU (15) countries. In Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), women’s labour market participation has being decreasing in recent decades. In 
these countries, many women worked and had children at the same time during the Soviet 
era, but during the transition period their employment rates fell sharply and to a greater 
extent than those of men. Nevertheless, even in EU (15) member states, the constraints on 
female employment vary widely from one country to another, resulting in marked differences 
in female labour market participation. The following subsections report in more detail the 
impact of the presence, the number and the age of children on mothers’ employment 
patterns, including mothers’ time devoted to paid work. I also consider the consequences of 
parenthood for the gender division of household and labour tasks and the gender wage gap.  
 
 
1.1.1. Mothers’ employment rates   
 
The European Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat LFS) and the European Household Panel 
(ECHP), which since 2001 is progressively replaced with data collection under the EU-SILC 
(Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) regulations, are the two major data sources 
used to compare men’s and women’s labour market participation and employment patterns 
in EU Member states.  Both are based on sample surveys. Concerning the Eurostat LFS, the 
national employment surveys are based on individuals and are harmonised, for example by 
counting women in parental leave the same way in all countries (identical definitions). 
National employment surveys differ because, for example, in Sweden, women in parental 
leave are counted as active and in France as inactive. The EU-SILC’s sample surveys are 
not based on individuals but on household panels. Therefore, the EU-SILC is more limited 
with regard to the number of observed units in comparison to the Eurostat LFS. However, the 
EU-SILC contains more detailed information about each household’s behaviour and 
composition.  
 
                                                 
33 Definition “employment rate”: the percentage of the working age population (ages 15 to 64) who are currently employed. A 
person is considered employed if they have worked at least 1 hour in "gainful" employment. 
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Several studies show how the proportion of women in the European working population has 
been growing consistently since the 1970s (c.f. Thévenon, 2007; Vlasblom, 2004). Recent 
Eurostat LFS data for all 27 EU member states indicate that the average gender employment 
gap (population aged 15 to 64) fell from 18,9% in 1996 to 14,2% in 2007.34 This is mainly due 
to a rise in female employment rates. In 1996,  in the 12 new member states, the 
employment gap, at 11,9%, was smaller than in the EU(15) (20,2%), but increased to 13,4% 
in 2007 whereas in the old member states the gap decreased to 14,5% in 2007. However, 
the evolution of the employment rates over the last decade in Eastern Europe has to be 
interpreted with care: In the 1990s in Eastern Europe, the female as well as the male 
employment rates fell strongly, mainly due to the transition to a market economy. They 
started to rise again due to an upturn in the economy when these States became EU 
members in 2004. The gender employment gap continued to be lowest in the Northern 
countries and highest in the Mediterranean countries in 2007.  
 
Female unemployment rates tend to be underestimated because women with young 
children, especially married ones, who are not in paid employment may not declare 
themselves to be „unemployed“ even though they would like to work, (c.f. Jaumotte, 2003 for 
OECD countries). At the same time, women suffer from higher long-term unemployment 
rates than men. In 2007,  on average in the EU (27), 3,3% of women were long-term 
unemployed as compared to 2,8% of men according to Eurostat LFS data using ILO 
definitions, but the differences in long-term unemployment rates between women and men 
vary widely across countries (up to 4,8 percentage points in Greece).  
 
Based on Eurostat LFS data, de Hénau et al. (2004)35 emphasise that the employment gap 
between men and women in Europe is mainly due to motherhood, since it is mothers rather 
than fathers who are faced with a dichotomous choice between paid work and raising 
children. In analysing the impact of children on employment, de Hénau et al. (2007) focus on 
the labour market participation of men and women aged between 25 and 49 years, which is 
widely considered to be the age bracket when mothers devote most time to parenting.36  
 
                                                 
34 The gender employment gap is the difference between the male and the female employment rate, whereas the employment 
rates are calculated by dividing the number of women (men) aged 15 to 64 in employment by the total female (male) population 
of the same age group. The employed population consists of those persons who during the reference week did any work for pay 
or profit for at least one hour, or were not working but had jobs from which they were temporarily absent.  
35 Results from the MOCHO EU Research Network 2004 (The rationale of Motherhood Choices: Influence of Employment 
Conditions and Public Policies). Scientific partners: Danièle Meulders, Jacques Le Cacheux, Siv Gustaffsson, Daniela Del Boca 
and Haris Symeonidou.  
36Even though in some countries the age of mothers at first birth may be lower for some groups of women and men may 
become fathers at a later age. Moreover, some countries record very high teenage pregnancy rates. Furthermore, the age at 
which children leave home has been increasingly postponed and also, the burden of caring for older relatives befalls women 
more so than men. 
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The data presented in table 22 in the appendix show that fathers in the 25 to 49 age group 
are more likely to be employed than men without children in all EU member states (European 
Labour Force Survey, 2006). By contrast, in all countries, mothers’ employment rates are 
lower than those of women without children (aged under 12). The average EU (27) 
employment gap between women without children and mothers is 13.6 percentage points.37  
The gap is much smaller (below 5 percentage points) in Portugal, Romania and Lithuania, 
but it is particularly large (more than 20 percentage points) in Malta, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovakia.  The gap is also relatively large (between 15 and 20 points) in the UK, 
Germany, Estonia, Spain, Luxembourg and Austria. In these countries, employment rates 
are relatively high for women without children.  
 
Mothers’ labour market participation is particularly high in Finland, where the dual earner 
model of families is widespread. It is also relatively high in Portugal, which is an exception in 
the countries of Southern European with respect to women’s labour market participation. 
One explanation may be that the low average wage level in Portugal obliges mothers to 
contribute to the household income (c.f. de Hénau et al., 2007). By contrast, the employment 
rate of mothers is far below the EU (27) average (62.4%) in the Mediterranean countries, 
since low female wages, insufficient childcare infrastructure, and persistently high 
unemployment may discourage mothers from working. However, persisting traditional role 
models (i.e. the male breadwinner family model) may also explain the relatively low labour 
market participation of mothers in Mediterranean countries.  
 
The negative impact of children on female employment suggested by the Labour Force 
Survey is confirmed by several country-specific empirical studies: Pailhé and Solaz (2007), 
for example, find out that in France, 71% of women change their working situation after a first 
childbirth, 86% after a second childbirth and 91% after a third childbirth. (Enquête Famille et 
Employeurs INED/INSEE 2004-2005). Schippers and Vlasblom (2004) use estimation results 
of a female labour supply model to compute some decomposition analyses for six EU 
member states (data also based on the Labour Force Survey). They find out that large 
numbers of women leave the labour market when they have a first child, without indicating if 
and when they will return. To analyse the long term labour market behaviour of mothers in 
Europe, it is necessary to have time series data that allow to observe cohorts, but there are 
only a few countries that provide this kind of data, for example France (Enquête INED 
Histoires de Famille) or the Netherlands. Based on the Netherlands Family Survey for the 
years 1993-2003, Schippers and Vlasblom (2005) show that in the Netherlands the presence 
of children has costly consequences for mothers in terms of employment also in the long run. 
                                                 
37 Data are not available for Denmark, Sweden and Ireland. According to data from the EHCP, in Denmark and Sweden the gap 
is relatively low and on average in Ireland (c.f. Chaupain-Guillot et al., 2008). 
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Women who leave employment after child birth are unlikely to rejoin the labour market within 
ten years even. 
 
The impact of the number and age of children on mothers’ labour market participation has 
long been of interest to labour market analysts: de Henau et al. (2007), for example, find that, 
based on Eurostat LFS data (2005), the probability for mothers not to work increases with the 
number of children they have in all 27 EU member states. The difference between the 
employment rates of mothers and those of women without children is largest for mothers with 
three or more children in all countries. Using the wave 7 of the ECHP (EU (15), 2000), 
Chaupain-Guillot et al. (2008) show that the impact of the number of children on the labour 
market participation of mothers was the smallest in Sweden, Denmark, Spain and Greece. In 
Sweden, 75% of mothers with at least three children were in the labour force and more than 
80% in Denmark, suggesting that the presence of young children did not prevent women 
from being economically active. In Spain and Greece, where overall employment rates for 
women were much lower, rates for mothers with three or more children were very similar to 
those of mothers with one or two children, that is to say relatively low. Drawing on a literature 
overview of  the causal influence of children on mothers’ working activity in France, Moshion 
(2007) concludes that mothers with one or two children are often in employment, whereas 
mothers with at least three children tend to withdraw from the labour market. Méda et al. 
(2003) confirm a particularly strong negative impact of the third child on the mothers’ labour 
market participation in France, where only 16% of mothers with one child but over 40% of 
mothers with three children or more are not working (Enquête Emploi DARES/CREDOC 
2002).  
 
Using data from the Eurostat LFS for the years 1992 to 2005, Thévenon (2007) shows that 
the employment rates of mothers also vary with the age of the youngest child: in general in 
EU(27), the older the youngest child, the more likely it is that the mother will be in paid work. 
Thévenon (2007) further illustrates that in Eastern European countries, the UK and the 
Netherlands, mothers of children under 6 years tend to work less than those of older 
children. In these countries, most women take up work when the youngest child starts 
primary school at the age of six. This effect is most marked in Germany:  Here, two out of 
three mothers whose youngest child is aged between 6 and 11 are employed, but less than 
one out of two mothers whose youngest child is aged between 3 and 5 is employed (c.f. 
Chaupain-Guillot et al., 2008). In France, the turning point for mothers’ employment is 
somewhat earlier, since most children from the age of three are enrolled in pre-schools (c.f. 
Jonsson and Letablier 2005). Schippers and Vlasblom (2004) show that the negative impact 
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of the youngest child’s age on the mothers’ employment is lowest in Mediterranean 
countries, due to the relative stability of family networks which provide informal childcare.  
 
However, the major differences in employment rates between men and women as well as 
between mothers and women without children cannot be interpreted as a “pure” motherhood 
effect, since other factors such as educational differences may also play a role. Furthermore, 
mothers may not stop working completely but may reduce their hours worked by working 
part-time. Overall employment rates do not reflect the employment “penalty” in the form of 
work time reduction, since the rates include all employed persons irrespective of hours 
worked.  
 
 
1.1.2. Mothers’ time dedicated to work    
 
Througout Europe, women’s full-time equivalent employment rates are lower than their 
overall employment rates. According to the European Labour Force Survey (2005) for the EU 
(15), the gap between women’s full-time equivalent and women’s overall employment rates is 
the smallest in Sweden and Denmark and the widest in the Netherlands (more than 75%), 
followed by the UK and Germany (40% each). Furthermore, in all European countries, the 
full-time equivalent employment rate of mothers is significantly below that of women without 
children. Hence, women with children tend to reduced working hours, mainly in the form of 
part-time work, more than men and women without children.  
 
 According to the LFS data (2007), in all European countries, the proportion of women (aged 
15 to 64) in part-time work is considerably higher than that of men. In the EU(27), this share 
is on average 31,4% for women, four times higher than that for men (7,8%). As these 
numbers are regardless of the presence of children, it seems that part-time work is not only a 
means for reconciling work and family responsibilities but reflects a broad variety of 
situations. It may be used by men and women as a transition into and out of the labour 
market or as a flexible working arrangement imposed by employers on their employees, as 
documented by the Company Survey on Working-time and Work-life balance commissioned 
by the European Foundation for the improvement of working and living conditions (c.f. Anxo 
et al., 2007). The gender gap in hours of work may also be due to different preferences of 
men and women for work and leisure. 
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Yet, Apps and Rees (2008) find out that male and female preferences do not differ 
significantly and that the main part of gender differences in time dedicated to work are 
strongly associated with the age and number of children.  
 
To identify the impact of parenthood on time dedicated to work, I focus on the part-time 
employment rates of women and men at the age of parenthood (20-49 years old) with regard 
to the presence of children in 22 European countries, as shown in table 23 in the appendix. 
The data are based on the Eurostat Labour Force Survey (2003). The definition of part-time 
work varies across European countries. The LFS, which contains harmonised measures of 
part-time work, defines part-time as work up to 30 hours a week. Based on this data, de 
Hénau et al. (2007) find out that the presence of children increases the difference in the 
working time patterns between men and women in all countries. On average in the 22 
countries in 2003, 10,9 % of all working women without children worked part-time against 
2,7% of working men without children. The presence of children reduces the proportion of 
men in part-time to 2,3%. At 4,7%, Lithuania is the country with the highest proportion of 
fathers working part-time. On the contrary, for women, the presence of children significantly 
raises the proportion in part-time work from the mentioned 10,9% to 15,4% on average.  
 
This is especially true for the Netherlands, where more than one in two women with children, 
but only one in three women without children works part-time. Visser (2002) has dubbed the 
Netherlands the “first part-time economy” in Europe, since also the share of men in part time 
work is higher there than in other countries. 
 
Part-time employment of mothers is also very frequent in the UK, Germany and Austria (over 
30%). In these countries, women’s full-time employment rates have stagnated since the early 
1990s and, as a consequence, the increase in female employment is mainly due to a rise in 
women’s part-time work (c.f. Buffeteau and Essafi, 2006). Chaupain-Guillot et al. (2008) 
argue that as these countries offer only limited childcare facilities to parents, part-time work 
appears to be a compromise for reconciling work and family responsibilities for mothers.  
 
Visser and Yerkes (2005) confirm this. Comparing part-time work in the Netherlands, the UK 
and Germany, they argue that mothers’ part-time work emerges from preferences for what is 
considered in these three countries as the “second best option” for combining work and care 
responsibilities, but in Germany and in the UK it is more difficult to overcome the 
“marginalisation” of part-time workers than in the Netherlands. This holds also for France, 
where part-time work is also relatively wide spread, but numerous part-time workers would 
prefer to work full time. Hence, in many European countries, mothers’ part-time work does 
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not necessarily result from preferences, but from practical constraints. Moreover, in some of 
these countries, family norms and values do not necessarily encourage mother’s labour 
market participation. In Germany for example, there exists the term “Rabenmutter” (raven 
mother as proxy for a uncaring, bad mother) for mothers working full-time. 
 
Table 23 furthermore shows that mothers’ part-time work is relatively low in Finland and in 
the Southern European countries. This is mainly because in these countries, motherhood 
rather leads to women exiting the labour market rather than reducing their hours worked. In 
the 10 new member states, part-time work is also limited (mostly under 10%), mainly 
because in these countries, part-time work does not provide sufficient income for families.  
 
Furthermore, several studies emphasise that the higher the level of education, the level of 
earnings and the better the working conditions for women, the higher is the probability for 
mothers to work full time (c.f. OECD, 2002;  Rivaud and Ulrich, 2007; Méda et al., 2003; 
Marc, 2004). Nevertheless, the fact that in all 22 European countries there are significant 
differences in part-time employment rates between women without children and mothers 
shows that family reasons play an important role on mothers’ time dedicated to work.  
 
 
1.1.3. The division of labour within households 
 
The rise of women’s overall employment rates and its relative high share of part-time work is 
also reflected in the division of labour within European households. As more and more 
mothers try to combine professional careers and childrearing, the number of households with 
only one male breadwinner is constantly decreasing all over Europe (Lewis, 2001) while the 
number of dual earner couples has been increasing rapidly since the 1990s.  Table 24 shows 
the division of paid labour of couples with children under 15 (sources: Eurostat, OECD; 14 
European countries, 2000).  
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Table 24: Household situation: division of paid labour (household types in shares) 
                (couples with children under 15), 2000 
 
  one bread winner 
both full-
time 
husband ft / 
wife pt 
both part-
time 
husband pt/ 
wife ft 
Germany 39,7 26,1 32,9 0,6 0,7 
Belgium 27,3 40,8 28,3 1,9 1,7 
Spain 56,3 35,6 7,5 0,2 0,4 
Finland (2002) 31,2 58,9 5,0 _ _ 
France 36,0 45,4 16,3 1,2 1,1 
Greece 49,7 43,7 4,7 0,9 0,9 
Italy 53,6 31,2 13,0 1,3 0,9 
Luxembourg 51,2 25,7 23,2 _ _ 
Netherlands 32,7 10,8 52,9 2,3 1,3 
Portugal 26,5 66,5 7,0 _ _ 
UK 29,8 28,6 40,0 0,7 0,9 
Ireland 55,5 27,1 16,2 1,1 _ 
Sweden (2002) 13,0 39,4 39,1 _ _ 
Denmark (1999) 17,5 75,2 _ _ _ 
      
Sources: Eurostat (2002), OECD (2005) Babies and Bosses   
 
 
Only the Mediterranean countries, Luxembourg and Ireland still have a relatively high share 
of one breadwinner households (over 50 %). The share is the lowest in Sweden, Denmark, 
Portugal, Belgium and the UK (under 30%). In most of the observed countries, dual earner 
couples are the dominant norm. However, women’s contribution to paid work varies across 
countries: On the one side, in Denmark, in more than 75% of dual earner couples both 
partners work full time and in Portugal in more than 66%. At the other side, average levels of 
female part-time work stay relatively high in all other countries. In the Netherlands, the UK 
and Germany, the dominant norm is a household in which the husband is working fulltime 
and the wife part-time. Households with both partners working part-time or with the husband 
working part-time and the wife working full time present a minority in all observed countries. 
Hence, despite the rising employment of women, the division of parental responsibilities 
stays rather traditional in most European countries. Furthermore, Moss and O’Brien (2006) 
point out that the traditional division can not only be found in households where the 
husband’s income and status in working life is higher than the wife’s, but is also found in 
households where the parents have equal education and incomes. Dribe and Stanfors (2007) 
show that even in Sweden, parenthood still promotes a traditional division of household tasks 
between couples in 2000, though the influence has been strongly declining since the 1990s.  
In summary, the literature shows that the impact of chidren on female employment and 
especially on mothers’ work time patterns widely between the countries of the European 
Union.  
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In general, four country groups can be identified with regard to mothers’ employment 
patterns: 
 
•  The first group contains countries with a generally high level of female employment. 
In these countries, the impact of children on the labour market participation of 
mothers is relatively low and mothers tend to continue working full time rather than 
reducing to part-time. These countries are Denmark, Sweden and Finland. Estonia, 
Latvia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Lithuania and Portugal also fit in this group, though their 
female employment rates are generally lower.  
•  The second group contains countries with relatively high levels of female 
employment, but the working activity of mothers displays a strong discontinuity: 
motherhood first leads to a work interruption and then to part-time work when the 
child gets older. Part-time rates of mothers are generally relatively high in these 
countries, which are mainly the Netherlands, the UK, Germany and Austria.  
•  The third group is similar to the second group, except that mothers change their 
professional activity only after the second child and go back to full time work earlier. 
As a consequence, overall part-time work rates are smaller than in the second group. 
This group is represented by France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland. 
•  In the countries of the fourth group, motherhood mainly leads to work discontinuation 
and part-time work is rather uncommon. As female employment rates are rather low 
in general, the working activity of mothers appears to be quite continuous. These 
countries are primarily Spain, Italy, Greece and Malta. Poland, Hungary, Romania, 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria can also be counted to this group, though 
their overall female employment rates are somewhat higher (50-60%). 
 
 
1.1.4. Gender equality  
  
The significant impact of motherhood on women’s labour market participation also has costly 
consequences on gender equality in a wider sense: Disruption and gaps in women’s 
employment biography may lead to work segregation, deterioration of working conditions and 
of access to social rights related to work as well as to income losses, career interruptions, 
income insecurity and financial dependence of women. Not only work cessation, but also 
work reduction to part-time work leads to precariousness for many mothers. Single parents 
are particularly concerned by employment penalties and its negative consequences on 
financial security (c.f. Fondazione G. Brodolini, 2005). Millar and Ridge (2001) emphasise 
that single parent families are at a higher risk of poverty than couple families, and on average 
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single mothers have poorer health than couple mothers. Data from the British Department for 
Work and Pensions (2005/2006), for example, illustrates that in the UK 47% of single parent 
families are below the Government-defined poverty line. 
 
Table 25 in the appendix shows the gender pay gap for all 27 European countries, which is 
based on gross hourly earnings of men and women. In 2006, the gender pay gap reached 15 
points on average in the EU (27), but was higher than 20 points in Estonia, Cyprus, Slovakia, 
Germany, the UK, Finland and Austria (source: Eurostat, LFS). The gap was below 10 points 
in Malta, Belgium, Slovenia, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Romania and Greece. In most countries, 
the gender wage gap decreases much slower than the gender employment gap. To isolate 
the impact of motherhood on the gender pay gap, Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel (2006) 
compare the earnings of women with children relative to childless woman and to men in eight 
European countries by using data from the Luxembourg Income Study. They find out that 
mothers’ earnings lag behind those of women without children for all countries, but the gap 
varies widely between only 11% in the Nordic countries and up to 44% in Germany and the 
Netherlands. However, as the earnings of women without children also considerably lag 
behind those of men, the gender pay gap can not be interpreted as a pure motherhood 
effect.  To single out the motherhood effect, Gregory and Connally (2008) identify the pay 
penalty of children for mothers for the UK. They show that while the gender gap has been 
narrowing for mothers working full time, the pay penalty has been rising for mothers working 
part-time, reflecting the polarisation of part-time jobs in low wage occupations. In addition, 
women often experience down-grading from higher-skill full time jobs into lower skill part-time 
occupations as they reorganise their working lives around the presence of children. The 
crowding of part-time jobs into low wage, low status occupations had already led to part-time 
workers been categorised as the new social underclass (c.f. Humphries and Rubery, 1995). 
The disadvantage of this underclass is growing despite legal regulations protecting part-time 
workers (c.f. Gregory and Conally, 2008). Furthermore, all over Europe, more and more 
regulated part-time work is transformed into more precarious forms of work, which especially 
affects women with children. 
 
Several studies emphasise that in a variety of countries, the gender pay gap is mainly due to 
two factors, women’s responsibility for childbearing and the segregation of jobs (c.f. Meurs, 
Pailhe and Ponthieux, 2007; Davies and Pierre, 2005; European Commission, 2006;  
England, 2005). Segregation occurs  in the form of  horizontal as well as in the form of 
vertical segregation. Horizontal segregatin refers to the fact that men and women tend to 
work within different sectors of the economy, while vertical segregation denotes the empirical 
pattern of men occupying high positions to a larger extent than women. Table 25 shows that 
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although women record a higher educational attainment on average than men in all member 
states, gender segregation of occupations and economic sectors of activity persists. Estonia, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Finland display a high segregation in occupations 
whilst segregation in sectors is the highest in Estonia. As a result, women are 
underrepresented in economic sectors that are crucial for economic development (and where 
wages are higher). England (2005) points out that segregation and motherhood can be, but 
are not necessarily, related. Several comparative studies highlight the impact of motherhood 
on segregation in Europe, stipulating that high levels of female employment often go together 
with high levels of segregation in sectors that facilitate a reconciliation of work and family life 
(c.f. OECD, 2007; Gilles, 2007 and 2008). This is especially the case in the Nordic countries, 
though this segregation is not considered as conductive to gender equality. This holds 
inversely for the Mediterranean countries where low levels of female employment are 
associated with low levels of segregation. In addition, Apps and Rees (2008) alert to the fact 
that gender differences in labour supply behaviour may not only result in a gender wage gap, 
but inversely, the gender wage gap (due to segregation and discrimination) can also be the 
reason for gender differences in the labour supply. Hence, women’s and especially mothers’ 
reduced labour supply and reduced wage income are mutually dependent. 
 
Since parental responsibilities are not equally shared between parents, beyond segregation 
and income losses motherhood may also lead to a limitation of mothers’ participation in 
political and civic decision making. With respect to decision-making in the economic sphere, 
table 25 shows that the share of women among managers was 32,6% on average in 2006, 
but exceeds 35% in Poland, Hungary, France, Latvia and Lithuania. The share was notably 
lower in Cyprus and Malta. In 2007 and unchanged since 2004, on average for all 27 
European countries only 23% of national parliament members are women (c.f. European 
Commission, 2008). The share exceeds 35% in Belgium, Spain, Denmark and the 
Netherlands and 40% in Finland and Sweden but is below 15% in Greece, Cyprus, France, 
Slovenia, Ireland, Romania and Hungary. It did not exceed 10% in Malta.  
 
The disadvantaged position of women in the labour market raises women’s poverty risk, both 
at the age of raising children and at the age of retirement. The average share of people living 
in households at risk of poverty (income below the threshold set at 60% of the median 
income) was significantly higher for women than for men in the EU (25) (25% vs. 16%; c.f. 
European Commission, 2008).  
 
Finally, the discussed literature shows that that labour market participation and the amount of 
time dedicated to paid work by women between 25 and 49 years are closely linked to the 
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presence, and moreover the number and the age of children. Furthermore, mothers’ 
employment penalty caused by the presence of children has further costly consequences for 
mothers. This suggests that the change in women’s labour market behaviour induced by 
children can not only be attributed to women’s working time preferences, but rather to 
economic constraints that women face when children are present (c.f. Del Boca and 
Locatelli, 2007; Fagan, 2003; Bielenski, Bosek and Wagner, 2002).  
 
The efforts and methods of family policies that are implemented by the State in order to 
alleviate mothers’ employment constraints as well as in order to financially support 
households with children vary widely in Europe. Moreover, family policies themselves may 
impact women’s labour supply decisions in a positive or negative way. Hence, the next 
section analyses whether differences in family policies can explain the discussed large 
differences in the impact of motherhood on female labour market participation within 
European countries.  
 
 
1. 2. The impact of family policies on mothers’ labour market participation 
 
The impact of children on mothers’ labour market participation may be influenced by family 
policies that support parenthood and reduce the costs of raising children. Nevertheless, 
these policies can impact women’s labour supply decision in a positive or negative way, 
depending on the instruments’ characteristics. Since reconciliation of work and family life has 
become a major issue on the European agenda, a wide range of empirical literature has 
explored the impact of family policies on female employment.  
 
A quick glance at women’s employment rates and policy expenses dedicated to support 
parenthood shows that in Nordic countries,  high women’s employment rates are correlated 
with high level of government expenses dedicated to family policies. By contrast, in South 
European countries where public expenses dedicated to support parenthood are low, 
women’s employment rates are also relatively low. The total “family/children” benefit 
expenditure that can be obtained from the Eurostat social protection expenditure 
(ESSPROS, EU (27), 2005).38 The amounts vary from 0.8 % of GDP in Poland up to 3.8% in 
Denmark. The EU average is 2.1 % of GDP.  
 
                                                 
38 The “family/children” function is defined as “support in cash or in kind (except health care) in connection with the costs of 
pregnancy, childbirth and adoption, bringing up children and caring for other family members”. It includes benefits that provide 
financial support to households for bringing up children, that provide financial assistance to people who support relatives other 
than children and that provide social services specifically designed to assist and protect the family, particularly children. 
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However, when considering all 27 European countries, the relationship between family policy 
expenses and female employment is not so clear and a closer look at particular family policy 
instruments is necessary to assess the impact of family policies on women’s labour market 
participation and women’s employment patterns. “Family/children” benefits may be grouped 
in three categories, which are recognised as the three core measures of family policy: cash 
support (benefits and tax reliefs), child-rearing allowance during parental leave, and childcare 
support. An overview of the empirical literature will show that the instruments’ particular and 
joint impact on mothers’ labour market participation differs widely between countries.  
 
The following analysis basically focuses on family policy instruments that are based on the 
traditional family model, which is a married couple with children. This procedure has the 
purpose of giving a compact overview on family policies and their impact on female 
employment. However, the limited nature of the analysis does not do justice to today’s 
reality. All over Europe, it is widely recognised that the traditional family is no longer the only 
family form. In recent decades, European families have changed considerably in their 
structure and composition and family living arrangements have diversified. Family transitions 
are characterised by a lower incidence of marriage and an increase in divorce and 
separations. More and more couples live unmarried in cohabitation. Allover Europe, the 
number of extramarital births is rising continuously and single parents form a noticeable and 
increasing part of families. Reconstituted families become more and more common and 
socially accepted (c.f. Hantrais, 2004). According to Eurostat data (2002), the average 
number of marriages per 1.000 population in the EU (15) fell by nearly 34% between 1960 
and 2000 (from 7,7 to 5,1). The divorce rate per 1.000 population rose by nearly 74% within 
the same time period (from 0,5 to 1,9). Furthermore, all over Europe the proportion of 
marriages ending in divorce is rising and reaches 40% in Northern Europe. The EU (15) 
average of extramarital births as a percentage of live births rose from 5,1% to 28,4% 
between 1960 and 2000. Here again, Northern countries exhibit the highest rates, whereas 
the rates are relatively low in Southern Europe. In 2000, in the EU (15), on average 10% of 
children aged 0-14 lived in families with only one adult (as a proportion of all children of that 
age in families). Here again, the proportion was the highest in the Northern countries (up to 
20%) and the lowest in Southern Europe (2,8% in Spain, for example). Nevertheless, lone 
parenthood is not always a stable state, but rather forms a stage of life. In the UK, for 
example, in about 50% of cases, lone parenthood has a duration of four years of less. It is 
important to note that on average in the EU (15), 90% of single parents are female (c.f. 
Hantrais, 2004). This evolution of family models in Europe shows the rising importance for 
family policies to cater to the needs of different family types. Each European country has 
national or local organisations that offer support specifically for single parents. Lump sum 
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cash benefits represent the main part of governments’ support for single parents with an 
objective of minimising child poverty. Nevertheless, supporting the employment of lone 
parents, mothers in most cases, still plays a secondary role in many European countries. In 
Germany, for example, single mothers are particularly penalised by the fact that all-day child 
care facilities are hardly available and affordable, especially for  children under three years of 
age (c.f. Fagnani, 2001). Nevertheless, for the purpose of clarity, I do not give details about 
family policy instruments dedicated to lone parents only. 
 
To understand the impact of family policy instruments on the labour supply decisions of 
mothers in a conventional family structure, it is useful to have a look at the mechanism of 
intra-household decision making. This is why, before presenting empirical results, the next 
section provides an overview of theoretical arguments that explain labour supply decisions of 
married women and the impact of family policy instruments.  
 
 
1.2.1. Theoretical background: female labour supply in a microeconomic 
framework 
 
There exists no single model of reference which explains the labour supply of married 
women living with a partner. Several theoretical and empirical investigations add up to an 
overall picture. 
 
Traditional approach: unitary framework  
 
The traditional approach by Samuelson (1956) considers the household as a homogenous 
unity that behaves exactly like one single agent: The spouses have identical preferences and 
share a pooled income. A two-member household (i, j) allocates consumption x and leisure l 
by maximising a common and unitary utility function: 
 
),,( , jjii lxlxU  
 
which is subject to a joint budget constraint. The rationality principle implies an optimal 
arbitrage between consumption (paid in working hours) and leisure. Goods are bought at 
price p and leisure is bought at price w, which means that the price of leisure is the 
opportunity cost of labour. The solution yields a household’s goods demand and labour 
supply. Hence, a household’s labour supply is a function of preferences, wages and prices. 
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Policy instruments that reduce income, like taxes, affect the household’s labour supply in two 
ways: The household may increase its labour supply in order to avoid consumption 
restrictions (income effect). The household may also lower its labour supply because the 
wage reduction caused by taxes implies that the price of leisure falls (substitution effect). The 
standard unitary model can not predict which effect dominates. Furthermore, the model does 
not take into account intra-household choices, as the couple is reduced to a single economic 
agent (black box). Hence, the unitary framework can not clarify labour divisions and resource 
distributions between spouses and consequently can not distinguish between gender-specific 
impacts of policy instruments on the two spouses. 
 
To correct for the problems and shortcomings of the neoclassical unitary framework, new 
models of intra-household decision making were created that follow the concept of 
methodological individualism. These models help to understand gender-specific issues of 
intra-household decision making, such as the distribution of resources and the division of 
labour between spouses. 
 
Intra-household decision models 
 
Intra-household decision models take into account the individual preferences of each 
spouse. A household’s behaviour results from the spouses’ individual rational choices, which 
implies that there exist two separate individual utility functions. The individual utility functions 
of the spouses can represent egoism (c.f. Manser and Brown, 1980), care (c.f. Becker, 1973, 
1974) or altruism (c.f. MacElroy and Horney, 1981). Egoistic individuals maximise their own 
utility function, whereas the utility of caring individuals depends not only on its own level of 
consumption and leisure, but also on the utility of the other members of the household. The 
utility of altruistic individuals depends on its own level of consumption and leisure as well as 
of the other household member’s level of consumption and leisure. Caring and altruistic 
preferences imply a larger transfer of resources within the household. 
 
It is assumed that marriage brings an utility gain for both spouses. For egoistic individuals, 
this gain can come from economies of scale and access to public goods.  For caring or 
altruistic individuals, there may also be a gain from household production (meals, children, 
prestige, cf. Becker, 1973) and affection (love, health, the joy of sharing leisure time, cf. 
Hammermesh, 2000). The utility gain is shared between the spouses according to a 
predetermined rule. Spouses break up if they could increase their utility outside marriage. 
The break up “threat” makes it possible for both spouses to bargain with one another.  
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Cooperative bargaining models 
Cooperative bargaining models assume that the labour supply of each spouse is based on a 
cooperative bargaining procedure between spouses. Each spouse maximises his/her utility 
function subject to a joint budget constraint. The “threat point”, known from game theory 
(Nash, 1953) is the outcome of each spouse at non-cooperation, which can occur in the case 
of divorce. Manser and Brown (1980) model divorce-threat Nash-bargaining for egoistic 
individuals, and McElroy and Horney (1981) do so for altruistic individuals. The threat-point 
can also be the outcome at non-cooperation within marriage (Ludberg and Pollak, 1993, 
1994). It is assumed that the negotiated distribution of gains and division of labour between 
spouses is Pareto-efficient.  
 
The collective approach by Chiappori (1988, 1992) also suggests a cooperative decision 
making process in which the spouses collectively take Pareto-efficient decisions. Yet, in 
contrast to the aforementioned cooperative bargaining models, the collective approach does 
not assume a Nash-equilibrium bargaining rule, but a predetermined sharing rule. Also in this 
model, the individual maximises his or her utility (dependent on leisure and consumption) 
subject to a joint budget constraint which is determined by both spouses’ wages and non-
labour income. Chiappori (1998, 1992) proves theoretically that the negotiated outcome, 
which is each spouse’s labour supply, is Pareto-efficient, dependent on the individual 
preferences (egoism, care or altruism).  
 
Non-cooperative bargaining models 
The labour supply of each spouse can also be interpreted as a strategy based on a Nash-
equilibrium of a non-cooperative negotiation game. In a repeated game, the spouses turn off 
course in case of divergent interests that fail to be reconciled. Bourguignon (1984), focussing 
on labour supply, shows that the non-cooperative solution leads to a Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium, in which each individual maximises his utility subject to the joint budget 
constraint and to the time constraint given the behaviour of the other member. Lundberg and 
Pollak (1994) further add that the joint budget constraint can be divided in individual budget 
constraints, depending on the individual’s own resources and the voluntary contributions of 
the other household member. In this case, the threat point within marriage is the refusal of 
contribution. 
 
In all these models, the household is modelled as a pair of individuals with distinct utility 
functions who arrive at a Pareto-efficient allocation of individual consumption and labour 
supplies. In the Pareto-efficient equilibrium, each household member provides goods that 
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reflect the negotiated responsibilities to the family and adopts a labour supply decision 
according to the negotiated division of labour.  
 
Yet the models do not explain what determines the negotiated equilibrium of contributions.  
Further approaches are necessary to arrive at a framework that is able to explain differences 
in the negotiated contributions between spouses.  
 
Apps and Rees (1997) extend Chiappori’s collective approach by  adding domestic 
production,  supposing that time not spend in the labour market is used not only for leisure as 
assumed by Becker (1965). Without domestic production, a rise in wage of individual i only 
has an income effect on individual j. With domestic production, a rise in wage of individual i 
also has a substitution effect on individual j: individual i’s higher wage implies a rise in the 
price of his  time at home, which rises the implicit price of domestic goods produced by 
individual i. Hence, wage differences between spouses cause substitution among production 
by each individual: if individual i’s wage for paid labour is higher than individual j’s wage, 
individual i will work less in domestic production, and individual j will compensate this by 
reducing his time spent in the labour market. This is how gender specific wage differences 
lead to a gender-specific division of labour within the household. Empirically, husbands tend 
to work more in paid labour and wives tend to work more in household production. Traditional 
norms may reinforce the specialisation of gender roles within the household (c.f. Lundberg 
and Pollak, 1993). Cigno (1990) emphasises that gender specific production advantages play 
a role, too. A women’s relative production advantage in domestic labour would lead to a 
division of labour even in the case of wage equality between spouses.  
 
In addition, Apps and Rees (1997) highlight that Chiappori’s model does not provide for the 
possibility of non-participation in the labour market. It can be assumed that an individual does 
not participate in the labour market as long as its wage is under the reservation wage (a 
wage at which the agent is exactly indifferent between working and not working). Taking into 
account the possibility of non-participation, an empirical study by Blundell, Chiappori, 
Magnac and Meghir (2006) analyses the labour supply variations of spouses due to their 
partner’s income variation. The analysis is based on United Kingdom survey data from 1978 
to 2001. They find out that the labour elasticities are in general not symmetric among 
spouses: the wife’s labour supply tends to vary inversely with her husband’s wage. 
Unemployment of husbands leads to an increase in the wife’s labour supply (added-worker 
effect, c.f. Serneels, 2002) and an increase in the husband’s wage lowers a woman’s labour 
supply, as predicted by Apps and Rees’ (1997) model (income effect). Yet, conversely this is 
not the case: the empirical analysis shows that the husband’s labour choice can be 
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considered as discrete: either, he works full time or he doesn’t work at all, independent of his 
wife’s wage. Further empirical analysis by Knowles (2007), based on US-households in the 
years from 1965 to 2000, confirms that even in times of increasing working hours and wages 
of women, the labour supply of married men does not decrease. However, recent studies 
(c.f. Neimann, 2008; Killingsworth, 2008; Soobedar; 2008) detect that with women’s rising 
labour market participation and wage income, there is a higher possibility that spouses take 
their employment decisions simultaneously (mutual interdependency between spouses 
labour supply decisions). 
 
Blundell et al. (2006) show that a woman’s labour supply also varies with her own wage. 
Women do not participate in the labour market as long as their wage stays under the costs of 
working, which is the price of an externalisation of domestic work (costs of childcare, 
housework…) (c.f. Cigno, 1990). Furthermore, an increase in a woman’s wage increases her 
opportunity cost of staying at home and consequently increases her labour supply 
(substitution effect).  
 
The husband’s rigid labour supply and the wife’s high labour supply elasticity reflect a 
gender-specific division of labour with the men as principal earner and the women as second 
earner of the household. The division of labour and the resulting income differences between 
spouses are Pareto-optimal. This equilibrium is independent of the predetermined “sharing 
rule” of gains between the spouses, which is why Chiappori (1988, 1992) makes no particular 
assumptions about the sharing rule. In general, it is assumed that the household’s decisions 
concerning the assignment of expenditures are independent from who receives the income 
within the household (Beckerian “income pooling”). However, the household members may 
agree to pool income in a joint account but the spending from this may depend on who is 
earning the money (c.f. Bonke and Browning, 2008). As the individual’s income share 
impacts its bargaining power, it is possible that the bargaining power in turn determines the 
intra-household resource distribution.  The bargaining power of individual i is determined by 
the relative share of resources lost for individual j if individual i goes away (c.f. Orsini and 
Spadaro, 2005). Hence, it can be assumed that the gender-specific division of labour has 
negative consequences for the second earner’s intra-household bargaining power, and as a 
result, household resources are unequally shared among spouses. 
 
Le Cacheux (2005) emphasises the fact that bargaining models fail to explain intra-
household resource distribution. This makes it difficult to analyse the impact of policy 
instruments on labour supply decisions. Furthermore, Le Cacheux (2005) stresses that the 
presented models do not take into account the fact that women’s labour supply may also 
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vary with labour market constraints (involuntary unemployment, selectivity bias). To 
investigate the impact of policies on intra-household choices with respect to labour supply 
and resource distribution, micro-simulation models can be useful. Yet, so far these models 
no not sufficiently take into account the interaction between reform impacts on intra-
household resource distribution and reform impacts on the spouses’ labour supplies.  
 
Finally, what can we say about the impact of policy instruments on female labour supply? 
First of all, a socio-fiscal system can re-allocate resources within a household by attributing 
non-labour income to individuals. Thus, public transfers can lower gender-specific income 
differences and therefore raise the second earner’s (mostly women’s) bargaining power in 
the household (c.f. Orsini and Spadaro, 2005). On the other hand, public transfers lower 
women’s labour supply due to an income effect (c.f. Blundell et al., 2006; Agarwal, 1997). 
This, in turn, lowers women’s bargaining power (c.f. Orsini and Spadaro, 2005).  Blundell et 
al. (2006) emphasise that policies that encourage female labour market participation 
significantly improve women’s relative welfare within the household, whereas public transfers 
to households can make women worse off. Hence, in order to rebalance bargaining power 
between spouses, a socio-fiscal system should focus on encouraging female employment by 
reducing gender-specific wage differences.  
 
The analysis so far supposes that child benefits (lump sum cash benefits, parental leave 
benefits…) lower female labour supply due to an income effect. To analyse the impact of a 
joint tax system on female labour supply, one has to take into account the marginal effective 
tax rates. The base of the joint tax system is the household income as a whole. Households 
enjoy an advantage from joint tax splitting only if one spouse is in a higher tax bracket than 
the other. The higher the spouses’ income difference and the higher the progressivity of the 
tax system, the higher is the tax relief for the couple. This raises the bargaining power of the 
second earner. Yet, an increase in income of the women as second earner lowers the tax 
relief of the household. Consequently, the joint tax system implies a higher marginal effective 
tax rate for the second earner in comparison to an individual tax system. We have seen that 
the labour supply elasticity with regard to the wage of the second earner is higher than of the 
principal earner. Accordingly, the labour supply elasticity of the second earner with regard to 
marginal tax rates is higher than of the principal earner (c.f. Hausman, 1981). Hence, it is 
likely that a joint tax system discourages female employment (c.f. Orsini and Spadaro, 2005).  
Child care subsidies and costs reliefs for childcare lower women’s costs of working and 
therefore are supposed to encourage female employment (c.f. Cigno, 1990; Jaumotte, 2003).  
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A series of empirical studies (c.f. Blundell et al., 2006; Cherchye and Vermeulen, 2003; 
Knowles, 2007) reject the unitary approach and strongly favour the collective approach of 
intra-household decision making. Nevertheless, until recently many countries’ transfer and 
benefit system takes into account only the resource allocation of a household as a whole, 
especially when the poverty reduction of children is on the agenda. In these cases, policy 
makers assume an equitable sharing of resources within the household and neglect impacts 
of tax and benefits on women’s labour supply decisions (c.f. Agarwal, 1997). The analysis so 
far suggests that improving the well being of households as a whole may come at the cost of 
an increase in gender-specific disparities within a household (c.f. Le Cacheux, 2005). This 
underlines the importance of considering intra-household decision making processes.  
 
 
1.2.2. The impact of the child benefit and family tax system on   
           mothers’ labour market participation 
 
In all 27 European countries, the main family instrument that aims to compensate for the 
costs of having children are family benefits in cash, complemented by tax breaks. On 
average, these benefits represent around 60 % of total « family/children » expenditures and 
1.2 % of GDP.  There are large discrepancies between countries in cash benefits, ranging 
form 0,2% of GDP in Spain up to 2,7% in Luxembourg. Apart from Luxembourg, cash 
benefits are also very high in Austria, Germany, Belgium and France. Nordic countries, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Italy and Spain are below the average (ESSPROS data, EU (27), 
2005). Child benefits are mainly paid as lump-sum benefits per child regardless of the level 
of family income, but they can vary with the age of the children. Furthermore, child benefits 
are not conditioned on the use of, for example, childcare services. In most countries, there 
are additional child benefits targeted at particular situations like large families, low income 
families, disabled children or lone parents, which will not be discussed here. Child benefits 
aim to reduce child poverty, but can lower female labour market participation. Périvier (2004) 
and Jaumotte (2003) highlight that generous lump-sum child benefits weaken the incentive to 
work for the second earner of a couple (mostly mothers) due to an income effect.  
 
Moreover, also the tax system affects parental labour market decisions including working 
time patterns. Most EU countries have individualised tax systems, but nearly all countries 
have some forms of tax relief either for spouses or for children. In France, for example, there 
is a joint family tax system (quotient familial) that takes into account the number of children. 
In Germany, married couples benefit from tax reliefs independent of the presence of children 
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(Ehegattensplitting).39 The progressivity of European tax schedules implies that in all 
countries with family tax systems, the household’s tax relief is higher the larger the 
household income and the larger the income disparities between spouses. Women as 
second earners are confronted with a high effective marginal tax rate, because a rise in 
women’s labour supply leads to a withdrawal of tax credits and benefits on the basis of total 
family income (c.f. Apps and Rees, 2008). Due to the high labour supply elasticity of second 
earners, family tax systems discourage the labour supply of married women (c.f. Jaumotte, 
2003).  
 
 
1.2.3. The impact of parental leave on mothers’  labour market participation  
 
There are various forms of family-related leave systems across Europe. Depending on the 
scheme, parental leave can make it easier for parents to continue working or to get back into 
employment after a break, but it can also worsen the difficulties faced by some parents, 
mainly mothers, in trying to keep a job or in returning to employment. Leave schemes may 
also accentuate career discontinuity, which is most prevalent among mothers. In such cases, 
parental leave may, ultimately, undermine rather than promote gender equality at work, at 
home and in the family by reinforcing women taking on a greater share of parenting duties. 
 
Cash benefits for family related leave (income maintenance benefit at childbirth, parental 
leave benefit, birth grants) represent on average 0,3% of GDP in the 27 European countries. 
Nordic countries, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Hungary and Romania are the 
countries reporting a larger proportion of GDP to these kinds of benefits (up to 0.7% of GDP 
in Sweden, for example) (ESSPROS data, EU (27), 2005). Other forms of family related 
leave are maternity and paternity leave and leave to care for children in special 
circumstances like illness, disability, an emergency situation etc. 
 
Concerning parental leave, which is the main element of family related leave, the types open 
to parents vary widely across countries. Based on the year 2004 and with respect to 
payment, we can distinguish between two groups of countries: In the first group, parental 
leave is paid as a percentage of the former wage (for example in Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Finland, Germany from 2007 on, Slovenia). In the second group, parental leave 
compensation is a flat rate allowance (for example in Ireland, UK, Spain, Austria, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany up to 2007, France).  
 
                                                 
39 More on France’s and Germany’s family tax system in the second section of this chapter. 
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With respect to the duration of parental leave, two clusters of countries may be identified: in 
the first one, the combined duration of maternity and parental leave is not more than one 
year (for example in Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Slovenia, Germany 
since 2007) whereas in the second cluster, parental leave provides longer support up to 
three years (for example in Austria, Finland, France, Germany until 2004, Hungary, Poland, 
Spain, Sweden, Slovakia). 
 
A third point to consider is the fathers’ entitlement to share part of the parental leave, splitting 
countries in two groups, one group where fathers are encouraged to take part of the parental 
leave (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Austria, Germany since 2007) and 
another group where fathers are not particularly adressed.  
 
Deven and Moss (1999, 2002a, 2002b, 2005) raise the question of parental leave being a 
progress or a pitfall for mothers with respect to work.  They point out that the impact of 
parental leaves on women’s employment widely depends on the characteristics of the 
scheme - in terms of duration, level of compensation, flexibility and provisions for sharing by 
the two parents. Parental leave can promote mothers’ labour supply when it offers adequate 
conditions for a break in working trajectory. However, if the leave scheme is too long or not 
flexible, parents - in practice mothers - may be less likely to return to work. Long parental 
leaves (more than one year) can damage a mother’s ability to return back to work and to 
continue a career, as emphasised by Piketty (2005) and Thévenon (2007). They show that 
the 36 months - parental leave period in France significantly raises mothers’ withdrawals 
from the labour market, especially for low educated women obtaining low wages. 
 
In order to reduce the work penalty for women for taking leaves, policies in Scandinavia, 
Portugal, Austria and, more recently, in Germany, have attempted to get more fathers taking 
up parental leaves by reserving some paid weeks of leave for their use. Fathers’ use of 
parental leave largely depend on the level of compensation: in countries where the 
compensation is a rate of the former wage, like in Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and 
recently Germany, more fathers are likely to take up leave. Though, even when 
compensation is high, fathers’ take-up rates stay significantly lower than mothers’.  
 
Furthermore, gender pay disparities and cultural values also explain take up disparities 
between fathers and mothers. For instance in Hungary and Slovakia, traditional family 
organisation appears to be the main barrier to fathers’ participation in family life (c.f. Math 
and Meilland, 2004). In Spain, little is done to foster greater sharing of parenting and 
domestic duties and to tackle a prevailing male-dominated culture. In France, fathers’ 
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reluctance to take up paternity leave stems from their disapproval of the idea of stopping 
work for caring a child, viewing the new approach to child-rearing as too far from their values 
regarding fathers and mothers roles in the raising of children (c.f. Gregory and Miller, 2008; 
Math and Meilland, 2004). Finally, the impact of parental leave on women’s employment 
depends also on further contextual factors such as the availability and accessibility of 
childcare facilities, women’s working conditions and their possibility of tailoring job and work 
schedules (c.f. Pfau-Effinger and Geissler, 2005; Math and Meilland, 2004). 
 
 
1.2.4. The impact of policies supporting childcare on mothers’   
            labour market participation  
 
Family benefits in kind mainly include benefits that are aimed at providing child day care to 
families. These benefits represent 0.6 % of GDP on average in the EU (27), with up to 2.2 % 
in Denmark (ESSPROS data, EU (27), 2005). Nordic countries differ from other European 
countries by spending much more on in-kind benefits than others. Since the 1990s onwards 
in most EU countries, policy makers are increasingly concerned by developing early and 
affordable childcare facilities and pre-school education in order to facilitate parents’ 
employment as required by the Lisbon employment strategy and the Barcelona targets. 
 
Childcare costs hinder many mothers to engage in paid work. Apps and Rees (2008) 
highlight that gender differences in labour supply are partly driven by the hourly cost of the 
care of a dependent child. As childcare costs indirectly reduce a mother’s net wage, these 
costs are analogous to a tax on the woman’s wage. The resulting lower wage is a 
disincentive for mothers to work. Yet, not only childcare costs, but also restricted opening 
hours of childcare facilities hinder mothers’ work effort. In some countries like the South 
European countries, mothers’ labour market participation depends largely on informal 
childcare arrangements with relatives, neighbours, or other family members (c.f. Moss, 2007; 
Lewis, 2006).  
 
Perraudin and Pucci (2007) discuss the effect of childcare costs on mothers’ labour supply 
by focussing on the trade off between work and care. Their analysis is based on choice 
models for the potential second earner in which the trade off is related to costs (wage versus 
childcare costs). Perraudin and Pucci (2007) find out that on the one side, mothers’ labour 
supply varies according to various facts between counttries, as the number and age of 
children, the measurement of childcare costs or the work context, but on the other side, in all 
countries the costs of childcare and the level of cost compensation play an important role on 
 155
mothers’ decision to participate in the labour market. Informal childcare by family members 
becomes more attractive when the costs of formal childcare are high (c.f. Flippo and Sedillot, 
2000).  
 
Chaupain-Guillot et al. (2007) model molthers’ simultaneous decisions relating to childcare 
and labour supply. They estimate that in many EU member states including Germany, the 
UK, the Netherlands and Southern European countries, childcare constraints remain 
particularly high, which negatively impacts mothers’ employment.  In these countries, 
childcare coverage is low, especially among the 0-3 years old. Though many 3-6 years old 
children participate in pre-school programs, these programs are not always full time and the 
demand is not satisfied. This implies that mothers of young children have to reduce their 
working time to care for the children themselves. Consequently, in these countries mothers 
have to choose between work reduction and work cessation. Nordic countries began earlier 
than other West European countries to develop formal high quality public childcare 
structures, including extended pre-school and school hours. The child care policy of the 
Nordic countries is an important part of their policy model supporting the combination of work 
and family responsibilities (c.f. also Jonsson and Letablier, 2005; Moss, 2007). Central and 
East European countries (NMS) used to have an extended system of public childcare. Since 
the countries’ transition to a market economy, especially in Poland, Hungary and Estonia, 
childcare facilities are on the decline, which reduces mothers’ labour market participation (c.f. 
also  IPROSEC research network 2003 and 2004). In France, the dual system of free pre-
school (ecoles maternelles) for children aged 3 to 6, in which every child has the right to a 
place, and childcare support for younger children (crèches, nannies, childminders) appears 
to contribute to a relatively high labour market participation rate for mothers, especially for 
mothers with children above 3 years old. However, although the system combines collective 
structures and private (subsidised) childcare, the demand for collective structures is not fully 
satisfied. 
 
Whether the State provides public collective childcare or subsidises private childcare 
(childminders, nannies), the impact on women’s employment is positive since childcare costs 
are reduced in both cases. In fact, as noticed by the OECD (2007), both demand and supply-
side funding can be effective in achieving reconciliation goals as long as only good quality 
care is supported, not only in terms of opening hours, health and safety dimensions but also 
with respect to child development objectives (pedagogical components). Though parents 
often praise the higher quality of public collective structures in comparison to childminders, 
individual forms of childcare may be preferred by working parents over collective structures 
because of greater flexibility regarding atypical hours of work (c.f. Eydoux and Letablier, 
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2008).  On the other hand, parents who have to pay a childminder are often faced with higher 
costs in comparison to public child care. In countries with area-wide public child care 
services it is attractive for parents to engage in paid work. In countries where little public 
childcare support is available, childcare costs for parents may be substantial.  According to 
OECD (2007) calculations, after accounting for income-tested childcare support, out-of 
pocket childcare costs exceed 20% of the net income of a dual earner family with full-time 
earnings of 167% of the average wage in Ireland and the UK. Childcare costs are above 40% 
of a family budget of a lone parent with 66% of the average wage in Ireland. Consequently, in 
Ireland and the UK, the costs of childcare may be so high that work may not pay for many 
mothers. The importance of public investments in childcare must therefore not be 
underestimated, especially for low income families and lone parents. Public support to extra 
school hours or to leisure time care services is also an important issue with respect to 
mothers’ labour market participation and employment patterns. Denmark and Sweden and to 
a lesser extent France have developed a system of extra school childcare organised by 
municipalities, using existing public infra structures (mainly school buildings) for the purpose 
of delivering such services (c.f. OECD, 2007). 
 
 
1.2.5. The overall impact of family policies on mothers’ labour market  
           participation  
 
Del Boca et al. (2007) attempt to access the role of a whole set of family policies (childcare 
arrangements, parental leave, family allowances) on women’s decision towards labour 
supply. Their research based on the European Household panel (ECHP) indicates that the 
differences in women’s labour market participation attributed to family policie differs 
according to women’s educational levels and thereby women’s (potential) income levels. 
Childcare facilities, family allowances and parental leave regimes have more impact on 
participation decisions for low educated women than for qualified women.   
 
Several researches highlight that effective family policies with regard to mothers’ 
employment assist parents in the reconciliation of work and family life (for instance, Daly, 
2000; Gornick and Meyers, 2006; OECD, 2007). However, only some countries, especially 
the Nordic countries, pursue a universal comprehensive approach of supporting such 
reconciliation, whereas other European countries tend to restrict spending and to target their 
support to low income families.  
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Numerous typologies have been produced to map the relationships between mothers’ labour 
market participation and policies supporting parenthood (for instance: Gornick and Meyers, 
2006; De Hénau et al., 2004; Hantrais, 2004; Thévenon, 2006; Da Roit and Sabatinelli, 2007; 
Chaupain-Guillot et al., 2008).  Using the ECHP data for the year 2000, Chaupain-Guillot et 
al. (2008) distinguish four clusters of countries in the EU(15) to which a fifth group may be 
added:   
 
In the first cluster of countries (France, Austria, Finland and until 2007 Germany), parental 
leave is a major dimension of reconciliation policy since in these countries, the duration of 
parental leave is longer than in the other EU countries. It is paid with reference to mothers’ 
caring activity instead to wage replacement. More over, in these countries there exist 
relatively generous lump-sum child benefits. For a mother with three children, the lump-sum 
child benefits represent around one third of the average wage of women. The focus of family 
related expenditures on low income families reflects the welfare tradition of equalising living 
conditions for children in order to evade poverty. Yet, a raise in income reduces family 
benefits and tax reliefs, which discourages mothers as second earners to come back into the 
labour market.  Hence, a weak position of women in the labour market results (c.f. also 
OECD, 2007).  
 
In the second cluster (Denmark and Sweden), childcare facilities are the major dimension of 
reconciliation policy and the proportion of parents using childcare facilities is the highest 
among EU (15) countries. The duration of parental leave is shorter than in the first cluster of 
countries. At the same time, in Denmark and Sweden, mothers’ labour market participation is 
relatively high (more than 80%). Ellingsaeter and Leira (2006) add that  Denmark and 
Sweden invest more in care and early education services for young children, whereas 
Finland and Norway focus public resources more on supporting parents providing home care 
for very young children. Nevertheless, the family support system of Nordic countries is 
consistent and coherent. The high priority of childcare policies reflects the objective of 
supporting mothers’ work and care balance (c.f. also Börnberg, 2007). 
 
Greece, Spain and Portugal form a third cluster in which policies supporting parenthood and 
the labour market participation of mothers are limited, except in Portugal. Italy is not included 
in this cluster because of a more generous system of parental leave, lump-sum child benefits 
and childcare facilities. 
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In the fourth group (Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK), 
mothers’ participation in the labour market is relatively high, but often part-time, and children 
enrolment in preschool at the age of 4 is slightly higher than in the other EU member states.  
 
The typology of Chaupain-Guillot et al. (2008) does not include the 12 new member states.  
These countries are likely to form a fifth cluster (cf. Hantrais, 2004), which is characterised by 
a “re-familisation” of the family –policy relationship. An underfunded reconciliation policy 
makes working parents increasingly dependent on family and kinship solidarities since 
access to childcare facilities is becoming too expensive for most parents.  
 
 
1.3. Conclusion  
 
Since the 1990s, in most EU (15) member states mothers’ employment has increased 
substantially, but their working time patterns continue to vary widely across countries. 
Furthermore, in the 2000s in all 27 EU member states, women with children are less likely to 
be in employment than women without children. The motherhood-induced employment gap 
has negative consequences on income, career opportunities and access to social security 
benefits for mothers. These losses can be interpreted as indirect costs of having children and 
may significantly impact women’s fertility decisions. 
 
The analysis has shown that family policies play an important role in mothers’ employment, 
but not all of them encourage mothers to work. Long parental leave durations and generous 
lump-sum child benefits and tax allowance lower the incentive to work for a couple’s second 
earner. This concerns especially low qualified women. In contrast, child care facilities 
encourage the reconciliation of mothers’ work and family life. 
 
Furthermore, we have seen that the impact of family policies on mothers’ employment varies 
widely across countries. Even within a country it is possible that family policy instruments 
differ with respect to the impact on mothers’ employment. This is due to the fact that in many 
countries, family policy aims to achieve a variety of often incompatible objectives with regard 
to mothers’ employment, fertility and reduction of child poverty. However, more and more 
countries accept the idea that family policies supporting reconciliation of paid work and family 
life are not only beneficial for mothers’ self-interest, but are also beneficial for the society as 
a whole, as they can rise fertility and lower children’s poverty. Consequently, reconciliation 
policies are on many national agendas throughout the European Union and in some 
countries, family policy shifts have been huge in recent years. This goes especially for 
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Germany, where the recent reform of parental leave reflects the country’s willingness to 
support mothers’ employment. However, opposing incentive effects of Germany’s tax and 
benefit system for families and the insufficient childcare infrastructure undermine the purpose 
of the reform. It becomes clear that focusing on single policy measures is not enough to 
effectively encourage mothers’ labour market participation.  
 
The analysis so far points out the difficulties encountered in assessing the overall 
effectiveness of family policies. The impact of family policies on female employment needs to 
be examined on the basis of a holistic approach. To identify and compare the overall 
effectiveness of a country’s whole range of family policies on mothers’ participation in the 
labour market, a more detailed knowledge of the policy instruments and the composition of 
the society is necessary. This also includes knowledge about a country’s values concerning 
gender roles, motherhood and parenting, about its conceptualisation of children’s education 
and its political and societal contexts. A comparative analysis based on all 27 European 
countries can hardly offer a holistic approach. This is why in the next section I propose a 
detailed case study that focuses only on two countries, which are Germany and France. 
 
 When comparing the overall impact of family policies on mothers’ labour market partcipation 
for all 27 European countries, Germany and France are  classified in the same cluster 
(section 1.2.5.), mainly because of their relatively generous lump-sum child benefits. 
Nevertheless, mother’s employment patterns and fertility behaviour vary largely between the 
two countries. This supports the statement that a closer look in the form of a case study is 
necessary.   
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2.  Case study: The impact of financial assistance to families on mothers’ 
labour market participation in Germany and France40 
 
Numerous articles on family politics in Europe focus on a comparison between France and 
Germany.41 Despite a general similarity of their respective socio-economic systems, these 
two countries display very different levels of fertility and female labour market participation. 
On the one hand, there has been a massive entrance of women into the labour market since 
the 1970s, and today women’s global employment rate is around 60% in both countries.42  
On the other hand, fertility rates in Germany average 1.3 children per woman aged between 
14 and 49 years, much lower than in France, where this figure is approximately 1.9.43 The 
greatest differential exists for university degree-holding women between the age of 35 and 
40: in Germany, 40% of these women are childless, whereas in France this figure is only 
24%.44 Furthermore, female employment has developed very differently in the two countries: 
in Germany, it consists, to a larger extent, of part-time work and precarious employment; 
39% of German female employment is part-time, versus only 24% in France.45 Concerning 
part-time work, the contrast between the two countries is greatest between mothers. The 
percentage of part-time working mothers whose youngest child is below the age of six is 46% 
in Germany, opposed to 23% in France. Moreover, the percentage for employed mothers 
working part-time, whose youngest child is between the ages of six and fourteen, is 59% in 
Germany opposed to 28% in France. 
 
Many studies seek to explain these differences in fertility rates and the sheer volume of 
female labour between these neighbouring countries. Fagnani (2001), for example, 
emphasises the importance of norms and values related to education and child-rearing. 
Germany long considered familial responsibilities as a private matter. France, on the other 
hand, has a long tradition of institutionalised family politics. These different approaches are 
exemplified in childcare infrastructure. In France, supply of childcare is a lot more developed 
than in Germany, despite of the fact that the supply of childcare for very young children 
(between the ages of zero and three) still can be ameliorated. In Germany, there is a lack of 
child care centres and nurseries compared to France, and opening hours are not adapted to 
full-time employment within the entire age range of children. Since the turn of the century, 
Germany has realised the importance of enabling a reconciliation of professional and family 
                                                 
40Section 2 based on a publication under my maiden name : Greulich, A. (2008): “Aides et Compensations Fiscales pour 
Familles en France et en Allemagne. Où se fait la Différence ? Quelles Réformes à Envisager ?” Centre d’Analyse 
Stratégique. Horizons Stratégiques n°7. 
41 See, for example, « Politique Familiale : la France et l’Allemagne divergent. » Espace Social Européen N° 845, march 2008. 
42 Eurostat (2006). 
43 INSEE (2006). 
44 Statistsiches Bundesamt (2003). 
45 Eurostat/ EU Labour Force Survey (2003). 
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life and has endeavoured to improve its childcare system in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Lisbon guidelines. 
 
Yet, the gap between the volume of female labour (in terms of absolute labour supply and in 
terms of hours of work) in France and Germany supposes that the influence of norms and 
family values is not limited to the system of childcare but extends more widely, for example to 
the system of financial assistance to families. In effect, the financial support which parents 
receive in accordance to family policies differs to a great extent between these countries. 
Though, as the total volume of financial support to families is comparable in Germany and 
France46, the divergent effects of financial support are less documented compared to the 
effects of childcare supply, and thus risk being underestimated.  
 
My analysis checks the following hypothesis: the lesser extent of female labour (measured in 
hours) in Germany versus France is in non negligible parts due to the principles which 
underlie the system of financial support for families in each country, which differ greatly. In 
Germany, family policies have long encouraged the traditional family, with a principal 
breadwinner. A detailed analysis will show that even today, a part of financial support to 
families in Germany encourages mothers to stay at home. It may be that this incentive is due 
to the fact that the high lump-sum family benefits in Germany are detrimental to investment 
expenditures designed to reconcile professional and family life.  
 
In France, on contrary, it has become socially acceptable for mothers to work full-time. It is 
therefore likely that that the French system of financial support to families seeks to 
encourage conciliation between and work and family life, and provides more incentives for 
women to work, even though in France lump-sum family benefits are also relatively generous 
in comparison to other European countries. 
 
This section presents a deep analysis of the main instruments of state financial support to 
families in France and Germany by taking into account redistributive effects as well as effects 
on women’s labour supply decision. Firstly, this article offers a comparative description of 
cash benefits to families by taking into account different family norms and values in the two 
countries. The presented cash benefits are lump sum benefits per child, parental leave 
benefits, child care cost reductions and tax reductions due to the family tax system. 
Secondly, this article highlights the redistributive effects of the family transfer and tax 
compensation systems in France and Germany. Thirdly, this article analyses the overall 
effects of these instruments on providing an incentive for women to work. I show that while in 
                                                 
46 They both approximate the European average in 2005 (source: Eurostat). 
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France, the dominant objective of all instruments of financial assistance to families is the 
reconciliation between work and family life, the priorities of financial assistance to families set 
by Germany are less coherent. Thirdly, I discuss potential reforms of financial assistance to 
families in both countries, focussing on the family tax system.   
 
 
2.1. Instruments of financial assistance to families in Germany and France 
 
The different instruments of financial assistance to families in Germany and France can be 
thought of in four categories: classic instruments, instruments related to parental leave, 
instruments related to childcare, and instruments related to taxation of family income. The 
following description is limited to these four main family policy devices which are basically 
devoted to families representing the conventional model, that is a married couple with 
children. 
 
The limitation is made in order to give a compact overview on family policies and in order to 
assess the impact on female employment in Germany and France more easily. However, 
one must note that Germany and France provide specific financial assistance to lone 
parents, which reflects the fact that in both countries, the traditional family structure is on the 
decline. In 2008, in West Germany about a quarter and in East Germany more than half of all 
children are born to unmarried mothers. In France, the percentage comes to 42,6%. Around 
10% of children aged 0-14 live in families with only one adult (as a proportion of all children 
of that age in families) in France, which means that 90% of children are reported to be living 
with two parents, irrespective of whether the two parents are both the biological parents. In 
Germany, one fifth of all households with children have single parents47. The financial 
support for single parents offered by France and Germany mostly consists of lump sum cash 
benefits in order to prevent children of lone parents from poverty. For the purpose of clarity, I 
do not give details of these measures48. Nevertheless, it may be pointed out that the lack of 
area-wide all-day child care facilities, especially in Germany, penalises lone mothers in 
particular. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 Data for Germany: Statistisches Bundesamt; data for France: INED (Institut National des Etudes Démographiques) 
48 Apart from financial assistance to lone parents, there are other special forms of family assistance that will not be discussed 
here for the purpose of clarity. For example, France has a back-to-school aid as well as a fixed tax reduction for education 
expenses.  
 163
2.1.1. Classic instruments 
 
Table 26 in the appendix indicates the principal elements of classic instruments of financial 
assistance to families in Germany and France. In both cases, lump-sum benefits based on 
the number of children constitutes the key element of family benefits. 
 
In Germany, parents face a choice between tax allowances and a lump-sum benefit per child 
(Kindergeld). The former case includes tax allowance for children (Kinderfreibetrag) and, 
since 2000, tax allowance for children related expenses (Betreuungsfreibetrag). These two 
tax allowances are cumulative and depend on taxable income. To choose between the lump-
sum benefit per child (Kindergeld) and tax allowances, the fiscal administration automatically 
applies the more favourable system to each household (Günstigerprüfung). Tax allowances 
are only valid if the lump-sum benefit per child does not have the effect of full tax exemption. 
This eventuality only applies to very high-income households, who have a higher marginal 
tax rate.49 A study by Baclet, Dell and Wrohlich (2007) estimates that only 17% of 
households with children are subject to child tax allowance in Germany. In contrast to 
France, lump-sum child benefit in Germany is not indexed to annual inflation. In 2005, these 
benefits totalled in expenditures of around 35 billion euros (c.f. Rosenschon, 2006). The 
amount paid per child has been rising in a continuous fashion since the 1990s. In 2005, child 
tax allowances caused tax losses of 1.5 billion euros.  
 
In France, lump-sum benefits per child (allocation familiale) are granted independently of 
household income, just as in Germany, but do not co-exist with tax allowances.  In direct 
comparison to Germany, the lump-sum benefits in France are less generous than those in 
Germany, not only in terms of actual amounts but also because they are only effective from 
the second child onwards. Furthermore, the age limit for children is lower in France.50 
Therefore, total expenditure on financial assistance to families is lower in France (12 billion 
euros in 2005).51 However, as in Germany, the amount paid per child has been rising in a 
continuous fashion since the 1990s. Nevertheless, in the two countries lump-sum benefits 
are relatively generous in comparison to other European countries, as discussed in the first 
section of this chapter.  
 
 
                                                 
49 The coexistence of tax allowance and lump-sum child benefit (Kindergeld and Freibeträge)  is due to the fact that the German 
Constitution (1949) forbids taxation of a certain minimum living allowance for families with children. As a consequence, a tax 
allowance for children was initiated in 1983, without ending the regime of lump sum child benefit that existed since 1975. The 
current amounts are valid since January 2002.  
50 In France, the applicable age limit is twenty. In Germany, the age limit was reduced from 27 to 25 in 2007 (children pursuing 
education). 
51 11.95 billion € according to CNAF (2007). 
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In addition, both countries pay a premium for low-income households with children. While the 
child premium in Germany (Kinderzuschlag) is aimed at reducing child poverty, the French 
equivalent (complément familial) rather aims to support large families, independently of 
income: it is reserved for families with at least three children aged above three years. 
Furthermore, there exists a further lump-sum benefit for large families (allocation forfaitaire 
pour familles nombreuses) which has very specific requirements and therefore only a 
marginal impact.52  
 
With lump-sum benefits per child, both Germany and France mainly seek to reduce family 
poverty (c.f. L’Hommeau and Paupy, 2001, for a discussion of France), but the two countries 
emphasise different further aims. In France, the absence of lump-sum benefits paid to single-
child households reflects the intention to primarily help large families (horizontal 
redistribution). In Germany, the lump-sum benefits allocated per child start with the firstborn 
and are generally more generous, which favours low-income households (vertical 
redistribution). Moreover, total expenditure on lump-sum family benefits are three times 
higher in Germany. This generosity supposes that Germany, more so than France, seeks to 
support families with a principal breadwinner. 
 
 
2.1.2. Instruments related to parental leave 
 
Table 27 in the appendix illustrates the main instruments related to parental leave. 
Concerning parental aid, the German system recently underwent reform. Before 2007, there 
was a benefit for rearing children (Erziehungsgeld) which consisted of a fixed amount of 300 
Euros per month for duration of two years.53 This duration had been continuously increased 
since 1979. Its main beneficiaries were stay-at-home mothers, since it was conditional on a 
certain income ceiling and even part-time employment would reduce the benefit significantly. 
 
For children born during or after January 2007, the new parental leave benefit (Elterngeld), 
inspired by Scandinavian countries, brought about profound changes. The declared goal of 
this reform is to diminish income losses, to shorten the duration of parental leave for mothers 
and to provide an incentive for fathers to go on parental leave (c.f. Spiess and Wrohlich, 
2006). Parental leave benefit was thenceforth augmented and indexed to previous earnings, 
but the duration of these payments was reduced. The parent temporarily abstaining from 
work in order to take care of the baby receives his/her previous salary at a replacement rate 
                                                 
52 This fixed premium concerns families with 3 three children, of which one lives at home at the age of 20 and is paid until that 
child turns 21. This helps alleviate the fall in financial assistance to large families, which has occurred because it is limited to the 
age of twenty.  
53 Respectively, 450 €  for a duration of one year. 
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of 67%.54 The amount is computed on the basis of the average monthly income of the last 
twelve months before maternity leave (Mutterschutz).55  The maximum amount is 1800 Euros 
per month. The minimum amount (300 euros per month) is designated towards parents who 
have not previously been employed.  
 
Unlike the prior regulation, there is no income ceiling, but the amounts allocated are limited 
to a duration of only 12 months56 (14 months in the case of a single parent). In order to 
encourage fathers to go on parental leave, the duration is extended to fourteen months if the 
other parent is also taking a leave of at least 2 months. This type of benefit has to be 
requested during the official “paternal leave period” (Elternzeit). This is the period that 
assures that the parent can return to his/her job, which has a duration of three years after the 
childbirth.  
 
A parent reducing his/her hours worked (i.e. working part-time) in order to take care of the 
child receives reduced parental leave benefit (reduziertes Elterngeld) which rises to 67% of 
the difference between previous full-time earnings and the current part-time salary. Parents 
can totally split childcare by each working no more than thirty hours a week.  
 
According to estimations of the Germany’s Family Ministry, the new parental aid scheme 
costs an additional billion euros per years, as compared to the previous system 
(Erziehungsgeld), which cost 3.15 billion euros in 2005. 
 
France has also reformed its system of parental leave benefits. The main changes are; 
firstly, an extension of parental leave benefits to families with only one child, and secondly, a 
rise in the level of benefits for parents working part-time. The new PAJE (Prestation d’Accueil 
du jeune enfant) is valid for all children born after January 2004. It replaces all benefits 
related to infancy which were effective before 2004, i.e. APJE (allocation pour jeune enfant), 
AAD (allocation d’adoption), APE (allocation parentale d’éducation), AFEAMA (aide à 
l’emploi d’une assistante maternelle agrée) and AGED (allocation de garde d’enfant à 
domicile).  
 
                                                 
54 With two children aged below three years and three children aged below six years, this parental benefit substitutes 73.7% of 
net earnings (Geschwisterbonus de 10%). In case of multiple births, parental leave benefit includes an additional 300€ per 
month per additional child. In case of low income, parental aid can be up to 100% of net earnings. In case of the birth of  a 
second child within two years of the birth of the first child, the earnings substitution is based on the salary received before the 
birth of the first child (“speed premium”). 
55 In both countries, there is also maternity leave. In Germany, maternity leave (Mutterschutz) lasts for six weeks before and 
eight weeks after giving birth. In France, the duration of maternity leave (congé de maternité) is 16 weeks in total with the 
possibility of choosing the distribution of these weeks. France differs from Germany in that it gives fathers the possibility of 
benefiting from eleven days of work leave during the 4 months after a child is born. 
56 By reducing this amount by half, it can be paid for a duration twice as long.  
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PAJE consists of four elements: a premium allocated at birth or adoption, the baseline 
benefit, a supplement for free activity choice (complément du libre choix d’activité)  and a 
supplement for free choice of childcare (complément du libre choix du mode de garde) (the 
latter will be outlined in the next section). For the premium allocated at birth or adoption and 
for the baseline benefit, there exists an income ceiling which is rather high. The baseline 
benefit is payable during the first three years after birth/adoption and is not cumulative with 
respect to family supplements. During those three years, the right to return to one’s previous 
job is guaranteed.  
 
The supplement for free activity choice (complément du libre choix d’activité) seeks to allow 
parents to interrupt, be it totally or partially, their professional activity in order to care for 
children younger than three years of age (c.f. “l’essentiel” No. 52 – CNAF, august 2006). It is 
directed at parents who were employed during the two years prior to their child’s arrival. As a 
result, it excludes anybody with a discontinuous career path – such parents are only eligible 
for the premium allocated at birth or adoption and the baseline benefit. Furthermore, the 
supplement for free activity choice (complément du libre choix d’activité) presents a higher 
benefit level than the former plan for parents working part-time. This implies a valuation of 
part-time employment relative to ceasing work entirely. Furthermore, the maximum payable 
amount was raised by 37%. On the other hand, the required conditions for previous 
employment were tightened. With several children, the supplement for free activity choice 
(complément du libre choix d’activité)   is paid during three years beginning with the arrival of 
the child. According to the new regulation, parents with only child can also receive this 
payment, but its maximum duration is limited to six months after the arrival of the child. 
 
In order to shorten the duration of payment, France has instigated an optional supplement for 
free activity choice (COLCA – complément optionnel de libre choix d’activité), given to 
parents who are caring for at least three children and who are interrupting their career for 
one year after the child’s arrival. This type of supplement awards higher payments for a 
duration that is shorter.57 
 
According to the French family benefits office CNAF (Caisses Nationales d’Allocations 
Familiales), the first three elements of PAJE brought about expenditures of 3.9 billion Euros 
in 2005. That same year, the corresponding former allocation schemes (APJE, AAD and 
APE) still brought about expenditures of 2.55 million euros. The sum of these expenditures 
(6.45 billion euros) is 1.5 times higher than that estimated for parental leave benefit in 
Germany (Elterngeld) in 2007. 
                                                 
57 758, 95 €/month without the baseline benefit and 587, 90 €/month with the baseline benefit for one year. 
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With these new schemes in place, Germany and France are seeking to make returning to 
work more attractive to mothers. Yet in France, the principal schemes related to parental 
leave have basically remained the same. Germany, on the other hand, has undertaken 
deeper reforms, thereby demonstrating a real will to change the behaviour of parents. By 
shortening the duration of parental benefit, German mothers are effectively obliged to start 
working again sooner and German fathers have an incentive to go on paternal leave. 
Furthermore, the new German regulation diminishes the loss of transfer payments due to 
part-time employment, which reduces the incentive to completely stop working. 
 
The reforms led by the German government are mainly benefiting high-income households. 
Since parental leave benefit (Elterngeld) is computed on the basis of previous earnings, 
these reforms predominantly support university degree-holding mothers with high incomes 
(c.f.  Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2007). The new regulation is less favourable towards mothers 
with no or low income as the duration of payment is reduced (from 2 years to 12 or 14 
months). The new parental benefit (Elterngeld) therefore is less conducive to vertical 
redistribution.  
 
The reform suggests that Germany is starting to promote other family models than that of 
one principal earner (male breadwinner). On the other hand, this reform, by the way in which 
it substitutes salaries, encourages degree-holding women to leave the labour market more 
so than before, and discourages women from having children in the early phase of their 
career since eligibility for parental leave benefit (Elterngeld) requires successful professional 
integration. Therefore, despite the progressive character of this reform, its effects on young 
mothers’ employment and fertility patterns remain to be seen. 
 
In France, the reforms related to PAJE favour higher income households since the income 
ceilings and the amounts awarded in connection to a reduction of hours worked were 
increased, while those related to completely stopping work were left unchanged. According 
to a study by Marchal (2007), high income families tend to work less, while medium income 
households rather choose to stop work completely. Revaluing part-time employment relative 
to complete work cessation in this manner was primarily intended to make returning to work 
more attractive to mothers. On the other hand, the new parental benefit schemes are a lot 
less progressive than those introduced in Germany. Especially for low qualified mothers with 
more than one child, France’s payment duration of 36 months, considered quite long, risks 
delaying mothers’ return to the labour market. In addition, fathers are not explicitly addressed 
by these new schemes unlike in Germany. 
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2.1.3. Financial assistance reducing the cost of child care 
 
Table 28 in the appendix presents the main instruments of financial assistance reducing the 
cost of child care. In Germany, a new regulation covering the cost of child care by providing 
tax deductibility of child care costs (Absetzbarkeit Kinderbetreuungskosten) was introduced 
in 2006. Previously, working couples (i.e. when both are working) could reduce their tax duty 
by 1500 euros a year when cost of child care exceeded 1548 euros. The new regulation 
raised the ceiling for child care expenses. Now, lone working parents and working couples 
can reduce their tax duties by two thirds of child care costs, from the first euro up to 4000 
euros per year. The new German scheme also allows tax allowances by two thirds of child 
care costs for lone non-working parents or couples where only one partner is employed. 
However, for them, the age limit is stricter. All types of child care (cribs, kindergarten and 
nannies) are included in this measure. In contrast to France, the fiscal treatment in Germany 
thus does not depend on the mode of child care. The German finance minister foresaw a 
loss of fiscal revenue amounting to 0.46 billion euros per year from 2006 onwards because of 
these new measures.  
 
In France, parents choose between the free activity choice supplement (redemption of salary 
losses incurred when reducing or stopping employment: complément du libre choix d’activité) 
and the supplement for free choice of childcare (for parents in full-time employment: 
complément du libre choix du mode de garde).58 The latter seeks to grant parents a more 
free choice of child care and takes account of more important child care fees than previously 
(c.f. “l’essentiel” No. 36 – CNAF, april 2005). If parents employ a childminder or a nanny, the 
supplement for free choice of childcare (complément du libre choix du mode de garde) 
covers the social security contributions and a part of the net salary. When a childminder 
(childcare at childminer’s house: assistante maternelle) is employed, all social security 
contributions are covered by 100% (exemption from employers and empoyees contributions). 
In the case of a nanny (childcare at parents’ house: garde à domicile), 50% of social security 
contributions are covered up to a limit of 402 Euros per month (the maximum amounts can 
vary depending on the child age). For both types of child care, a minimum of 15% of the care 
taker’s salary is left to be paid by the parents. The supplement for free choice of childcare 
(complément du libre choix du mode de garde) seeks to blur the choice between employing a 
childminder or a nanny.59 
 
                                                 
58 The accumulation is possible given part-time employment and having a paid child minder. 
59 Previously, employing a child minder was supported by AFEAMA (aide à la famille pour l’emploi d’une assistante maternelle 
agrée) and was favoured relative to employing a nanny, which was supported by AGED (allocation de garde d’enfant à 
domicile), because AFEAMA covered  parts of the net salary and AGED did not. 
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If parents don’t employ a care taker themselves but instead use an association or a company 
which employs child minders or nannies, they receive higher allowances, since social 
security payments are not covered. In the case of child care by a registered child minder 
(assistante maternelle agrégée) parents receive a lump sum per child. In the case of a nanny 
(garde à domicile), parents receive a fixed sum regardless of the number of children. Again, 
in all cases, parents are left to pay at least 15% of these expenditures.  
 
According to CNAF, the supplement for free choice of childcare (complément du libre choix 
du mode de garde) amounted to expenditures of 1.33 billion Euros in 2005.60 The 
corresponding former schemes, AFEAMA and AGED, still entailed expenditure of 1.7 billion 
Euros that same year. Together, they made up 3.03 billion Euros of government expenditure 
– almost seven times the amount planned for reducing child care costs in Germany in 2006.  
 
In Germany, the tax deductibility of child care costs (Absetzbarkeit Kinderbetreuungskosten) 
helps active parents and reflects the political will to improve the possibility of reconciling work 
and family life. Nonetheless, the costs of these measure are a lot lower than in France, 
whether one is looking at total government expenditure/loss of fiscal revenue for child care 
cost coverage or coverage per family. Despite a well-meaning reform, in Germany financial 
support to working parents by covering child care costs is thus limited compared to France.  
 
 
2.1.4. Taxation of family income 
 
Like France, Germany takes the existence of families into account across the entire range of 
income taxation. But the compensation of family expenses in the case of taxation of 
household income differs in important ways between the two countries, as illustrated in    
table 29. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 In France, the supplement for free choice of childcare is applicable only to children up to the age of six only. However, since 
January 2006, a  tax deduction of child care costs is also possible, regardless of the type of child care (home-based or not) and 
the age of the child (“service à la personne”). This deduction is subject to an income ceiling. Parents can pay the registered 
child minder, the respective association or the nanny in CESU-cheques (cheque employ service universel). They receive a tax 
certificate which allows them to benefit from a tax reduction.  
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Table 29: Taxation of family income in Germany and France, 2007 
 
Germany France 
married couple’s tax splitting           
(Ehegattensplitting) 
family tax splitting                                   
(quotient familial) 
joint taxation with income splitting           
(tax reduction not limited) 
joint taxation with income splitting           
(limited tax reduction) 
splitting divisor (Splittingfaktor) : 2           
for a married couple 
splitting divisor: 2                                      
for a married couple without children 
does not take into account  plus 0,5  for the first child 
the number of children ! plus 0,5 for the second child 
  plus an additional part                           for every further child 
 
Data Germany: january 2007; data France: mai 2007,  
Sources : BMFSFJ (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend) 2007, CNAF (Caisse nationale d’allocations 
familiales) 2007, MISSOC (Mutual Information System on Social Protection) 2006.  
 
 
In Germany, there’s a married couple’s tax splitting (Ehegattensplitting), a tax system in 
which husband and wife each pay income tax on half the total of their combined incomes. In 
order to calculate the amount of tax, the taxable income of both spouses is summed and 
divided by two (Splittingfaktor 2: slitting divisor, number of shares). Finally the tax rate 
schedule is applied to both halves for each spouse and the resulting amount is added to the 
common tax duty (no income ceiling). The number of children is not taken into account by the 
calculation. The married couple’s tax splitting (Ehegattensplitting) is the second most 
expensive instrument of German family policy (following lump-sum child benefit: Kindergeld); 
according to the federal government, it amounted to 19.1 billion Euros in 2005.  
 
In France, the family tax splitting (quotient familial) takes into account the number of children 
below the age of 18, which constitutes one of the main differences between the two 
countries’ family policies. The splitting divisor (number of shares) rises with the number of 
children and the resulting amount of tax resulting from this divided income is multiplied by the 
number of shares. The family tax splitting (quotient familial) is subject to an income ceiling 
which varies according to the family’s situation. But as the ceiling is very high, most families 
do benefit from this family tax splitting in France.61 Courtioux, Laib, Le Minez and Mirouse 
(2004) use a micro-model to estimate that family tax savings due to the family tax splitting 
reached 11 billion Euros in 2004. 
 
                                                 
61 German parents can actually choose between the married couple’s tax splitting (Ehegattensplitting) and individual taxation, 
which is not possible for French families. In order to benefit from the tax splittingt, Germans have to be married. In France, 
couples registered for a civil solidarity pact (PACS) are eligible for the family tax splitting as well. However, the French family tax 
splitting also applies to single parents (with a different calculation of shares), while in Germany there are tax exemptions for 
single parents. 
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Because the tax schedule in both countries is progressive, both the German and the French 
tax splitting system favour couples with only one salary or markedly dissimilar salaries. For 
such couples, both splitting systems slow the incremental increase of the tax rate and 
thereby cause a rise in deductions. It therefore seems that both the married couple’s tax 
splitting (introduced in Germany in 1958) and the family tax splitting (introduced in France in 
1945) are derived from a traditional family model with a sole or main breadwinner. 
Furthermore, both splitting systems imply a rise in tax savings with total family income.  
 
 
2.2. Impacts of financial assistance to families 
2.2.1. Redistributive impacts 
 
In order to evaluate the redistributive effects of the overall system of financial assistance to 
families in France and in Germany, I first compare total expenses in each country. Their 
volume varies depending on the sources. Effectively, the calculations often take account of 
more elements than the four main instruments listed above. These elements are mainly 
redistribution schemes for low income persons which vary according to the family situation, 
such as expenditures for housing, disabilities, precariousness and social security. Most data 
coming from OECD, Eurostat or national data sources unanimously indicate that the total 
expenditures of financial family assistance have been continuously rising since the early 
nineties in both countries. In Germany, these expenditures were at a lower level than in 
France at the beginning of the 1990s, thereafter, they rose more quickly in a catching-up 
manner. Expenditures on families have been converging in the two countries in the last 
couple of years and stood at around 3% of GDP in both countries in 2005 (Eurostat). At this 
level, Germany and France represent the European Union average.62 Tax reductions for 
families occupy a large share of “family expenditure” in both countries - around 1% of GDP in 
Germany and 0.8% of GDP in France.63 This represents around 30 billion Euros in Germany 
per year, of which 19 billion are spent on the married couple’s tax splitting 
(Ehegattensplitting). In France, the total amount of tax reductions for families stands at 18 
billion Euros per year, of which 11 billion are spent on the family tax splitting (quotient 
familial).  
 
However, this conformity in the volume of government expenditure for families in terms of 
GDP does not imply that family policies in the two countries are aimed at similar objectives. A 
comparison of the relative amounts attributed to each of the four main instruments reveals 
marked contrasts, which reflect very different goals. In Germany, expenditure on families has 
                                                 
62 Eurostat (2006). 
63 OECD Social Expenditure Database (2003). 
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risen since 1990 mainly because of the high level lump-sump child benefit (Kindergeld). With 
an amount of 35 billion Euros in 2005, these fixed payments constitute the main instrument 
of financial support to families in Germany, aimed at protecting families from poverty (vertical 
redistribution). Moreover, the high lump-sum child benefit seeks to offset the effect of the 
married couple’s tax splitting (Ehegattensplitting), which favours high-income households 
and thus weakens the intended vertical redistribution. At a cost of 19 billion Euros in 2005, 
the married couple’s tax splitting (Ehegattensplitting) is the second most expensive of 
German family policy. The two main instruments of financial support for families thus have 
opposite redistributive effects. The way in which this contradiction is tolerated assumes that 
family policy favours the shared effect of these two main instruments, which is to support 
families with a sole or main breadwinner.  
 
The recent reforms of parental leave benefit (Elterngeld) and of tax deductibility of child care 
costs (Absetzbarkeit Kinderbetreuungskosten) in Germany signal that policy is distancing 
itself from the traditional model of the family. By supporting working couples and single 
working parents more than before, the new parental leave benefit (Elterngeld) encourages a 
conciliation of work and family life. To obtain this aim, the German state accepted the anti-
redistributive character of parental leave benefit (Elterngeld), which substitutes previous 
earnings by 67% subject to a rather high income ceiling (1800 Euros per month). Hence, the 
losers of this reform are poor or low-income parents including students. Prior to the reform, 
they received 300 Euros per month for a duration of 24 months. The reform implies a 
shortening of this duration to 12 or 14 months. Despite the progressive character of the 
reform of parental leave and the coverage of child care costs, the expenditures related to 
these instruments, around 4.2 billion Euros for parental leave benefit (Elterngeld)  and 460 
million Euros for tax deductibility of child care costs (Absetzbarkeit Kinderbetreuungskosten)  
for the year 2007, don’t compare well to those expenditures related to lump-sum child 
benefits (Kindergeld) and the married couple’s tax splitting (Ehegattensplitting) mentioned 
before. Thus, these reforms cannot be interpreted as a radical change away from the 
dominant principles of family politics. The reforms rather represent first signs of greater open-
mindedness on part of German politicians. It is therefore likely that these reforms will have a 
medium-run impact on the behaviour of parents:  their resort to parental leave benefit 
(Elterngeld) and to tax deductibility of child care costs (Absetzbarkeit 
Kinderbetreuungskosten) costs will probably pick up only in the next years, so that the 
financial volume of these instruments will increase. 
 
In France, the two main instruments of financial assistance to families – in terms of 
expenditure volume – are the family tax splitting (quotient familial) (approximately 11 billion 
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Euros annually) and the sump-sum child benefit (allocation familiale) (approximately 12 
billion Euros per year). The family tax splitting (quotient familial) seeks to provide relief to 
large families by taking the number of children into account and by attributing an entire 
supplement to each child from the third child onwards. At the same time, the family tax 
splitting (quotient familial) favours high-income families and working couples which great 
earnings disparity. As a result, it implies horizontal redistribution, all the while encouraging a 
traditional, principal breadwinner model of the family. Of course, the lump-sum child benefit 
(allocation familiale) aims to prevent families from entering poverty, but it also works in a 
manner conforming to the family tax splitting’s objective of horizontal redistribution by taking 
effect only from the second child onwards. The expenditures related to parental leave benefit 
(around 6.5 billion Euros in 2005 for: premium allocated at birth or adoption, baseline benefit, 
supplement for free activity choice: complément du libre choix d’activité), and coverage of 
child care costs (around 3 billion Euros in 2005 for the supplement for free choice of 
childcare: complément du libre choix du mode de garde), which are designed to reconcile 
work and family life, seem less significant by comparison to the former two instruments. 
Nonetheless, the absolute amount invested in reconciling work and family life is twice as high 
in France as in Germany.64 
 
A study by Bacet, Dell and Wrohlich (2007) uses a micro-simulation taking into account the 
two countries’ respective income distributions and tax schedules to confirm the notion that 
the system of financial assistance to families in Germany places greater emphasis on vertical 
redistribution. The French system, on the other hand, is effectively more oriented towards 
horizontal redistribution. As a result, families who raise their income suffer greater financial 
losses in Germany than in France. This assumes that the two systems of financial support for 
families also differ concerning employment incentives for women. 
 
 
2.2.2. The impact on women’s labour market participation 
 
In Germany as in France, the socio-fiscal system (transfer payments and tax schedules) 
gives rise to an income redistribution from high-income to poorer households. This implies 
that when a household’s gross income is high, financial support stagnates or diminishes and 
deductions rise more than proportionately. As vertical redistribution is stronger in Germany 
than in France, it may be that the overall socio-fiscal system in Germany is more progressive 
as well. This would imply that the effective marginal income tax rate is higher in Germany 
than in France.  
                                                 
64 In France, instruments related to parental leave and coverage of child care costs add up to 9.5 billion euros (6.5 billion euros 
+ 3 billion euros). In Germany, these instruments add up to almost 5 billion euros (4.2 billion euros + 460 million euros).  
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These different progressivities cause different labour supply incentives in the two countries. 
The more progressive a fiscal system is, the lower is the incentive to raise one’s labour 
supply. Many empirical studies such as Hausman (1981) assume that the labour supply 
elasticity with regard to effective marginal tax rates of the second earner within a household 
is higher than that of the household’s principal earner. In the majority of cases, a progressive 
socio-fiscal system is therefore less conducive to the employment of women relative to that 
of men within a couple.  
 
Math (2004) analyses the progressivity of France and Germany’s respective socio-fiscal 
systems and their incentive effect on a household’s second earner’s labour supply decision, 
i.e. women in most cases. In order to indicate the progression of each country’s socio-fiscal 
system, Math computes an effective implicit marginal tax rate (IMTR) based on data from 
2001. This rate represents the additional part of gross income resulting from a rise in labour 
supply that is not transfered into an additional part in net income because of deductions and 
transfer losses. The IMTR takes taxes into account social security contributions, elements of 
financial assistance to families, housing aid and benefits which reduce the costs of health 
care and education. The IMTR is computed for various types of households, which are 
differentiated according to their size (couples or single persons, number of children) and their 
income level.  
 
The IMTR is estimated for three transitions concerning the employment of women (rises in 
women’s labour supply) within a couple. It is based on the assumption that men, being the 
principal earners, work full time and that they earn the average income of men working full-
time.  
 
The first transition is that of women within a couple from not working to working part-time. 
This model assumes that female part-time employment earns the full-time minimum wage in 
France and half the average full-time salary of women in Germany.65 
 
The model’s second transition is a move from not working at all to full-time employment. The 
model assumes that women in both countries earn women’s average salary when they move 
to such full-time employment.  
 
The third transition is a move from part-time to full-time employment. The model assumes 
that a woman’s earning thereafter rise from earning minimum full-time wage in France and 
                                                 
65 This is due to the fact that there is no legal minimum wage in Germany.  
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half the women’s average full-time earnings in Germany to earning the full average salary for 
women in both countries.  
 
Table 30 shows the calculated IMTR for each of the three transitions in France and 
Germany.  
 
 
Table 30: Effective implicit marginal tax rate (IMTR) in % for three activity transitions  
               of married women in Germany and France, 2001 
 
 Germany France 
1) inactivity → part-time 50 33-40 
2) inactivity → full time 51 33-41 
3) part-time → full time  53 23-44 
 
Source: Math (2004) 
 
 
 
For Germany, the model generates a IMTR which is always independent of the number of 
children. In France, the IMTR depends on the number of children for each transition. It is low 
for couples with three children and couples with no children. Couples with one child of 
preschool age are at a disadvantage because of the rise in expenses compared to childless 
couples and because financial support is weaker than for large families (couples with only 
one child have no lump sum child benefits -allocation familiale-,  for example).  
 
For all three transitions, the IMTR is higher in Germany than in France. This confirms a 
systematically higher progressivity of the German socio-economic system. Consequently, the 
financial work incentives for women living in couples are lower than in France regardless of 
the size of the household. In Germany, persons with three children and persons without 
children wishing to move from working part-time to working full-time are face a IMTR at least 
twice as high as in France. For all household sizes, the German IMTR is higher for 
transitions to full-time employment than for transitions to part-time employment. This isn’t 
always the case in France. The transition to full-time employment is thus penalised in 
Germany relative to a move to part-time employment. This contributes to the fact that female 
employment in Germany consists, to a large extent, of part-time work (39% in Germany vs. 
24% in France).66 
 
Social security contributions and tax schedules are similar in the two countries. The 
difference in IMTRs is thus largely due to divergent effects of fiscal benefits and tax 
compensations for families. Among these, the incentive effects of the married couple’s tax 
                                                 
66 Eurostat (2003). 
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splitting (Ehegattensplitting) in Germany and the family tax splitting (quotient familial) in 
France play special roles. As both tax splitting systems tend to favor households in which 
there exists a great earnings disparity between spouses, they reduce the financial incentives 
for the second earner’s (i.e. usually women) labour supply decision. The difference between 
Germany’s married couple’s tax splitting and France’s family tax splitting is that the latter 
takes the number of children into consideration. In France, tax reductions related to the 
family tax splitting rise with the number of children: this helps to explain (to a considerable 
extent), why the IMTR facing a mother deciding to initiate or increase her labour supply is 
lower in France than in Germany. As a result, the German socio-fiscal system induces 
families to follow the traditional model with a single or principal breadwinner more so than in 
France.  
 
Based on 2001 figures, the study by Math (2004) does not consider the recent reforms 
concerning parental leave and coverage of child care costs in both countries, that is to say, 
the parental allowance (Elterngeld) as well as the tax deductibility of child care costs 
(Absetzbarkeit Betreuungskosten) in Germany and PAJE in France. 
 
The work of Spiess and Wrohlich (2006) on reforms of parental leave benefits in Germany 
(Elterngeld) conclude that shortening their duration provides an incentive for mothers to 
return to work sooner. The authors estimate that employment of mothers with children aged 
two will rise from 36% to 40% on average. In addition, this measure encourages fathers to go 
on paternity leave. This alleviates mothers’ burden of domestic chores and encourages them 
to be employed. During the first nine months of 2007, 37.140 fathers - correspondingly 9.6% 
of total demand for parental leave benefits (Elterngeld) - chose to go on paternity leave.67 Of 
these, 41.1% chose to stop working for a duration between three and twelve months.68 In 
march 2008, 12,1% of the persons drawing parental leave benefits (Elterngeld) were fathers. 
77% of them were active before the birth of their child. 63% of them stoped working for only 
two moths.69 Hence, despite a positive tendency, it is still mainly women who are reducing or 
ceasing their work for a longer time period after the arrival of a child. It remains to be seen if 
the new parental allowance in Germany really induces a change of paradigm. 
 
In France, the free activity choice supplement (complément du libre choix d’activité) makes a 
reduction of work more attractive than total cessation. Due to this supplement, mothers who 
were employed in low-paid jobs before the arrival of their child dispose of a similar income as 
before when reducing their hours worked by three quarters. Marcial (2007) shows that the 
                                                 
67 Statistisches Bundesamt (2007). 
68 BMFSFJ (2007). 
69 Statistisches Bundesamt (2008). 
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PAJE has incurred a decline in the number of mothers who stop working completely relative 
to those who reduce their hours worked in 2004. On the other hand, it’s conceivable that the 
long duration of payment for mothers having more than one child (36 months) delays their 
return to work. Schönberg and Ludsteck (2007) show that this was the case in Germany 
before 2007, when the old parental allowance (Erziehungsgeld) paid out fixed amounts for a 
duration of 24 months. 
 
To complete the analysis, Marc (2004) show that the working conditions of women (as in 
status/position, type of contract, working hours, salary, career perspectives) play a particular 
role in deciding – or not – to restart employment after going on maternity leave. If these 
conditions are not taken into account, the impact of financial assistance to families on 
mothers’ decision to stop working risks being overestimated.  
 
Concerning child care costs, the supplement for free choice of childcare in France 
(complément du libre choix du mode de garde) represents a higher level of financial support 
than in Germany, where this support derives from the tax deductibility of child care costs 
(Absetzbarkeit Kinderbetreuungskosten). This results in more mothers working full-time in 
France than in Germany. Furthermore, in France only full-time employed mothers are entitled 
to coverage of child care costs. In Germany, parents who reduce or cease their labour supply 
not only receive a substitution of their salary (parental leave benefit), but also some form of 
coverage of child care costs. This high level of financial support implies that, for women 
holding university degrees, reduction and cessation of work are more attractive options in 
Germany than in France. For women with low qualifications, reduction and cessation of work 
are more attractive options in France than in Germany because of the longer duration of 
financial support.  
 
 
2.3. Potential reforms 
 
In both countries, recent reforms of financial assistance to families seek to encourage 
women to work. However, in both countries, some political debates revolve around reforms 
that constitute disincentives to female employment.  
 
In Germany, the actual discussion of future reforms rather illustrates a return to old norms. In 
2007, a large proportion of conservative policy decision-makers demanded a child care 
allowance (Betreuungsgeld)70 of approximately 150 euros per month to non-employed 
                                                 
70 Critics have coined the term “stove prime” (Herdprämie) for this requested allowance. 
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parents of young children.  This proposal seeks to compensate working and non-working 
parents equally: As working parents will benefit from planned government investments in 
child care centers, non-working parents would receive 150 euros per month to compensate 
them for looking after their children.  This discussion hinders the development of progressive 
ideas which could advance female emancipation. Moreover, only recently the German 
government decided to increase the monthly lump-sum child benefit (Kindergeld) from 2009 
on  to 165 euros for the first and second child, to 170 euros for the third child and to 195 
euros for the fourth and every further child in order to compensate families for rising living 
expenses. The political discussion abstracted completely away from possible disincentive 
effects for mothers’ labour supply. Only isolated voices argued for investments in childcare in 
stead of increasing child benefits by emphasising that the irreducible elevation per child (10 
to 16 euros per moths) would not be efficient to prevent families from income poverty.  
 
In France, the system of welfare benefits for households with no or little income has recently 
been reformed. The reform does not particularly address married mothers with children, but 
is subject to criticism because of the expected negative impact on mothers’ labour supply. 
Since may 2007, in 34 French departments the RSA (revenu de solidarité active) replaces 
the former welfare benefit for unemployed persons RMI (revenu minimum d'insertion). Its 
general introduction is foreseen for july 2009. The RSA will then be extended to replace the 
work premium for low income groups PPE (prime pour l'emploi), the benefit for sole parents 
API (allocation de parent isolé) and the benefit for specific solidarity ASS (allocation de 
solidarité spécifique) as well. The RSA aims at phasing out financial disincentives a person is 
facing when obtaining the RMI and wanting to take up work remunerated by the minimum 
wage (SMIC). The RSA is an income supplement for workers with low income and at the 
same time, it represents the welfare benefit for persons without income. Allège (2008) admits 
that the new RSA provides a higher incentive for inactive singles, especially for those who 
are low qualified, to take up work than the former RMI did. However, the RSI risks inducing 
secondary earners, typically married women with children, to reduce or stop working. Allège 
(2008) warns that the introduction of the RSA could have a perverse effect on the labour 
market, which is that the reduction of the labour supply by married mothers offsets the 
increase of the labour supply by low qualified singles. The global labour supply effect would 
then be negative. In fact, the RSA confronts secondary earners, who want to increase their 
labour supply, with a higher marginal tax rate than the RMI. This higher marginal tax rate 
represents a strong disincentive to work especially for secondary earners, because of their 
high labour supply elasticity. Piketty (1998) shows in an empirical analysis for France, based 
on household survey data from 1982 to 1997 (INSEE), that the labour supply elasticity of 
mothers with young children (in the function of second earners) is between 0,6 and 1, 
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whereas the labour supply of principal earners is quasi-inelastic. As a result, tax and benefit 
systems have a high impact on the labour supply of mothers, in a positive or negative way 
depending on the characteristics of the system, and hence, the RSA implies a strong 
disincentive for mothers, especially low qualified ones, to work. Eissa and Hoynes (1998) 
show for the USA that a reform similar to the RSA, namely the expansions of the EITC 
(earned income tax credit) between 1984 and 1996, has reduced the activity rate of women 
living in couple by 1 %. The EITC implies cash-transfers to lower-income families. Secondary 
earners of low qualification and hence low income are confronted with high marginal tax 
rates, especially in the phase-out of the EITC. Eissa and Hoynes (1998) conclude that the 
EITC reforms have effectively subsidised married mothers staying at home. Laroque and 
Salanié (2002) already warned that an introduction of tax credits in France similar to the 
american EITC, which they named ACR (allocation compensatrice de revenue), would have 
similar disincentives for mothers to work. In addition, Marc (2008) emphasises that in order to 
minimise mothers’ disincentives to work, the costs as well as the non-monetary obstacles of 
return to work for mothers have to be reduced. Hence, to compensate the negative impact of 
the RSA, it is advisable to reduce child care costs and increase child care facilities. 
 
The discussion of a child care allowance (Betreuungsgeld) and the child-benefit increase in 
Germany as well as the impending area-wide introduction of the RSA (revenu de solidarité 
active) suggest that in both countries, the declared will to promote women’s employment 
sometimes takes a back seat. This is all the worse as in both countries, further reforms are 
necessary to encourage gender equality in the private as well as the professional sphere.  
Méda and Périvier (2007), for example, recommend for France streamlining the parental 
leave benefits so that parental leave is shorter and explicitly includes fathers71, paying 80% 
of earnings subject to an income ceiling. However, today, a big part in policy debate in 
Germany and France centers on the question how the tax system can make work for women 
with children more attractive. The following sections present three reforms which would 
significantly raise the incentive for women to work and which all constitute profound changes 
of the way families are taxed.  
 
 
2.3.1. Adoption of the French family tax splitting in Germany 
 
The great differences between the incentive for women to work in France and Germany are, 
in large part, due to differences in the way in which families are taxed. Germany is one of the 
only countries in Europe not to take the number of children into account when taxing couples. 
                                                 
71 duration : 6 months for mothers and 6 months for fathers. 
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This begs the question of the effect of applying the French family tax splitting (quotient 
familial) in Germany. This effect was studied by Beblo, Beninger and Laisney in 2003. Since 
the French family tax splitting (quotient familial) implies lower effective marginal tax rates 
than the German married couple’s tax splitting (Ehegattensplitting), the study assumes that 
adopting the family tax splitting in Germany would increase the incentive for mothers to work.  
 
The economists base their assumptions on a micro simulation. In principle, this model 
computes a woman’s potential income if the French family tax splitting was to be applied in 
Germany and estimates the potential change in women’s labour supply in Germany. The 
model maintains the existing definition of taxable income in Germany. The analysis is based 
on data from the German SOEP (Socio-Economic Household Panel) of 1998, which includes 
individual data such as labour market status/position and income level of mothers. The 
model takes into account individual preferences (deterministic collective labour supply model, 
c.f. Chiappori, 1988, 1992) by estimating preference parameters for men and women in order 
to estimate their labour supply functions.  
 
The study shows that applying the French family tax splitting in Germany would raise the 
potential income of women as “second earners”. However, the total labour supply of women 
in terms of hours worked would not change. The potential effects rather emerge when 
differentiating between number of children and mothers’ qualifications. Especially mothers 
with several children would benefit from a higher potential income. The incentive to increase 
one’s labour supply would be highest for mothers with several children and having high 
qualifications. As a result, adopting the family tax splitting would encourage highly qualified 
mothers to combine professional and family life. Thus, adopting family tax splitting in 
Germany would tackle an important problem: In Germany today, qualified mothers do not 
supply more labour than those with low qualifications, on one hand, and the fertility rate is 
lowest for women holding university degrees (around 40% of degree-holding women in 
Germany between the ages of 35 and 40 are childless versus 24% of such women in 
France)72. 
 
 
2.3.2. Individual taxation 
 
Although the French family tax splitting (quotient familial) encourages mothers to work more 
than the German married couple’s tax splitting (Ehegattensplitting), the French family tax 
splitting still has a negative impact on the labour supply decision of many women. That’s why 
                                                 
72 Statistisches Bundesamt (2003). 
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Goldman and Sachs (2007) recommend introducing individual taxation not only in Germany 
but also in France, which would equalise effective marginal tax rates of men and women. 
This idea was first developed in the USA. Eissa and Hoynes (2002), for example, 
recommend basing the American EITC on individual earnings and not on family earnings in 
order to offset the incentive for secondary earners to leave the labour force. 
 
A study by Callan, Dex, Smith and Vlasblom (2003) analyses the potential impact of 
individual taxation on labour supply of married women in Germany73. Their study supposes 
an adoption of the individual tax system that exists in Great Britain. The economists estimate 
the labour supply function of women in Germany, and then proceed by simulating 
hypothetical participation rates of women working part- and full-time within a regime of 
individual taxation. With the help of a bivariate probit model, based on women’s utility 
functions, they estimate the probability of women participating in the labour market (choice 
between working and staying at home) as well as the probability of working full-time (choice 
between working part-time and working full-time). The model takes into account other 
exogenous variables such as salary, education and professional experience of women as 
well as the presence and age of children. The labour supply decision is determined by 
disposable after-tax income. The study concludes that applying individual taxation would 
hardly change the rate of part-time employment of married women in Germany. However, it 
would reduce women’s rate of non-participation and would raise women’s rate of full-time 
employment. In Western Germany, women’s rate of non-participation would sink from 
44.33% to 33.6% and women’s rate of full-time employment would rise from 28.9% to 40.3%. 
In Eastern Germany, women’s rate of non-participation would sink even further, from 16.1% 
to 2.3%, while women’s rate of full-time employment would rise from 73.3% to 85.7%. These 
significant impacts plead in favor of individual taxation in Germany and suggest that this 
system would have similar positive effects in France. On the other hand, applying individual 
taxation would imply a great reduction in horizontal and vertical redistribution and would 
forsake the family character of the tax system, as emphasised by Hugounenq, Périvier and 
Sterdyniak (2002). 
 
 
2.3.3. Gender specific taxation  
 
A study by Alesina et al. (2007) goes even further by suggesting taxation that is lower for 
women than for men. The idea, inspired by Akerlof (1978), assumes that income taxation 
should depend on non-modifiable characteristics which nevertheless influence income, such 
                                                 
73 Individual data are from the German Socio-Economic Household panel (GSOEP, 1991 and Eurostat, 1996). 
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as age or sex. The proposition to tax women less is derived from Optimal Taxation Theory, 
which implies reduced tax rates for persons with high labour supply elasticity.74 Alesina et al.  
(2007) recommend to reduce income taxation for women and to increase income taxation for 
men in smaller increments, all the while lowering average tax rates. With such an optimal 
income tax, the labour supply of men will decrease by a lesser amount than that of women 
will rise. Thus, the overall labour supply would be higher and government fiscal revenues 
would not be diminished. 
 
Gender based taxation would increase women’s net earnings. As a result, this taxation 
system not only reduces behavioral distortions but also makes discrimination against women 
more costly for employers. Furthermore, such taxation would compensate women for the 
burdens of motherhood (career interruptions, among others). The authors emphasise that 
gender based taxation would not be unfair but could, quite to the contrary, encourage 
equality of men and women, most notably concerning access to the labour market and 
concerning the division of household tasks. It may be that a lower tax rate for women would 
reduce their labour supply elasticity while that of men would simultaneously rise. That 
situation would allow each sex to have the same marginal tax rates in the long run. 
Consequently, it would be possible to introduce identical tax rates for men and women in the 
long run. 
 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
Several studies emphasise that lower female employment and lower fertility rates in 
Germany than in France can be explained by a lack of institutionalised child care in 
Germany. This chapter shows that different norms concerning childrearing in the two 
countries are equally reflected in the systems of financial assistance to families. The effects 
of these differences in the systems should therefore not be underestimated.  
 
With its high level of lump-sum child benefits (Kindergeld), Germany seeks to prevent 
families from living in poverty by emphasising vertical redistribution. Yet, the strong 
progressivity implied by the system of financial assistance to families has a negative impact 
on the labour supply of a household’s second earner (mainly mothers). In France, the system 
of financial assistance to families favors large families (horizontal redistribution) more 
independently of the level of household income. This encourages highly educated women to 
work while raising their children at the same time. Recently, in view of an ensuing shortage of 
                                                 
74 Studies like Hausman (1981) have shown that the labour supply elasticity of women, who are often  household’s secondary 
earners, is higher than that of men, who tend to have a practically inelastic labour supply as principal earners. 
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qualified workers, Germany became aware of its incentive problem for qualified women to 
work. With the new parental leave benefit (Elterngeld) and tax deductibility of child care costs 
(Absetzbarkeit der Kinderbetreuungskosten), the German government has started supporting 
high- income mothers, which encourages them to have a career.  
 
The French family tax splitting (quotient familial) and the German married couple’s tax 
splitting (Ehegattensplitting) have a negative impact on the labour supply of women as 
secondary household earners. In both countries it would therefore seem useful to focus on 
potential reforms of the way families are taxed, one possible framework being individual 
taxation. Completely abolishing the family tax splitting and the married couple’s tax splitting 
would certainly aggravate with immediate effect the financial situation of large families with 
large income disparities between the spouses and a relatively low total income. It is obvious 
that measures to reconcile family and professional life should not be applied in spite of 
children’s well-being. However, such an abolishment would free up enormous resources to 
compensate low-income families and large families.  
 
In France, the free resouces should be implemented to secure a better compensation of the 
cost of having a first child. Many family associations, for example “familles de France“,  
estimate that the lack or the low levels of funding towards families with only one child 
represent one of the big shortcomings of French family policy. A better compensation of the 
cost of having a first child could contribute to reducing child poverty in France, which is 
observed to an increasing extent (c.f. Damon, 2007). Complementary, in France the free 
resources should be implemented to improve the supply of child care for children aged 
between zero and three years. Such an investment is necessary to allow freedom of choice 
of professional involvement and of type of childcare which is envisioned by the instruments of 
PAJE (c.f. Méda and Périvier, 2007). In Germany, freed-up resources should be used to 
facilitate reconciliation between family and professional life  most notably by improving child 
care infrastructure for children of all ages.  
 
Finally, to advance gender equality in the private as well as the professional sphere, it is 
advisable that France and Germany do not only focus on financial assistance to families and 
child care infrastructure. Encouraging female emancipation requires active policies in favor of 
women which are not limited to family policies. According to Jaumotte (2003) the best 
policies are those which do not only help women to reconcile family and professional life, but 
also liberate their career ambitions (equalising agents at work, for example). 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
This thesis shows that women’s labour market participation, macroeconomic growth and 
family policies are closely linked to each other. Whereas there exists clear theoretical and 
empirical evidence that female labour market participation unambiguously promotes GDP 
growth, the inverse impact of GDP growth on female labour market participation is not as 
clear in the existing literature. Own empirical investigations prove that inversely, GDP growth 
first lowers female labour market participation and increases it in the middle and long run 
only.  By empirically proving the validity of the “feminisation U” hypothesis, which implies a U-
shaped (convex) pattern of female labour market participation along the economic 
development path, my empirical investigation closes a research gap. The finding implies 
several policy implications. As the impact of GDP growth on female labour market 
participation is ambiguous, it becomes clear that simply relying on macroeconomic growth is 
insufficient to promote female labour market participation. A policy which pursues this 
strategy not only risks restraining women’s economic empowerment but also risks keeping a 
country’s growth performance below its potential. Therefore, equalising institutions that 
promote women’s labour market participation are necessary. A closer look on institutional 
settings in Europe shows that this goes not only for developing but also for industrialised 
countries. An investigation of the impact of family policy instruments on mothers’ labour 
market participation in Europe and finds that not all family policies unambiguously encourage 
a reconciliation of work and family life. The redistributive character of several family policy 
instruments risks discouraging mothers’ labour supply. Hence, it is essential to create a set 
of coherent family policy instruments that manage to simultaneously prevent families from 
income poverty while encouraging mothers’ employment and fertiliy at the same time.  
 
This is the essential conclusion of the present PhD thesis. Nevertheless, the analysis 
presented in the three chapters offers a series of further insights which are worth highlighting 
at this point.  
   
Firstly, chapter 1 illustrates that the existing literature proves that gender equality in terms of 
education and labour market participation clearly promotes GDP growth. Today, this finding 
is recognised by many world bodies, like the World Bank or the UN for example, which take 
increasingly into account gender specific aspects when compiling their development aid 
programms. In its report “Engendering Development” (2001), the World Bank states that 
women in the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are most 
disadvantaged in terms of education and employment. The report emphasises furthermore 
that a reduction in gender discrimination is not just crucial for women themselves, but is also 
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meaningful in economic terms and hence for society as a whole. The World Bank suggests 
that yearly per-capita growth would have almost doubled in the past 30 years in many 
developing countries if more had been invested into the education and employment of 
women. The president of the World Bank acknowledged the scientifically proven fact that 
women’s education and employment promotes growth at the forth Women’s World 
Conference in Beijing in 1995 with the following African saying: “When we educate a boy, we 
educate a person.  When we educate a girl, we educate an entire family and an entire 
nation.” In order to reduce gender-specific discrimination in terms of education and income, 
the World Bank has decided to institutionalise a gender perspective in all of its development 
projects (gender mainstreaming) and projects are checked over to ensure that the needs of 
women are taken into consideration. In its report, the World Bank refers to a project in 
Morocco which illustrates why such consideration of women is important. A Moroccan village 
decided to invest in the building of streets and electricity, even though the nearest water 
source was five kilometres away. Women and girls are traditionally the ones who fetch water, 
and they often miss school to make long trips to the nearest well. The fact that no money 
was spent on building a well prevented girls from obtaining more schooling. 
 
Nevertheless, the first chapter not only discusses the positive impact of women’s economic 
empowerment on GDP growth, but also reveals a research gap by showing that the inverse 
impact of GDP growth on female labour market participation is not as clear in today’s 
literature. Although several studies suggest a convex impact of GDP growth on female labour 
market participation ( “feminisation U” hypothesis), they do not generally prove the validity of 
the hypothesis. This is due to the fact that the existing empirical investigations are based on 
time series or cross country data only and that they do not sufficiently take into account 
endogeneity problems. 
 
Chapter two attends to this research gap, which is the missing empirical evidence of the 
validity of the “feminisation U”’ hypothesis. I empirically test the “feminisation U” hypothesis 
based on a newly available, large panel data set, combining time series and cross country 
data (184 countries, 1965-2004). This large data set allows taking into account endogeneity 
adequately. Furthermore, it allows testing for the robustness of the findings by using several 
specifications of the endogenous variable, female labour market participation. The presented 
estimation results prove a convex impact of GDP on female labour market participation. Yet, 
the analysis suggests that the U-shaped relationship is dominated by between-country 
variation. This finding is mainly due to the fact that the “feminisation U” can not be observed 
for single countries within the observed time period, which ranges over four decades only. 
This shows that further work is needed in the field of data collection and harmonisation. In 
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addition, chapter two also reveals that measurement and data availability problems limit the 
scope of interpretation. For example, it would be interesting to investigate the driving forces 
behind the convex impact of GDP on female labour market participation. For this purpose, it 
would make sense to investigate - as suggested by the theoretical framework - the impact of 
industrialisation and urbanisation on specific female employment patterns, for example part-
time work of women with young children or female employment by sectors (formal, informal, 
agriculture, non-agriculture, blue-collar, white-collar etc…). It also would be interesting to 
estimate the impact of a nation’s well being and it’s institutional setting on female labour 
market participation. Yet, in order to not significantly reduce the number of observations, it is 
necessary to stick to female labour market participation as endogenous and GDP as 
exogenous variable. This impediment reveals that more data collection is needed concerning 
more specific measures of female employment patterns, of welfare and of institutional 
settings, especially for developing countries. In addition, chapter two points out that even 
simple measures of female labour market participation are often not reliable, especially in 
developing countries, because of women’s widespread informal economic activities which 
are not taken into account by official measures. Therefore, also concerning female labour 
market participation, data lacks and measurement problems need consideration. 
 
Nevertheless, the empirical finding that macroeconomic growth lowers female labour market 
participation at early stages of development and increases it only in the middle and long run 
leads to an important policy implication: In order to increase female labour market 
participation, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the positive effects of growth, because they 
take effect very slowly and with delay. Gender promoting institutions are necessary, because 
economic growth may promote gender equality only with policy-makers’ intervention. Policies 
that aspire to promote growth must ensure that the needs of women are taken into 
consideration. Creating decent and productive work for women, which adequately 
corresponds to women’s specific needs, seems to be a major challenge in order to prevent 
women from dropping out of the labour market or getting stuck in low paid jobs in the 
informal economy with insufficient legal and social protection and a high degree of insecurity.  
 
That this concerns not only developing countries, but countries of all development stages, 
reveals a closer look at the link between female employment, the presence of children and 
institutional settings in Europe. Chapter 3 addresses the issue of the impact of motherhood 
and family policies on female employment patterns, focussing on the European Union (27). 
The impact of family policies and the presence of children on female labour market 
participation is interesting especially for highly developed countries, because in these 
countries, women often have the same levels of education as men, and according to the 
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“feminisation U” hypothesis, these countries’ high levels of GDP should go hand in hand with 
high female employment rates close to those of men. Yet, a closer look reveals that in many 
industrialised countries, women’s labour market participation is still significantly lower than 
that of men, especially when looking at full-time equivalent employment rates of mothers with 
young children. Furthermore, the analysis shows that allover Europe, women, and especially 
mothers, are highly underrepresented in top management positions, research and politics. In 
Germany for example, 40,6% of the women (under 30) obtain the university qualification 
(“Abitur”) and at university there are as many women as men. But the German female activity 
rate in 2003 is only 66% comparing to the male activity rate of over 80%, and only 11% of the 
CEOs and only 6% of the university professors are women (c.f. WSI, 2005). It becomes clear 
that the struggle to balance family and career results in the fact that even in industrialised 
countries, female employment rates lay significantly below those of men and moreover, that 
continuous employment and secure full-time careers are difficult to achieve for mothers. 
 
The analysis in the last chapter points out that country-specific institutional arrangements, 
like policies that encourage a reconciliation of work and family life, play an important role in 
promoting female labour market participation. In most European countries, it is necessary but 
not sufficient to further develop child-care facilities and all-day schools to promote the 
participation of women in the labour market. A comparative case study for France and 
Germany illustrates that it is essential to create a set of coherent family policy instruments in 
order to avoid that financial assistance to families, especially the taxation mechanism of 
family income, discourages mothers’ employment.  
 
In addition, the analysis shows several avenues of further research. Firstly, it is important to 
integrate more data on the new European member states in the current available data bases, 
as most of the considered studies are for the EU (15) only. Secondly, it would be useful to 
extend the time dimension of the data. The limited available time span of the data leads to 
the fact that most studies focus on cross-section analysis only and do not sufficiently take 
into consideration the evolution of female employment patterns and of family policies within 
the last decades. Hence, time-lagged impacts of family policy reforms on female employment 
can hardly be observed. Further data collection is of prime importance to analyse the impact 
of recent family policy reforms on the evolution of female employment patterns within the 
forthcoming years. This is especially revealed by the case study comparing the impact of 
financial assistance for families on women’s employment patterns in France and Germany, 
as both countries recently have reformed their parental leave system.  
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Finally, considering the three chapters as a whole, it becomes clear that another avenue for 
further research would be an investigation of the link between macro-based evidence and 
individual behaviour. A macro-micro framework would allow statements about the impact of 
different types of family support on specific outcomes of a family’s labour supply decision-
making process. To realise this research, here again further data collection is needed. The 
OECD is currently developing a data base on family outcomes and family policies with 
indicators for all OECD countries. The data base brings together information from different 
OECD databases (for example, the OECD Social Expenditure database, the OECD Benefits 
and Wages database, or the OECD Education database, and databases of other 
international organisations) and categorises information under four broad headings, which 
are family structures, labour market positions of families (i.e. maternal employment by family 
status; employment profiles over the life-course, time for caring…), public policies for families 
and children and child outcomes. Nevertheless, in order to extend the analysis to a large 
time span and non-OECD countries, the OECD data base needs to be completed by other 
data sources.  
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Table 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Klasen (1999) 
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Table 7 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Seguino (2000) 
 
Table 8 
 
  
Female share of the 
labour force (45 to 59 
year old women) 
   
% male labour force in 
white collar sector -0.793 (2.16) 
% female labour force in 
clerial sector (%FCLER) -1,25 (2.16) 
Years of schooling of 
adult wolen (FSCHL) 0.0153 (0.83) 
%FCLER * FSCHL 0.168 (2.25) 
Constant 0.514 (8.59) 
    
adjusted R² 0.18 
N 82 
  
(t-statistics in 
parentheses)   
 
Source: Goldin (1994) 
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Table 9 
 
 
 dependent variable: FSH (female share of the labour force) 
            
LGNP 1.3* 1,38* 1,42* 1,38* 1,50* 
 (0,32) (0,32) (0,33) (0,32) (0,31) 
LGNP²  -16,25*  -17,12*  -17,83*  -17,12*  -18,71* 
 (4,74) (6,47) (4.75) (4,67) (4.58) 
AFRICA  8,77*  7,83*  7,91** 7,82*  8,21* 
 (3,15) (3,12) (3,15) (3,12) (3,02) 
ASIA 4,84 3,88 3,93 3,88  4,18* 
 (3,22) (3,19) (3,22) (3,19) (3,10) 
CARAIB  7,96** 7,91** 7,57** 9,91** 7,29** 
 (3,41) (3,35) (3,38) (3,35) (3,27) 
LATIN -1,43 -1,62 -1,52 -1,62 -0,9 
 (3,17) (3,12) (3,14) (3,12) (3,04) 
MEAST  -10,04*  -10,09*  -10,04*  -10,09*  -10,55* 
 (2,97) (2,92) (2,94) (2,92) (2,85) 
SOUTHA  -9,39*  -9,58*  -9,85*  -9,58**  -9,33* 
 (3,80) (3,73) (3,76) (3,73) (3,64) 
XSOC 17,89* 17,47* 18,58* 17,47* 18,55* 
 (3,52) (3,47) (3,50) (3,47) (3,38) 
DUM85 0,39 0,57 -0,4 0,57 1,21 
 (1,07) (1,11) (1,05) (1,11) (1,09) 
XGP -3,53 -3,18 -2,59 -3,18 -2,63 
 (2,43) (2,40) (2,45) (2,40) (2,34) 
INGP -0,004 0,006 -0,003 0,006 0,001 
 (0,07) (0,07) (0,07) (0,07) (0,07) 
INFLAT 0,003 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,003 
 (0,003) (0,003) (0,003) (0,003) (0,003) 
URB  -0,13*  -0,14*  -0,15*  -0,14*  -0,16* 
 (0,04) (0,04) (0,04) (0,04) (0,04) 
ALA   2,13***    
   (1,17)    
EIA    2,68**   
    (1,24)   
WBA     3,15*  
     (1,19)  
WBA#      1,42* 
      (0,34) 
CONSTANT 83,91 85,01 89,21 84,99 89,55 
       
 (16,36) (16,27) (16,38) (16,10) (15,75) 
R² 0,6 0,61 0,61 0,62 0,64 
Adj R² 0,57 0,58 0,58 0,59 0,61 
N 193 193 193 193 193 
      
number in parentheses are standard errors   
* significant at 99% level of confidence    
** significant at 95% level of confidence    
*** significant at 90% level of confidence    
 
Source: Cagatay and Özler (1995) 
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Tables Chapter 2: 
 
 
 
Abbreviation indices: 
 
FLF:   Female share of the labor force (women aged 15 and older) 
FAR:   Female activity rate (women aged 15 and older) 
RAR:  Ratio female / male activity rates (men and women aged 15 and older) 
lnGDP:  nat. log of GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US$) 
(lnGDP)²:  square of nat. log of GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US$) 
EDU:   Percentage of women of the population aged 15 and over who have successfully 
completed secondary schooling 
FERT:  Total fertility rate 
OECD:   dummy variable for OECD countries 
LA:   dummy variable for Latin America  
EA:   dummy variable for East Asia 
SSA:  dummy variable for Sub-Saharan Africa 
MENA:   dummy variable for Middle East and North Africa 
MUSLM:   dummy variable for countries with Muslim population ≥ 50% 
DV1960s, DV1970s, DV1980s, DV1990s:  time-specific dummy variables for decades 
 
 
 
Table 10: Descriptive 
statistics, unprepared data  
    
variable nb.of observ. 
nb.of 
countries 
time 
period mean std. dev. min max 
FLF 4535 186 
1980-
2004 38.70 8.92 5.05 54.04 
FAR 1372 171 
1960-
2005 42.19 15.68 2.5 93.1 
RAR 1372 171 
1960-
2006 0.56 0.18 0.29 1.08 
lnGDP 5817 184 
1965-
2004 7.48 1.54 4.03 10.88 
EDU 800 120 
1950-
2000 7.54 8.15 0.1 50.8 
FERT 4485 197 
1960-
2004 3.63 1.98 0.84 8.5 
Data sources:  World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2006) 
  ILO Laboursta Data Base (2007) 
  Barro and Lee (2000) 
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Table 11: Descriptive 
statistics,  quinquennial data  
    
variable nb.of observ.  
nb.of 
countries 
time 
period mean  std. dev. min max 
FLF 925 186 
1980-
2004 38.66 8.92 6.36 53.91 
FAR 727 171 
1960-
2005 41.10 17.23 2.6 93.1 
RAR 727 171 
1960-
2006 0.53 0.22 0.029 1.08 
lnGDP 1166 184 
1965-
2004 7.46 1.54 4.03 10.77 
EDU 800 120 
1950-
2000 7.48 8.05 0.1 50.8 
FERT 1395 197 
1960-
2004 4.15 2.0 0.95 8.50 
Source: own calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Levin, Lin and Chu test  
                 for OECD- countries  
     
     
  FLF  FAR  RAR  lnGDP  
         
coefficient  -0.279*** -1.095*** -0.797*** -0.335*** 
 (-7.77) (-37.43) (-11.46) (-4.66) 
          
Nb. of countries 30 14 14 27 
Nb. of time periods  5 5 5 5 
Nb.of observations    108 48 48 96 
     
t statistics in parentheses    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001    
Source: own estimations 
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Table 13: The impact of growth on FLF: model (1)  
      
  
(1) 
Pooled 
OLS  
(2) FE (3) RE (4) IV 
(5) 
System 
GMM 
            
  FLF FLF FLF FLF FLF 
         
Constant 101.3*** 58.77*** 66.40*** 100.5*** 1.166 
  (14.31) (9.82)     (11.34) (13.35)  (0.55) 
         
L.FLF . . . . 0.862*** 
  . . . . (114.49) 
         
lnGDP -16.14*** -9.028*** -8.998*** -15.91*** 0.752 
  (-8.46) (-5.54)  (-5.70)    (-7.98)   (1.41) 
         
(lnGDP)² 0.994*** 0.811*** 0.682*** 
      
0.977*** -0.0139 
  (7.99) (7.28) (6.44)  (7.48)   (-0.41) 
         
F 45.48 53.82 . 38.92 . 
Wald Chi² . . 55.02 . 16101.17 
         
N 786 786 786 732 652 
         
R² 0.1041 . . 0.0965 . 
R² 
adjusted    0.1018 . . 0.0940 . 
R² within . 0.1498  0.1206  . . 
       
t statistics in parentheses    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001    
Source: own estimations
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Table 14:  The impact of growth on FLF:  model (2)
(1) 
Pooled 
OLS
(2) 
Pooled 
OLS (3) FE (4) IV
(5) 
System 
GMM
FLF FLF FLF FLF FLF
Constant 87.87*** 81.85*** 64.90*** 84.48*** 18.87***
-12.74 -8.85 -7.87 -8.77 -6.3
L.FLF . . . . 0.804***
. . . . -71.91
lnGDP -8.557*** -9.649*** -8.843*** -10.42*** -3.111***
(-4.90) (-4.25) (-3.85) (-4.37) (-5.01)
(lnGDP)² 0.395*** 0.566*** 0.742*** 0.621*** 0.223***
-3.49 -3.87 -4.47 -4.02 -5.96
FERT -2.054*** -0.738* -0.643* -0.930* -0.0941
(-9.03) (-2.28) (-2.49) (-2.55) (-1.21)
OECD 2.983*** 1.569 . 0.926 .
-3.57 -1.57 . -0.86 .
LA -4.293*** -4.056*** . -3.013** .
(-5.67) (-4.59) . (-3.15) .
EA 0.321 -0.344 . -1.144 .
-0.19 (-0.17) . (-0.58) .
SSA 5.747*** 4.933*** . 5.235*** .
-7.68 -5.03 . -4.9 .
MENA -6.495*** -5.432*** . -4.936** .
(-6.04) (-3.40) . (-2.81) .
DV1980s -0.703 -1.798* -1.280** -1.53 0.0845
(-1.09) (-2.34) (-2.83) (-1.85) -0.81
DV1990s 0.0305 -0.292 -0.438 0.0488 -0.0297
-0.05 (-0.42) (-1.46) -0.07 (-0.37)
MUSLIM -7.283*** -9.036*** . -8.318*** .
(-10.03) (-9.41) . (-7.99) .
EDU . 0.0376 -0.0392 0.0573 0.00223
. -0.82 (-1.29) -1.22 -0.24
F 82.44 38.64 24.39 29.9 .
Wald Chi² . . . . 16442.8
N 779 450 450 379 366
R² 0.5418 0.5148 . 0.495 .
R² adjusted 0.5352 0.5015 . 0.4785 .
R² within . . 0.304 . .
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Source: own estimations 
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    rate: model (2)
(1) 
Pooled 
OLS
(2) 
Pooled 
OLS (3) FE (4) IV
(5) 
System 
GMM
FAR FAR FAR FAR FAR
Constant 162.2*** 189.5*** 146.7** 191.0*** 181.6***
-8.83 -8.32 -2.88 -8.19 -10.62
L.FAR . . . . 0.586***
. . . . -19.05
lnGDP -25.70*** -33.43*** -18.37 -34.21*** -37.16***
(-5.63) (-5.99) (-1.53) (-6.12) (-9.50)
(lnGDP)² 1.508*** 2.041*** 0.855 2.077*** 2.187***
-5.22 -5.77 -1.16 -6 -9.24
FERT -1.895** -1.953* -2.164* -1.318 -2.541***
(-3.06) (-2.53) (-2.00) (-1.69) (-5.91)
OECD -0.765 0.133 . -1.1 .
(-0.42) -0.06 . (-0.55) .
LA -7.504*** -5.064* . -3.877 .
(-4.21) (-2.46) . (-1.90) .
EA 14.1 14.33 . 11 .
-1.67 -1.7 . -1.38 .
SSA 6.845** 9.560*** . 5.345* .
-3.19 -3.92 . -2.15 .
MENA -9.823** -5.244 . -4.805 .
(-3.28) (-1.01) . (-1.01) .
DV1960s -10.44* -7.876 -15.50** . 0.795
(-2.32) (-1.43) (-2.94) . -0.36
DV1970s -11.81*** -12.00*** -15.24*** -10.73*** -0.796
(-5.39) (-4.81) (-5.09) (-4.76) (-0.59)
D1980s -5.550** -5.184* -8.092*** -4.135* 0.94
(-3.12) (-2.50) (-3.96) (-2.18) -0.94
DV1990s -1.762 -1.494 -3.350* -2.115 0.16
(-1.09) (-0.78) (-2.31) (-1.33) -0.18
MUSLIM -16.77*** -19.87*** . -21.04*** .
(-8.07) (-8.25) . (-7.94) .
EDU . -0.139 0.0566 -0.00288 -0.0373
. (-1.24) -0.42 (-0.03) (-0.55)
F 33.45 20.33 21.45 20.74 .
Wald Chi² . . . . 813.83
N 466 329 329 303 221
R² 0.4903 0.4755 . 0.4826 .
R² adjusted 0.4756 0.4521 . 0.4593 .
R² within . . 0.4273 . .
t statistics in parentheses
Table 15:  The impact of growth on the female activity 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Source: own estimations 
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(1) 
Pooled 
OLS
(2) 
Pooled 
OLS (3) FE (4) IV
(5) 
System 
GMM
FAR FAR FAR FAR FAR
Constant 175.8*** 212.5*** 93.89 204.9*** 165.3***
-8.79 -8.46 -1.34 -7.83 -6.35
L.FAR . . . . 0.449***
. . . . -7.12
lnGDP -28.98*** -39.40*** -6.24 -37.81*** -33.24***
(-5.87) (-6.48) (-0.36) (-6.09) (-5.58)
(lnGDP)² 1.701*** 2.418*** 0.214 2.306*** 1.981***
-5.45 -6.32 -0.2 -6.03 -5.47
FERT -1.990** -2.071* -2.35 -1.256 -1.468*
(-2.84) (-2.33) (-1.63) (-1.39) (-2.19)
OECD -1.029 -0.695 . -1.513 .
(-0.52) (-0.31) . (-0.71) .
LA -6.620*** -3.723 . -3.123 .
(-3.44) (-1.69) . (-1.43) .
EA 12.88 13.02 . 9.986 .
-1.52 -1.56 . -1.26 .
SSA 6.144** 9.540*** . 6.125* .
-2.64 -3.62 . -2.27 .
MENA -10.47** -4.524 . -4.538 .
(-3.26) (-0.88) . (-0.84) .
D1980s -5.418** -5.037* -8.059** -4.192* -0.335
(-2.99) (-2.42) (-3.19) (-2.20) (-0.28)
DV1990s -1.736 -1.422 -3.479* -2.288 -0.303
(-1.07) (-0.76) (-2.20) (-1.46) (-0.36)
MUSLIM -16.30*** -19.72*** . -22.46*** .
(-7.36) (-7.68) . (-8.06) .
EDU . -0.149 -0.105 -0.0322 0.113
. (-1.27) (-0.58) (-0.29) -1.06
F 29.86 19.34 9.17 16.98 .
Wald Chi² . . . . 210.53
N 383 266 266 247 165
R² 0.4696 0.4784 . 0.4655 .
R² adjusted 0.4539 0.4537 . 0.4381 .
R² within . . 0.2446 . .
t statistics in parentheses
Table 16:  The impact of growth on the female activity rate: 
               model (2), without 1960s and 1970s 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Source: own estimations 
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female/male activity rate: model (2)
(1) 
Pooled 
OLS
(2) 
Pooled 
OLS (3) FE (4) IV
(5) 
System 
GMM
RAR RAR RAR RAR RAR
Constant 1.820*** 2.083*** 2.033*** 2.137*** 1.722***
-8.27 -7.7 -3.4 -7.46 -7.6
L.RAR . . . . 0.668***
. . . . -20.66
lnGDP -0.254*** -0.337*** -0.290* -0.359*** -0.342***
(-4.64) (-5.09) (-2.05) (-5.23) (-6.56)
(lnGDP)² 0.0150*** 0.0212*** 0.0156 0.0226*** 0.0203***
-4.34 -5.05 -1.8 -5.32 -6.44
FERT -0.0318*** -0.0286** -0.0242 -0.0230* -0.0331***
(-4.29) (-3.12) (-1.90) (-2.40) (-5.86)
OECD 0.00334 0.0129 . -0.00859 .
-0.15 -0.51 . (-0.35) .
LA -0.120*** -0.0970*** . -0.0821** .
(-5.61) (-3.97) . (-3.28) .
EA 0.111 0.133 . 0.102 .
-1.09 -1.33 . -1.05 .
SSA 0.106*** 0.142*** . 0.104*** .
-4.11 -4.89 . -3.39 .
MENA -0.108** -0.0507 . -0.0441 .
(-3.00) (-0.82) . (-0.76) .
DV1960s -0.213*** -0.205** -0.254*** . -0.014
(-3.95) (-3.13) (-4.11) . (-0.49)
DV1970s -0.195*** -0.202*** -0.236*** -0.179*** -0.00886
(-7.41) (-6.84) (-6.70) (-6.48) (-0.49)
DV1980s -0.104*** -0.105*** -0.128*** -0.0850*** 0.0141
(-4.90) (-4.29) (-5.33) (-3.65) -1.07
DV1990s -0.0404* -0.0427 -0.0555** -0.0416* -0.00155
(-2.09) (-1.88) (-3.26) (-2.12) (-0.14)
MUSLIM -0.230*** -0.270*** . -0.279*** .
(-9.22) (-9.44) . (-8.58) .
EDU . -0.0019 0.0002 -0.00089 -0.00048
. (-1.42) -0.13 (-0.68) (-0.55)
F 46.26 29.28 35.48 28.55 .
Wald Chi² . . . . 1052.55
N 466 329 329 303 221
R² 0.5709 0.5662 . 0.5622 .
R² adjusted 0.5586 0.5469 . 0.5425 .
R² within . . 0.5524 . .
t statistics in parentheses
Table 17:  The impact of growth on the ratio 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Source: own estimations 
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Table 18: The impact of lnGDP on FLF, FAR and RAR  
                 for subgroups of  countries 
       
  FE estimation 
  OECD SSA 
  FLF FAR RAR FLF FAR RAR 
              
Constant 321.4*** 808.3*** 7.711** 34.73*** -190.8 -1.367 
  (3.81) (3.64) (2.78) (5.84) (-0.35) (-0.19) 
           
lnGDP -64.59*** -159.0*** -1.535** 1.145 95.62 0.937 
  (-3.76) (-3.50) (-2.71) (0.56) (0.62) (0.47) 
           
(lnGDP)² 3.722*** 8.316*** 0.0838** -0.104 -8.248 -0.0840 
  (4.20) (3.51) (2.84) (-0.58) (-0.76) (-0.60) 
           
FERT -1.768** -1.474 -0.0137 0.923*** -4.532 -0.0766 
  (-2.81) (-0.84) (-0.62) (4.96) (-0.74) (-0.96) 
           
EDU -0.0592* 0.0719 0.000198 -0.0368 1.838 0.0207 
  (-2.39) (0.63) (0.14) (-0.80) (1.58) (1.38) 
           
DV1960s ; -13.73* -0.207** . . . 
  . (-2.45) (-2.95) . . . 
           
DV1970s . -14.21*** -0.211*** . -9.265 -0.184 
  . (-3.83) (-4.55) . (-0.65) (-0.99) 
           
DV1980s -0.924 -6.378* -0.0973** -0.125 -2.565 -0.0829 
  (-1.22) (-2.58) (-3.15) (-0.43) (-0.21) (-0.52) 
           
DV1990s 0.00668 -1.823 -0.0267 0.0119 -7.456 -0.130 
  (0.01) (-1.01) (-1.18) (0.06) (-1.02) (-1.37) 
           
F  28.45 16.64 28.17 10.95 0.91 1.56 
N 116 118 118 122 45 45 
R² within 0.6728 0.6131  0.7285   0.4275  0.2971 0.4209  
t statistics in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
Source: own estimations
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                  activity rate: model (2)
(1) Pooled OLS (2) FE
FAR_MA FAR_MA
Constant 154.2*** 176.6***
-10.43 -8.49
lnGDP_MA -24.00*** -29.99***
(-6.65) (-5.90)
(lnGDP)²_MA 1.393*** 1.736***
-6.01 -5.33
FERT_MA -0.856 -2.150***
(-1.68) (-4.39)
OECD -0.496 .
(-0.34) .
LA -9.935*** .
(-7.12) .
EA 15.71*** .
-3.42 .
SSA 4.242** .
-2.82 .
MENA -7.331** .
(-2.79) .
DV1960s -13.36*** -8.551***
(-8.19) (-7.56)
DV1970s -9.455*** -6.685***
(-6.50) (-7.45)
DV1980s -5.963*** -4.640***
(-4.43) (-6.83)
DV1990s -1.886 -2.119***
(-1.40) (-3.46)
Muslim -23.06*** .
(-14.92) .
EDU_MA 0.103 0.309***
-1.14 -4.13
F 65.77 84.12
N 890 890
R² 0.5128 .
R² adjusted 0.505 .
R² within . 0.4641
t statistics in parentheses
Table 19 :  Moving average variables: 
                  The  impact of growth on the female  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Source: own estimations
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Table 20: Granger Causality Test from FLF/FAR/RAR to 
                lnGDP with bigger lags 
    
  
(1) Pooled 
OLS 
(2) Pooled 
OLS 
(3) Pooled 
OLS 
  FLF FAR RAR 
       
Constant 6.294 23.30 0.291 
 (0.93) (0.88) (0.96) 
       
L3.FLF 1.720*** . . 
 (10.52) . . 
       
L4.FLF -0.899*** . . 
 (-5.67) . . 
       
L3.FAR . 0.733*** . 
 . (6.47) . 
      
L4.FAR . -0.0269 . 
 . (-0.23) . 
       
L3.RAR . . 0.835*** 
 . . (7.30) 
       
L4.RAR . . -0.0910 
 . . (-0.78) 
       
L3.lnGDP -19.50** -51.19 -0.799* 
 (-2.88) (-1.51) (-2.03) 
      
L4.lnGDP 19.47** 49.02 0.766* 
 (2.95) (1.51) (2.03) 
      
L3.(lnGDP)² 1.329** 2.120 0.0390 
 (2.96) (1.04) (1.65) 
      
L4.(lnGDP)² -1.299** -1.907 -0.0356 
 (-2.98) (-0.97) (-1.56) 
        
       
F 185.48 47.78  70.83 
       
N 134 133 133 
       
R² 0.8976 0.6947 0.7713 
R² adjusted  0.8927 0.6801 0.7604 
    
t statistics in parentheses   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001   
Source: own estimations 
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Table 21: Granger Causality Test from lnGDP to   
                 FLF/FAR/RAR with bigger lags  
    
  
(1) Pooled 
OLS 
(2) Pooled 
OLS 
(3) Pooled 
OLS 
  lnGDP lnGDP lnGDP 
       
Constant 0.985 -0.407 -0.466 
 (1.09) (-0.43) (-0.50) 
       
L3.FLF 0.0138 . . 
 (0.63) . . 
       
L4.FLF -0.0243 . . 
 (-1.15) . . 
       
L3.FAR . 0.00116 . 
 . (0.35) . 
      
L4.FAR . 0.00186 . 
 . (0.57) . 
       
L3.RAR . . 0.0842 
 . . (0.29) 
       
L4.RAR . . 0.200 
 . . (0.68) 
       
L3.lnGDP 0.605 1.401 1.485 
 (0.67) (1.34) (1.42) 
      
L4.lnGDP 0.232 -0.295 -0.365 
 (0.26) (-0.29) (-0.36) 
      
L3.(lnGDP)² 0.0630 0.00973 0.00408 
 (1.06) (0.15) (0.06) 
      
L4.(lnGDP)² -0.0499 -0.0154 -0.0109 
 (-0.86) (-0.25) (-0.17) 
        
       
F 490.44 508.19  511.69 
        
N 134 139 139 
       
R² 0.9586 0.9585 0.9588 
R² adjusted  0.9567 0.9566 0.9569 
    
t statistics in parentheses   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Source: own estimations 
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Tables Chapter 3: 
 
 
Table 22:  Employment rates of women and men (aged 25-49), depending  
                  on whether they have children (under 12) - 2006  
 
 women men difference 
 
without 
children 
with      
children 
without 
children 
with      
children women men 
Germany 80,3 62,7 80,6 91,4 -17,6 10,8 
Austria 83,6 68,5 87,7 92,9 -15,1 5,2 
Belgium 75,5 69,3 81,7 92,2 -6,2 10,5 
Spain 75,5 58,8 84,3 93,2 -16,7 8,9 
Finland 78,9 70,6 79,5 92,7 -8,3 13,2 
France 73,7 65,9 76,6 91,1 -7,8 14,5 
Greece 64,1 57,0 82,5 96,8 -7,1 14,3 
Italy 66,7 54,6 80,7 93,8 -12,1 13,1 
Luxembourg 80,2 65,0 90,3 95,7 -15,2 5,4 
Netherlands 83,8 72,7 87,9 94,5 -11,1 6,6 
Portugal 77,3 76,4 82,7 94,2 -0,9 11,5 
UK 82,9 63,1 84,1 91,9 -19,8 7,8 
Cyprus 82,1 70,8 87,8 95,7 -11,3 7,9 
Estonia 82,7 66,7 86,9 92,4 -16,0 5,5 
Hungary 76,1 49,8 79,1 86,1 -26,3 7,0 
Latvia 82,1 68,4 80,9 91,2 -13,7 10,3 
Lithuania 81,5 77,2 78,9 89,7 -4,3 10,8 
Malta 68,7 32,6 88,6 94,0 -36,1 5,4 
Poland 69,9 60,8 71,5 88,0 -9,1 16,5 
Czech Rep. 83,2 53,4 87,1 93,9 -29,8 6,8 
Slovakia 79,0 54,2 79,5 88,2 -24,8 8,7 
Slovenia 77,1 84,8 82,7 95,3 7,7 12,6 
Bulgaria 74,7 61,5 76,6 81,2 -13,2 4,6 
Romania 70,7 66,3 76,9 85,4 -4,4 8,5 
EU-24 77,1 63,8 82,3 91,7 -13,3 9,4 
EU-27 76,0 62,4 80,8 91,4 -13,6 10,6 
       
Source: European Labour Force Survey (2006)     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
221 
 
Table 23: Part-time employment rates for women and men aged 20 to 49  
                 with regard to the presence of children, 2003 
 
 women men difference 
 
without 
children 
with      
children 
without 
children 
with      
children women men 
Germany 21,3 35,1 4,3 3,0 13,8 -1,3 
Austria 16,8 32,3 2,3 1,5 15,5 -0,8 
Belgium 21,8 27,2 4,2 4,3 5,4 0,1 
Spain 8,7 9,7 1,4 0,9 1,0 -0,5 
Finland 10,2 7,8 5,0 2,4 -2,4 -2,6 
France 14,1 17,6 3,3 2,5 3,5 -0,8 
Greece 4,9 6,7 2,1 2,4 1,8 0,3 
Italy 12,3 15,2 3,3 3,3 2,9 0,0 
Luxembourg 15,5 26,1 _ 1,6 10,6 _ 
Netherlands 33,0 54,7 7,8 4,2 21,7 -3,6 
Portugal 7,7 7,2 2,0 1,0 -0,5 -1,0 
UK 18,5 36,2 3,4 3,3 17,7 -0,1 
Cyprus 8,8 8,3 -2,2 1,5 -0,5 3,7 
Estonia 4,5 4,9 4,0 1,8 0,4 -2,2 
Hungary 2,3 3,7 1,2 0,9 1,4 -0,3 
Latvia 5,1 7,6 3,1 3,5 2,5 0,4 
Lithuania 9,9 12,7 4,2 4,7 2,8 0,5 
Malta 8,6 8,4 _ _ -0,2 _ 
Poland 8,6 10,1 3,0 2,3 1,5 -0,7 
Czech Rep. 2,4 3,9 0,6 0,5 1,5 -0,1 
Slovakia 2,0 1,6 -0,8 _ -0,4 _ 
Slovenia 2,6 1,8 1,7 0,8 -0,8 -0,9 
EU-22 10,9 15,4 2,7 2,3 4,5 -0,5 
       
Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey (2003)     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 24 in chapter 3, page 139 
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Table 25:  Gender pay gap, educational attainment, gender segregation, distribution of  
                  managers, 1995, 2006, 2007 
 
 Gender Pay Gap
1 Educational attainment2 (2006) Gender segregation3 (2006) Distribution of Managers4 (2006) 
 1995 2007 Variation Women  Men  Diff. Women - Men in occupations in sectors Women Men Diff. Women - Men 
Austria 22 20 -2,0 86,7 84,9 -1,8 25,9 19,3 28,7 71,3 -42,6 
Belgium 12 7(p) -5,0 85,6 79,1 -6,5 26,1 18,3 31,3 68,7 -37,4 
Bulgaria : 14 : 81,1 80,0 -1,1 28,7 19,6 30,5 69,5 -39,0 
Cyprus 29 24(p) -5,0 90,7 76,1 -14,6 29,3 19,6 16,1 83,9 -67,8 
Czech Rep.   : 18 : 92,4 91,1 -1,3 18,9 19,1 29,2 70,8 -41,6 
Denmark 15 17 2,0 81,5 73,4 -8,1 27,8 19,4 24,3 75,7 -51,4 
Estonia 27 : : 89,8 74,1 -15,7 31,6 24,3 33,4 66,6 -33,2 
Finland : 20 : 87,0 82,3 -4,7 29,0 22,7 29,5 70,5 -41,0 
France 13 11(p) -2,0 84,3 80,0 -4,3 26,6 18,1 38,5 61,5 -23,0 
Germany 21 22 1,0 73,5 69,8 -3,7 26,5 18,2 27,4 72,6 -45,2 
Greece 17 10 -7,0 86,6 75,5 -11,1 22,4 15,9 26,8 73,2 -46,4 
Hungary 22 11 -11,0 84,7 81,2 -3,5 28,8 19,9 37,1 62,9 -25,8 
Ireland 20 9 -11,0 89,1 81,8 -7,3 26,8 22,7 30,2 69,8 -39,6 
Italy 8 : : 79,4 71,7 -7,7 23,7 17,8 32,9 67,1 -34,2 
Latvia : 16 : 86,2 75,9 -10,3 29,4 23,8 40,6 59,4 -18,8 
Lithuania 27 16 -11,0 91,2 85,3 -5,9 29,4 23,1 40,7 59,3 -18,6 
Luxembourg 19 14 -5,0 74,5 64,0 -10,5 26,4 18,3 25,9 74,1 -48,2 
Malta : 3 : 52,8 48,1 -4,7 24,7 16,5 18,6 81,4 -62,8 
Netherlands 23 : : 79,6 69,9 -9,7 25,6 18,0 27,0 73,0 -46,0 
Poland : 12 : 93,8 89,6 -4,2 25,5 19,4 35,2 64,8 -29,6 
Portugal 5 8(p) 3,0 58,6 40,8 -17,8 26,5 20,4 33,1 66,9 -33,8 
Romania 21 10 -11,0 77,8 76,6 -1,2 22,8 15,5 31,1 68,9 -37,8 
Slovakia : 22 : 91,7 91,2 -0,5 29,9 22,8 27,7 72,3 -44,6 
Slovenia 14 8(p) -6,0 91,4 87,7 -3,7 26,8 17,8 33,4 66,6 -33,2 
Spain 13 13 0,0 69,0 54,6 -14,4 27,1 20,4 31,8 68,2 -36,4 
Sweden 15 16 1,0 88,6 84,5 -4,1 26,8 21,6 31,8 68,2 -36,4 
UK 26 21 -5,0 80,3 77,3 -3 25,6 18,6 34,8 65,2 -30,4 
EU (27) 17(s) 15(s) -2,0 80,7 74,8 -5,9 26,6 19,7 32,6 67,4 -34,8 
EU (25) 17(s) 15(s) -2,0 82,2 75,1 -7,1 26,6 19,7 30,8 69,2 -38,4 
EU (15) 17(s) : : 79,9 73,0 -6,9 26,6 19,7 31,7 68,3 -36,7 
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12 NMS  23,3 14,2 -9,2 81,1 74,6 -6,5 26,4 19,5 31,7 68,3 -36,5 
 
:=Not available s=Eurostat estimate p=Provisional value          
Sources: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey (LFS)         
            
1 Gender pay gap (in unadjusted form) is given as the difference between average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees and of female paid employees as a percentage of average gross hourly 
earnings of male paid employees. The population consists of all paid employees aged 16-64 that are 'at work 15+ hours per week'.* Germany includes ex-GDR from 1991. 
2 Educational attainment (at least upper secondary school) of women and men aged 20-24. Students living abroad for one year or more and conscripts on compulsory military service are not covered by 
the EU Labour Force Survey, which may imply lower rates than those available at national level. This is especially relevant for the CY.   
3 Gender segregation in occupations is calculated as the average national share of employment for women and men applied to each occupation; differences are added up to produce the total amount of 
gender imbalance expessed as a proportion of total employment (ISCO classification). Gender segregation in sectors is calculated as the average national share of employment for women and men 
applied to each sector; differences are added up to produce the total amount of gender imbalance expressed as a proportion of total employment (NACE classification).  
4 Managers are persons classified in ISCO 12 and 13. 
 
Table 26: Classic instruments of financial assistance to families  
                 in Germany and France, 2007 
 
 Germany France 
lump-sum benefits  lump-sump child benefit      (Kindergeld) 
lump-sump child benefit    
(allocation familiale)   
  1 child:  154€ / month 1 child:  - 
  2 children: 308€ / month 2 children: 119,14€ / month  
  3 children: 462€ / month 3 children: 271,75€ / month 
  4 children: 641€ / month 4 children: 424,38€ / month 
  5 children: 820€ / month 5 children: 577,01€ / month 
  6 children: 999€ / month 6 children: 729,64€ / month 
  supplement per child:             179€ / month 
supplement per child:            
152,63€ / month 
  or:  and: 
  tax allowance for children (Kinderfreibetrag) 
cash supplement 
  3648€ / year / child                 for married couples 
child older than 11 years :      
33,51€ / month                        
  1824€ / year /child                  for sole parents 
child older than 16 years :      
59,57€ / month 
  
tax allowance for children 
related expenses 
(Betreuungsfreibetrag) 
only two children:                     
no supplement for the  older 
one 
  2160€ / year / child                 for married couples   
  1080€ / year /child                  for sole parents   
premium for low-
income households  
child premium     
(Kinderzuschlag)                   
child premium                
(complément familial) 
conditional on an         
income ceiling for children under 25 years  
for families with at least          
3 children all aged between     
3 and 21 years  
  max. 140€ / child / month       for max. 36 months 
155,05€ month /              
1860,60€ year 
 
Data Germany: January 2007; data France: Mai 2007,  
Sources: BMFSFJ (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend) 2007, CNAF (Caisse nationale d’allocations 
familiales) 2007, MISSOC (Mutual Information System on Social Protection) 2006.  
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Table 27:  Parental leave benefit in Germany and France, 2007 
 
Germany France 
Parental leave benefit               
(Elterngeld) 
Parental leave benefit                
(Prestation d'accueil du jeune enfant: 
PAJE) 
without income ceiling conditional on an income ceiling 
  1. premium allocated at birth or adoption 
  855,25 € in the 7th month of pregnancy  
  1710,49 € in case of an adoption             of a child under 20 years  
  2. baseline benefit 
  171,06€ / month / family                 
  3. supplement for free activity choice (complément du libre choix d'activité) 
complete work cessation:                   
67% net wage substitution                         
max. 1800€  / month                               
min. 300€ / month  
complete work cessation:               
530,72€ / month                                        
without baseline benefit                             
359,67€ / months                                       
with baseline benefit          
part-time work:                                    
max. 30 hours / week:                                
67% of the difference between                  
the previous full-time earnings              
and the current part-time salary  
part-time work, max. 50%:                         
403,52€ / month                                
without baseline benefit                    
232,52€ / month                                 
with baseline benefit  
  
part-time work, 50 - 80%:                          
305,17€ / month                                        
without baseline benefit                 
134,13€ / month                                 
with baseline benefit  
 
Data Germany: January 2007; data France: Mai 2007,  
Sources: BMFSFJ (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend) 2007, CNAF (Caisse nationale d’allocations 
familiales) 2007, MISSOC (Mutual Information System on Social Protection) 2006.  
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Table 28: Financial assistance reducing the cost of child care  
                 in Germany and France, 2007 
 
Germany France 
tax deductibility of child care costs       
(Absetzbarkeit Kinderbetreuungskosten) 
supplement for free choice of 
childcare (complément du libre choix du 
mode de garde : 4th element of PAJE)      
limited deduction                                
without income ceiling conditional on an income ceiling  
tax reduction for lone working parents 
and working couples  childminder or nanny cost coverage  
reduction of tax duties                               
by two thirds of child care costs                 
max. 4000€                                              
per year and per child (0-14 years) 
max. 374,75€                                            
per month and per child (0-6 years)           
depending on household's income and 
age of child                                                
+ coverage of social security 
contributions  
or:                                                              or:                                                             
tax allowance for lone non-working 
parents or couples where only one 
partner is employed                            
cost coverage of an association or a 
company which employs child minders 
or nannies 
tax allowance                                             
by two-thirds of child care costs                 
max. 4000€                                                
per year and per child (3-6 years)  
max. 776,25€                                        
per months and per child (0-6 years) 
depening on hh's income and age and 
number of children  
 
Data Germany: January 2007; data France: Mai 2007,  
Source: BMFSFJ (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend) 2007, CNAF (Caisse nationale d’allocations 
familiales) 2007, MISSOC (Mutual Information System on Social Protection) 2006.  
 
 
 
 
Table 29 in chapter 3, page 170 
Table 30 in chapter 3, page 175 
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Résumé 
This thesis shows that women’s labour market participation, macroeconomic growth and family 
policies are closely linked to each other. Whereas there exists clear theoretical and empirical evidence 
that female labour market participation unambiguously promotes GDP growth, the inverse impact of 
GDP growth on female labour market participation is not as clear in the existing literature. While some 
economists assume a strictly positive impact of growth on female labour market participation, recent 
studies suggest that growth decreases female labour market participation at early stages of economic 
development and increases it at later stages only. The convex impact, also known as “feminisation U” 
hypothesis, has not yet been proven empirically, as existing time series and cross country studies do 
not offer precise results so far. I test the “feminisation U” hypothesis based on panel data that spans 
over 180 countries and over 40 years, which allows to adequately take into account endogeneity 
problems. The analysis confirms the “feminisation U” hypothesis and makes clear that simply relying 
on macroeconomic growth is not suffiecient to promote female labour market participation. Equalising 
institutions that explicitly promote women’s, and especially mothers’ labour market participation are 
necessary not only in developing but also in industrialised countries. Yet, the analysis shows further  
that in most European countries, the redistributive character of several family policy instruments risks 
discouraging mothers’ labour supply. Hence, it is essential to create a set of coherent family policy 
instruments that manage to simultaneously prevent families from income poverty while encouraging 
women’s employment and fertiliy at the same time. 
Die vorliegende Dissertation zeigt, dass die Arbeitsmarktbeteiligung von Frauen, makroökonomisches 
Wachstum und familienpolitische Instrumente in enger Verbindung miteinander stehen. Während 
sowohl theoretisch als auch empirisch eindeutig bewiesen ist dass die Arbeitsmarktbeteiligung von 
Frauen eindeutig das Wachstum des Bruttoinlandprodukts fördert, gibt es bis heute keine klare 
Antwort auf die Frage nach der umgekehrten Wirkung von ökonomischem Wachstum auf die 
Arbeitsmarktbeteiligung von Frauen.  Einige Ökonomen gehen von einem rein positiven Einfluss aus, 
allerdings legen jüngste empirische Arbeiten eher nahe, dass ökonomisches Wachstum die 
Arbeitsmarktbeteiligung von Frauen erst senkt und erst ab einem höheren Einkommensniveau erhöht. 
Dieser konvexe Einfluss, auch bekannt als die „feminisation U“ -  Hypothese, konnte von bisherigen 
Zeitreihen- und Querschnittsstudien noch nicht eindeutig empirisch bewiesen werden. Ich teste diese 
Hypothese empirisch mit Makro - Paneldaten, die sich über 180 Länder und 40 Jahre erstrecken. 
Diese Datenstruktur ermöglicht es, auf Endogenitätsprobleme adäquat einzugehen. Meine Analyse 
bestätigt die „feminisation U“ – Hypothese und zeigt auf, dass ein Vertrauen auf die Kräfte 
makroökonomischen Wachstums nicht ausreichend ist, um die Arbeitsmarktbeteiligung von Frauen zu 
erhöhen. Gleichstellungsfördernde Institutionen, die die Arbeitsmarktbeteiligung von Frauen, und 
insbesondere von Müttern, explizit fördern, sind nicht nur in Entwicklungs- sondern auch in 
Industrieländern von Nöten. Allerdings zeigt die vorliegende Analyse, dass in vielen europäischen 
Ländern der redistributive Charakter vieler familienpolitischer Instrumente das Arbeitsangebot von 
Müttern negativ beeinträchtigt. Es scheint daher angebracht, den Mix der familienpolitischen 
Instrumente kohärenter zu gestalten, damit gleichzeitig Familienarmut bekämpft und die 
Arbeitsmarktbeteiligung von Frauen sowie auch die Geburtenraten in Europa erhöht werden können.   
Cette thèse recherche le lien entre l’emploi des femmes et la croissance macroéconomique en 
prenant en compte les effets des politiques familiales. Tandis que plusieurs modèles théoriques et 
analyses empiriques montrent un impact strictement positif de l’emploi des femmes sur la croissance 
macroéconomique, l’impact inverse de la croissance sur l’emploi des femmes n’est pas si clair. 
Quelques economistes suggèrent un impact strictement positif, mais des études empiriques recentes 
estiment que la croissance du PIB baisse d’abord l’emploi des femmes et l’augmente seulement à mi 
et long terme à partir d’un certain niveau de développement économique. Cet impact convexe 
(« feminisation U » hypothesis) n’est pas encore prouvé par des études empiriques, car les études 
existantes se basent seulement sur des donnés de séries temporelles ou de séries transversales et 
n’apportent pas des résultats explicites. Je propose donc une propre analyse empirique de l’impact de 
la croissance macroéconomique sur l’emploi des femmes, basée sur des données de panel, qui 
contiennent des observations de plus de 180 pays et de plus de 40 ans. La structure de la base de 
données me permet de prendre en compte des problèmes d’endogeneité. Mon analyse confirme un 
impact convex de la croissance macroéconomique sur l’emploi des femmes. Ce résultat montre que 
pour promouvoir l’emploi des femmes, on ne peut pas toujous compter sur la croissance. Des 
institutions promouvant l’égalité hommes-femmes sont nécessaires pour encourager l’emploi des 
femmes, et surtout l’emploi des mères, non seulement dans les pays en developpement mais aussi 
dans les pays industrialisés. Pourtant, dans de nombreux pays européens, le caractère redistributif de 
plusieurs instruments de la politique familiale risque de decourager l’offre d’emploi des mères. Par 
conséquent, il apparait essentiel de créer un set coherent d’instruments de politique familiale pour en 
même temps prévenir les familles de la pauvreté et encourager l’emploi des mères et la fécondité.
 228
 
